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Abstract
In the modern world, making informed decisions requires obtaining and aggregating relevant
information about events of interest. For many political, business, and entertainment events,
the information of interest only exists as opinions, beliefs, and judgments of dispersed indi-
viduals, and we can only get a complete picture by putting the separate pieces of information
together. Thus, an important ﬁrst step towards decision making is motivating the individ-
uals to reveal their private information and coalescing the separate pieces of information
together.
In this dissertation, I study three information elicitation and aggregation methods, pre-
diction markets, peer prediction mechanisms, and adaptive polling,u s i n gb o t ht h e o r e t i c a l
and applied approaches. These methods mainly di↵er by their assumptions on the partici-
pants’ behavior, namely whether the participants possess noisy or perfect information and
whether they strategically decide on what information to reveal. The ﬁrst two methods,
prediction markets and peer prediction mechanisms, assume that the participants are strate-
gic and have perfect information. Their primary goal is to use carefully designed monetary
rewards to incentivize the participants to truthfully reveal their private information. As a
result, my studies of these methods focus on understanding to what extent are these methods
incentive compatible in theory and in practice. The last method, adaptive polling, assumes
that the participants are not strategic and have noisy information. In this case, our goal is to
accurately and e ciently estimate the latent ground truth given the noisy information, and
we aim to evaluate whether this goal can be achieved by using this method experimentally.
iiiI make four main contributions in this dissertation. First, I theoretically analyze how the
participants’ knowledge of one another’s private information a↵ects their strategic behavior
when trading in a prediction market with a ﬁnite number of participants. Each participant
may trade multiple times in the market, and hence may have an incentive to withhold
or misreport his information in order to mislead other participants and capitalize on their
mistakes. When the participants’ private information is unconditionally independent, we
show that the participants reveal their information as late as possible at any equilibrium,
which is arguably the worse outcome for the purpose of information aggregation. We also
provide insights on the equilibria of such prediction markets when the participants’ private
information is both conditionally and unconditionally dependent given the outcome of the
event.
Second, I theoretically analyze the participants’ strategic behavior in a prediction market
when a participant has outside incentives to manipulate the market probability. The presence
of such outside incentives would seem to damage the information aggregation in the market.
Surprisingly, when the existence of such incentives is certain and common knowledge, we
show that there exist separating equilibria where all the participants’ private information
is revealed and fully aggregated into the market probability. Although there also exist
pooling equilibria with information loss, we prove that certain separating equilibria are more
desirable than many pooling equilibria because the separating equilibria satisfy domination
based belief reﬁnements, maximize the social welfare of the setting, or maximize either
participant’s total expected payo↵. When the existence of the outside incentives is uncertain,
trust cannot be established and the separating equilibria no longer exist.
Third, I experimentally investigate participants’ behavior towards the peer prediction
mechanisms, which were proposed to elicit information without observable ground truth.
While peer prediction mechanisms promise to elicit truthful information by rewarding partic-
ipants with carefully constructed payments, they also admit uninformative equilibria where
coordinating participants provide no useful information. We conduct the ﬁrst controlled
ivonline experiment of the Jurca and Faltings peer prediction mechanism, engaging the par-
ticipants in a multiplayer, real-time and repeated game. Using a hidden Markov model to
capture players’ strategies from their actions, our results show that participants successfully
coordinate on uninformative equilibria and the truthful equilibrium is not focal, even when
some uninformative equilibria do not exist or result in lower payo↵s. In contrast, most players
are consistently truthful in the absence of peer prediction, suggesting that these mechanisms
may be harmful when truthful reporting has similar cost to strategic behavior.
Finally, I design and experimentally evaluate an adaptive polling method for aggregating
small pieces of imprecise information together to produce an accurate estimate of a latent
ground truth. In designing this method, we make two main contributions: (1) Our method
aggregates the participants’ noisy information by using a theoretical model to account for the
noise in the participants’ contributed information. (2) Our method uses an active learning
inspired approach to adaptively choose the query for each participant. We apply this method
to the problem of ranking a set of alternatives, each of which is characterized by a latent
strength parameter. At each step, adaptive polling collects the result of a pairwise compar-
ison, estimates the strength parameters from the pairwise comparison data, and adaptively
chooses the next pairwise comparison question to maximize expected information gain. Our
MTurk experiment shows that our adaptive polling method can e↵ectively incorporate noisy
information and improve the estimate accuracy over time. Compared to a baseline method,
which chooses a random pairwise comparison question at each step, our adaptive method
can generate more accurate estimates with less cost.
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Introduction
To make informed decisions in the modern world, it is crucial to obtain and aggregate
relevant information about some uncertain events of interest. For instance, depending on
the forecasted release dates of their products, companies such as Google and HP may want
to adjust their research and development strategies. Businesses such as Yelp and Angie’s list
care about soliciting accurate and honest reviews of restaurants, service companies and health
care professionals. Individuals speculate about and bet on the rankings of sports teams in
competitions and the rankings of horses in horse races. In such domains, the information
of interest only exists as opinions, beliefs, and judgements of dispersed individuals. Each
individual only possesses a small piece of the whole information puzzle, and we can only
get a complete picture by putting the separate pieces of information together. Therefore,
motivating the individuals to reveal their private information and coalescing the separate
pieces of information together is an important ﬁrst step towards decision making.
Information Elicitation: There are three main challenges associated with the task of
eliciting useful information from individuals. First, for individuals who have useful infor-
mation, it is costly for them to reveal it, yet this action only beneﬁts others. Thus, it is
imperative to reward the participants for revealing their information. Many websites o↵er
explicit rewards for the participants’ contributions. These rewards may or may not be mon-
1etary. Iowa Electronic Markets, a famous example of prediction markets, provide monetary
rewards for participants who have accurate information for forecasting future events. On
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, requesters o↵er monetary rewards to the workers for completing
many di↵erent kinds of tasks, such as labeling images, providing opinions, transcribing au-
dios. On platforms such as StackOverﬂow, Yahoo Answers, Reddit, and Yelp, participants
can earn non-monetary rewards such as badges and ratings for their contributions. These
rewards make it rational for participants to contribute their opinions and information rather
than not.
Moreover, although explicit rewards make participating and contributing rational, they
do not necessarily incentivize the individuals to contribute their information truthfully, es-
pecially when the individuals strategically decide on what to contribute. In many scenarios,
instead of truthfully revealing his information, a participant may be tempted to withhold
information or reveal false information. For example, a prediction market participant may
reveal false information inside the market in order to gain external rewards. When par-
ticipating on Yelp or Amazon, a participant may want to be nice and not leave negative
reviews, or he may be paid to leave a positive or negative review for a certain company. On
crowdsourcing markets such as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, a participant is typically o↵ered
a constant monetary reward for completing a task. In this case, the participant may choose
to make a contribution requiring the least e↵ort rather than contributing his true opinion or
information. Thus, the second challenge is to motivate the participants to truthfully reveal
his information rather than strategically withhold or misreport their information.
Finally, for incentivizing truthful contributions, the designer assumes that the partici-
pants already have the desired information. In reality, however, participants need to invest
costly e↵ort to obtain the desired information, and the quality of the participants’ informa-
tion depends on the amount of e↵ort invested. Thus, the third challenge is to motivate the
participants to invest costly e↵ort in order to acquire accurate and high quality information.
In this dissertation, I study several information elicitation methods, which o↵er explicit
2rewards for the participants’ contributions. I focus on studying how the reward schemes of
these methods address the ﬁrst two challenges of incentivizing the participants to participate
and to contribute truthful information. I do not study whether they can address the third
challenge of motivating the participants to invest costly e↵ort to acquire information. More
speciﬁcally, I characterize the participants’ behavior towards these methods in theory and in
practice and analyze the e↵ect of these behavior on the quality of the elicited information.
Information Aggregation: Once the participants’ reports are collected, we may want
to aggregate these reports together to produce a single quantity for decision making, e.g. a
probability estimate of an uncertain event. Given a set of reports, some common methods for
aggregating the reports include statistical methods, voting, and probabilistic inference. The
aggregation and elicitation processes can be separate, but they may also be combined into
a single mechanism. For example, in a prediction market, each participant is motivated to
infer information from other participants’ reports and incorporate these inferred information
into his own report, e↵ectively performing the aggregation for the mechanism.
For a given set of reports, di↵erent aggregation methods may produce estimates of dif-
ferent accuracies. Choosing the best aggregation method critically depends on how the
participants’ information relates to the ground truth we are estimating. With little knowl-
edge of how participants formed their reports, simple methods such as averaging or majority
voting can be suitable for a wide range of settings. However, if we can better capture the
participants’ private information using theoretical models, then we may be able to develop
more sophisticated aggregation methods to produce more accurate estimates. In this dis-
sertation, I propose an adaptive polling method, which uses a particular statistical model
to capture the noise in the participants’ reports, and demonstrate that this method can
e↵ectively aggregate the participants’ reports to produce an accurate estimate of the latent
ground truth.
31.1 High Level Introduction to Three Methods
In this dissertation, I study three methods: prediction markets, peer prediction mechanisms,
and adaptive polling.I nt h i ss e c t i o n ,Ig i v eah i g hl e v e li n t r o d u c t i o nt ot h e s em e t h o d sa n d
describe the research questions that I address for these methods.
1.1.1 Prediction Markets
An important task for decision making is to generate accurate forecasts of uncertain events.
Some examples of such events are weather, elections, product sales, and Oscar winner. Pre-
diction markets are designed to elicit probabilistic estimates from participants and aggregate
these probabilities together to forecast uncertain events, whose realized outcomes will be
observed in the future. Participants of a prediction market can reveal their private informa-
tion through trading contracts, and the market rewards the participants by evaluating their
probabilistic estimates against the observable ground truth. At any time, the current market
price/probability can be interpreted as a consensus probabilistic forecast for the future event
given all the information that has been revealed to the market so far.
Substantial empirical research has demonstrated that prediction markets produce re-
markably accurate forecasts in practice [Berg et al., 2001, Camerer, 1998, Chen and Plott,
2002, Debnath et al., 2003, Forsythe et al., 1992, 1999, Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004]. Yet,
existing theory on prediction markets fails to explain its empirical success, especially how
and why information gets aggregated in the market. Ideally, prediction markets should be
designed to be incentive compatible such that every participant reveals his private informa-
tion truthfully at his ﬁrst opportunity to trade in the market. Unfortunately, prediction
market mechanisms are not incentive compatible in general. Thus, whether the market can
elicit and aggregate accurate information depends on how the strategic participants behave
in response to the monetary rewards provided by the mechanism. Speciﬁcally, when a par-
ticipant has multiple opportunities to trade in the market, or when he receives payo↵s from
4outside of the market contingent on his trade in the market, the participant may have in-
centives to withhold or misreport his private information when trading the market in order
to mislead other participants and maximize his total expected payo↵. If such manipulations
occur, it would be questionable whether all the participants’ information will be revealed
and incorporated into the market probability.
In this dissertation, I focus on studying market scoring rules proposed by Hanson [2007a],
which is one of the most popular automated market maker mechanisms for prediction mar-
kets. Market scoring rules achieves a weaker property than incentive compatibility: if all
participants are rational and self-interested economic agents, then any myopic participant
is incentivized to truthfully reveal his private information when trading in a market scoring
rule prediction market. A myopic participant is not forward looking and decides on what to
report for the current trade based on his expected reward from the current trade only.
My main goal in studying market scoring rules is to understand the behavior of non-
myopic participants and the e↵ects of these participants’ behavior on the accuracy of the
collected and aggregated information. Speciﬁcally I tackle the following research questions:
• In theory, how do non-myopic participants behave at game-theoretic equilibria of mar-
ket scoring rules?
• How does the equilibrium behavior of non-myopic participants a↵ect the accuracy of
the elicited and aggregated probabilistic estimates for uncertain events?
1.1.2 Peer Prediction Mechanisms
For many events of interest, the outcome of the events are neither observable nor veriﬁable,
so we cannot evaluate the participants’ reports against an observable ground truth. For ex-
ample, the outcome of the event may be subjective (e.g. the quality of a book), not publicly
observed (e.g. the breakdown frequency of a product, which is only known by the manufac-
ture), or not veriﬁable (e.g. the extinction of the human race). Peer prediction mechanisms
5are designed to elicit probabilistic estimates from participants about such events without ob-
servable ground truth. Peer prediction mechanisms use carefully designed monetary rewards
to induce the participants to reveal their private information truthfully. Assuming that the
participants are rational and self-interested economic agents, peer prediction mechanisms
have the following desirable theoretical property: a participant maximizes his expected re-
ward by reporting truthfully if he believes that all other participants are also truthful. In
other words, peer prediction mechanisms induce truth telling in equilibrium.
Despite the desirable property of peer prediction mechanisms, there is little theoretical
guarantee that the participants will adhere to truth telling in practice. First of all, many
peer prediction mechanisms have other uninformative equilibria where no useful information
is revealed, and the theory has no prediction on which equilibrium will be played in practice.
Moreover, there is a lack of understanding of the practical performance of peer prediction
mechanisms since most of them have not been evaluated in a practical setting.
My main goal in studying peer prediction mechanisms is to understand the behavior of
the participants towards peer prediction mechanisms in practice. Speciﬁcally I tackle the
following research questions:
• In practice, how do the participants behave towards peer prediction mechanisms?
• How do the participants’ behavior towards peer prediction mechanisms a↵ect the ac-
curacy of the elicited probabilistic estimates for uncertain events?
1.1.3 Adaptive polling
Adaptive polling aims to aggregate small pieces of imprecise information together in order
to produce an accurate estimate of a latent ground truth. In designing this method, we
make very di↵erent assumptions about the participants compared to the assumptions of
prediction market and peer prediction mechanisms. First, we assume the participants to be
non-strategic. Thus, eliciting truthful information is not our concern because the participants
6will truthfully reveal their information for a constant monetary reward. Moreover, we assume
that each participant provides a small and partial piece of noisy information of the latent
ground truth. One challenge is to understand and account for the noise in the participants’
information when aggregating their contributions. In addition, we assume to have the ability
to actively query the participants for speciﬁc pieces of information. So we aim to ﬁnd a way to
adaptively query information from the participants to improve the accuracy of the estimate
as quickly as possible. In summary, we explore the following research questions:
• How to use a theoretical model to best capture the participants’ noisy observations for
ap a r t i c u l a rl a t e n tg r o u n dt r u t h ?
• How to e ciently aggregate small pieces of noisy information contributed by the par-
ticipants in order to produce an accurate estimate of the ground truth?
• How to adaptively query information from the participants to improve the accuracy of
the estimate produced as quickly as possible?
1.2 Connecting the Three Methods
In this section, I compare and contrast the three methods in terms of which part of the prob-
lem they are targeting, whether they require observable ground truth, and what assumptions
they make about the participants’ behavior. By comparing and contrasting them from sev-
eral perspectives, I would like to relate the three methods and provide a bigger picture for
this dissertation. The following discussion is summarized in Table 1.1.
Prediction Markets Peer Prediction Adaptive Polling
Elicitation and Aggregation Elicitation Aggregation
Observable Ground Truth Latent Ground Truth
Strategic Participants Non-Strategic Participants
Perfect Information Noisy Information
Table 1.1: Comparison and contrast between the three methods
7Targeted Problem First, all three methods were proposed to solve the same high level
problem, but each of them was designed to target di↵erent parts of the whole problem.
Prediction markets were designed to tackle the whole information elicitation and ag-
gregation problem. A prediction market provides carefully designed monetary rewards to
incentivize the participants to truthfully reveal their private information. Moreover, the de-
sign of the market encourages each participant to improve upon the existing market estimate
by inferring information from the historical forecasts and incorporating the inferred infor-
mation into their own estimate. In essence, the participants are performing the aggregation
for the mechanism.
In contrast, peer prediction mechanisms and adaptive polling focus on solving part of
the whole problem. Peer prediction mechanisms aim to elicit truthful information from the
participants, but they do not specify how to use the elicited information. Although adaptive
polling has distinct elicitation and aggregation processes, it assumes away the challenge of
eliciting truthful information by considering the participants to be non-strategic. Instead,
adaptive polling focuses on adaptively query information from the participants and e ciently
aggregate the elicited information to produce an accurate estimate of the latent ground truth.
Type of Ground Truth These three methods also di↵er by the type of event they are able
to estimate or forecast. Prediction markets are designed to forecast events with observable
ground truth, since their rewards are determined by evaluating the participants’ probabilistic
estimates against the realized outcome of the event. Because an observable ground truth is
available, prediction markets can achieve relatively stronger theoretical guarantee – they are
incentive compatible for myopic participants.
In contrast, peer prediction mechanisms and adaptive polling are more powerful methods
since they can estimate or predict events without observable ground truth. Due to the lack
of observable ground truth, peer prediction mechanisms can only achieve a weak theoretical
guarantee — they can induce truth telling in equilibrium only. Adaptive polling uses a
theoretical model to accurately capture the noise in the participants’ information. Therefore,
8it can make good use of the reported noisy information to accurately estimate the latent
ground truth.
Assumptions of Participants’ Behavior One of the most important distinctions among
these methods is their assumptions of the participants’ behavior. These assumptions have
critical inﬂuences on the focus of these methods. For di↵erent assumptions, the designers
face di↵erent challenges when attempting to solve the overall problem, and thus the resulting
methods are derived with particular desirable properties which target speciﬁc aspects of the
whole problem. In particular, the assumptions of these three methods capture two distinct
aspects of the participants’ behavior: whether the participants make perfect or imperfect
observations of the desired information and whether they are strategic or not.
Prediction markets and peer prediction mechanisms assume that the participants have
“perfect information” and they are “strategic”. The participants make perfect observations
of the desired information and their information are not noisy. Moreover, the participants
are rational and self-interested economic agents and that they choose their actions in order
to maximize their expected rewards from the mechanism. Given these assumptions, the
designer aims to design the mechanism to be incentive compatible such that the participants
are best o↵ truthfully revealing their information. However, achieving complete incentive
compatibility is quite challenging. For the mechanisms studied in this dissertation, there
are several settings where a participant may be able to improve his expected rewards from
inside or outside of the mechanism by withholding or misreporting his information.
In contrast, adaptive polling assumes that the participants possess “noisy information”
but they are “not strategic”. The participants make noisy observations of the desired in-
formation, but they are always willing to truthfully reveal their information regardless of
whether their expected rewards can be improved by behaving otherwise. Given these as-
sumptions, this method focuses on developing the most e↵ective way to aggregate the noisy
information contributed by the participant to accurately estimate the latent ground truth.
The assumptions of all three methods are simplifying the participants’ behavior in one
9way or another. In practice, it is reasonable to assume that the participants have “noisy
information” and they are “strategic”. However, prediction markets and peer prediction
mechanisms ignore the “noisy information” aspect whereas adaptive polling assumes away
the “strategic” aspect. In the conclusion, I will discuss the implication of our results on
these assumptions as well as some new models of participants’ behavior in recent work.
1.3 My Contributions
In this section, I outline the four main contributions of my dissertation.
1.3.1 Theoretical Studies of Prediction Markets
We theoretically analyze the participants’ behavior at game theoretic equilibria of market
scoring rule prediction markets in following two settings.
In the ﬁrst setting, there are a ﬁnite number of participants in the market and each par-
ticipant can only trade for a ﬁnite number of times in the market. Since a participant can
trade multiple times in the market, he may have incentives to misreport or withhold his in-
formation in order to mislead the other market participants and capitalize on their mistakes
later on. We characterize equilibria of such prediction markets depending on how the par-
ticipants’ private information relates to the event being forecasted. When the participants’
information is unconditionally independent, there exists a unique family of equilibria, where,
qualitatively speaking, every participant reveals his private information as late as possible.
This is arguably the worst outcome for the purpose of information aggregation. We also
provide insights for the equilibria of the markets when the participants’ private information
is both conditionally and unconditionally dependent on the realized outcome of the event.
In the second setting, there are two participants in the market and each trades in the
market once. The ﬁnal probabilistic forecast generated by the market is used to make
ad e c i s i o n ,a n dt h eﬁ r s tm a r k e tp a r t i c i p a n tr e c e i v e sa na d d i t i o n a lp a y o ↵f r o mo u t s i d eo f
10the market contingent on the decision. If the ﬁrst market participant’s outside payo↵ is
attractive, he may have incentives to misreport or withhold his information when trading
inside the market in order to improve his additional payo↵ from outside of the market. For
this setting, it would seem that information loss within the market is inevitable because of
the ﬁrst participant’s incentive to manipulate the market probability. However, we show
that there exists a “separating” equilibria where all the participants’ private information is
revealed and incorporated into the ﬁnal market probability, which is the goal of running the
market. We characterize su cient and necessary conditions for such separating equilibria
to exist. We also characterize “pooling” equilibria where information loss occurs in the
market and show that the separating equilibria are more desirable than many other equilibria
because the separating equilibria satisfy domination based belief reﬁnements, maximize the
social welfare of the setting, or maximize either participant’s total expected payo↵.
1.3.2 Experimental Evaluation of Peer Prediction Mechanisms
We experimentally evaluate the performance of the Jurca and Faltings [2009] (JF) peer
prediction mechanism through a controlled online experiment. Our experiment allows the
participants to learn and adapt to the mechanism through a multiplayer, real-time and
repeated game. Using our experimental data, we analyze the participants’ behavior in terms
of convergence to game-theoretic equilibria of the JF mechanism.
In our setting, we observe that participants clearly favor the uninformative equilibria over
the truthful equilibrium when paid by the JF mechanism. Eliminating some uninformative
equilibria or making them less desirable successfully deterred the participants from choosing
them, but did not motivate the participants to be truthful. In contrast, the majority of
the participants are consistently truthful in the absence of any peer prediction mechanism.
Methodology wise, our work demonstrates the promise of evaluating game theoretic mecha-
nisms through online behavioral experiments, and using probabilistic models for analyzing
experimental data to explain the participants’ behavior.
111.3.3 Designing and Evaluating Adaptive Polling
We design and experimentally evaluate an adaptive polling method for aggregating small
pieces of imprecise information to produce an accurate estimate of a latent ground truth. In
designing this method, our main contribution is to combine an aggregation process, which
produces accurate estimates by accounting for the noise in the participants’ information,
with an elicitation process, which adaptively queries information from the participants in
order to quickly improve the estimate accuracy.
We apply adaptive polling to the problem of ranking a set of alternatives, each of which
is characterized by a latent strength parameter. Our goal is to produce accurate estimates of
the strength parameters in order to correctly rank the alternatives. At each step, adaptive
polling collects the result of a pairwise comparison, estimates the strength parameters from
the pairwise comparison data, and adaptively chooses the next pairwise comparison question
to myopically maximize expected information gain.
We evaluate our method through an experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Our exper-
imental results show that the adaptive method can e↵ectively incorporate noisy information
and improve the estimate accuracy over time. Also, adaptive polling is superior to a naive
method of presenting a random pair of alternatives for each participant.
1.4 Dissertation Organization
Chapter 2 introduce preliminary technical concepts to prepare for the subsequent sections.
Chapter 3 presents a theoretical analysis of participants’ equilibrium behavior in prediction
markets with a ﬁnite number of stages. Chapter 4 describes a theoretical analysis of predic-
tion markets where a market participant has incentives to manipulate the market probability
from outside of the market. Chapter 5 is an experimental evaluation of a peer prediction
mechanism. Chapter 6 proposes and experimentally evaluates an adaptive polling method
for eliciting and aggregating information without economic incentives.
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Preliminaries
2.1 Proper Scoring Rules
The simplest information elicitation mechanism is a scoring rule. A scoring rule provides
ac a r e f u l l yd e s i g n e dp a y m e n tt oi n c e n t i v i z eas i n g l ee x p e r tt ot r u t h f u l l yr e p o r th i sp r o b a -
bilistic estimates of an event. The amount of the payment depends on the expert’s reported
probabilistic estimates and the realized outcome of the event [Good, 1952, Winkler, 1969,
Savage, 1971, Gneiting and Raftery, 2007].
Formally, consider an event ⌦ with a set ! of m mutually exclusive and exhaustive
outcomes. Let r = {r1,r 2,...,r m} be the probabilistic estimates reported by the expert.
For a given set of probabilistic estimates r,t h es c o r i n gr u l es(!,r)a s s i g n sas c o r esi(r)i f
the i-th outcome in ! is realized. In fact, any bounded, convex and di↵erentiable function of
r corresponds to a proper scoring rule [Savage, 1971]. For example, a popular proper scoring
rule is the logarithmic scoring rule
si(r)=bln(ri)( 2 . 1 )
where b is a positive parameter.
A( s t r i c t l y )p r o p e rs c o r i n gr u l ei si n c e n t i v ec o m p a t i b l ef o rar i s kn e u t r a le x p e r t—a
13risk neutral expert maximizes his expected score by truthfully reporting his probabilistic
estimates. For example, consider the logarithmic proper scoring rule with m = 2. Assume
that the expert believes the probabilities of the two outcomes to be p and 1   p,a n dh e
reports the probabilities q and 1 q. The expert maximizes his expected score by reporting
q = p,a ss h o w nb e l o w :
@
@q
{pbln(q)+( 1  p)bln(1   q)} =0 ( 2 . 2 )
) b
⇢
p
q
 
1   p
1   q
 
=0 ( 2 . 3 )
) b{p(1   q)   q(1   p)} =0 ( 2 . 4 )
) b{p   pq + pq   q} =0 ( 2 . 5 )
) q = p (2.6)
In this dissertation, I study prediction market and peer prediction mechanisms, which
are both derived using proper scoring rules.
2.2 Prediction Markets
Prediction markets are powerful mechanisms created for the purpose of forecasting future
events. Similar to a ﬁnancial market, a prediction market o↵ers contracts whose payo↵s
are tied to outcomes of a future event. For example, to forecast whether the ﬂu activity in
Massachusetts will be widespread by May 1 this year, the contract could pay $1 per share if
the CDC characterizes the ﬂu activity to be widespread in Massachusetts on May 1 and $0
otherwise. Participants can express their private information about ﬂu activity in a credible
way by trading shares of this contract, and they will be rewarded based on their trades and
the realized outcome of the event. If a risk neutral participant believes that the ﬂu activity
will be widespread with probability p,t h e nh ec a nm a k ep r o ﬁ t si ne x p e c t a t i o nb yb u y i n g
the contract if its current price is lower than p and selling the contract if its current price
14is higher than p.T h u s ,t h em a r k e tp r i c eo ft h ec o n t r a c tm a yb ei n t e r p r e t e da sac o n s e n s u s
forecast for this event.
Prediction markets have been deployed and shown to be extremely successful in prac-
tice. Some notable examples of deployed prediction markets include Iowa Electronic Markets
(http://tippie.uiowa.edu/iem/), Inkling Markets (http://inklingmarkets.com/), Hol-
lywood Stock Exchange (http://www.hsx.com/)a n dB e t f a i r( http://www.betfair.com/
GBR/en/). Substantial empirical research has demonstrated that prediction markets pro-
duce remarkably accurate forecasts in practice and often outperform alternative forecasting
methods in a wide range of settings [Berg et al., 2001, Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004, Forsythe
et al., 1992, 1999, Debnath et al., 2003, Chen and Plott, 2002].
A prediction market has traditionally been run like a ﬁnancial market, by setting up
ad o u b l ea u c t i o nw h e r et r a d e r sp l a c eo r d e r st ob u yo rs e l ls h a r e so fc o n t r a c t sa n dm a k i n g
an auctioneer match the buy and sell orders without incurring any risk. These double
auctions work well for ﬁnancial markets where the number of participants is large, making
it easy to match buy and sell orders. However, double auctions may su↵er from the thin
market problem, which presents the participants from revealing their information through
trading. Moreover, double auctions are zero-sum games for the participants, and the no-trade
theorem shows that rational risk-neutral traders should not participate in such a zero-sum
game. These problems motivate the use of automated market maker mechanisms.
For an automated market maker mechanism, each participant interacts with the market
maker for buying or selling shares of the contracts. The market maker is always wiling to
accept any buy or sell orders at the price quoted by the market maker. Such an automated
market maker essentially subsidizes the market for the purpose of eliciting useful information.
Hanson’s market scoring rules (MSR) is the de facto automated market mechanism [Hanson,
2007a]. We formally introduce market scoring rules in the next section. MSR has the
desirable property that the maximum amount of money that the market maker may lose is
bounded in the worse case.
152.3 Market Scoring Rules
Market scoring rules (MSR), proposed by Hanson [2003, 2007b], are derived from proper
scoring rules. Consider a proper scoring rule s(!,r) for a binary event. The corresponding
MSR market is a sequential shared version of the proper scoring rule. Suppose that we
would like to forecast a binary event ⌦ with its realized outcome denoted ! 2{ 0,1}.T h e
MSR market starts with an initial market probability r0 for ! =1 .F o rab i n a r ye v e n t ,t h e
probability of outcome ! =0i si m p l i c i t l y1  r0.P a r t i c i p a n t st r a d ei nt h em a r k e ti ns e q u e n c e
and each participant can change the current probability estimate to a new value of his choice.
The market closes at a predeﬁned time. After that, the realized outcome ! is observed and
participants receive their payo↵s. When a participant changes the market probability for
! =1f r o mrt 1 to rt,h ei sp a i dt h es c o r i n gr u l ed i ↵ e r e n c e ,s(!,rt)   s(!,rt 1), depending
on the realized outcome !.A p a r t i c i p a n t m a y t r a d e i n t h e m a r k e t m u l t i p l e t i m e s .I f Ti
denotes the set of stages where participant i trades, then participant i’s total payo↵ is the
sum of the payo↵ for each of his reports,
P
t2Ti(s(!,rt) s(!,rt 1)). The logarithmic market
scoring rule (LMSR), derived from the logarithmic proper scoring rule, is one of the most
popular market scoring rule mechanisms.
A market scoring rule has the nice incentive property that a risk-neutral, myopic par-
ticipant can maximize his expected payo↵ by truthfully reporting his probability estimate,
because he cannot inﬂuence the market probabilities before his report. A participant is my-
opic if he is not forward looking and trades in each stage as if it is his only chance to trade in
the market. If a participant can trade multiple times in the market and wants to maximize
his total payo↵, then he may want to misreport his estimate or withhold his information in
order to mislead other participants and capitalize on their mistakes later on. Alternatively,
ap a r t i c i p a n tm a yw a n tt om a n i p u l a t et h em a r k e tp r o b a b i l i t yi no r d e rt oi n c r e a s ea np a y o ↵
he receives from outside of the market.
We describe MSR as a mechanism where participants sequentially revise the probability
estimates of event outcomes. However, it is known that under mild conditions, MSR can
16be equivalently implemented as an automated market maker mechanism where participants
trade shares of contracts with the market maker and the market maker updates the contract
prices based on the trades. In practice, a MSR market o↵ers one contract for each outcome
and the contract pays o↵ $1 if the corresponding outcome materializes. The prices of all
contracts represent a probability distribution over the outcome space. In this work, we
analyze MSR as a mechanism for changing probability estimates since abstracting away the
contracts makes subsequent analyses more tractable. We refer interested readers to [Chen
and Pennock, 2007] and [Abernethy et al., 2013] for more information on the equivalence of
the two models.
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Finite-Stage Prediction Markets
Ap r e d i c t i o nm a r k e tp r o v i d e se c o n o m i ci n c e n t i v e sf o rt h ep a r t i c i p a n t st or e v e a lt h e i rp r i v a t e
information about some uncertain event of interest. A market participants can express his
probability estimates for outcomes of the event by trading shares of ﬁnancial contracts, and
he will be rewarded if his probability estimate is more accurate than the previous market
estimate. By observing trading activities of other participants, a rational participant can
infer some information from their activities and combine such information with his private
information when trading in the market. Prediction markets rely on the economic incentives
provided by the mechanism and the belief updating of participants to achieve the primary
goal of eliciting and aggregating information about uncertain events of interest.
To this end, arguably we desire that participants reveal their private information truth-
fully and immediately in prediction markets. However, how well the information elicitation
and aggregation goal is achieved depends on the strategic behavior of the self-interested mar-
ket participants, and the behavior of the market participants is inﬂuenced by their private
information and their knowledge of others’ private information. We formally refer to the
relationship between the participants’ private information as the information structure of
the participants.
In this work, we model a prediction market as an extensive-form Bayesian game where
18each participant has a piece of private information, there is a joint distribution of the par-
ticipants’ private information and the event outcome, and this joint distribution is common
knowledge to all participants. This joint distribution, which is the information structure
of the market game, captures what participants know about one another’s private informa-
tion. The goal of this work is to understand how and how quickly information is aggregated
in the market by characterizing game-theoretic equilibria of the market game for di↵erent
information structures.
We study Hanson’s logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR) [Hanson, 2007b], which is the
de facto automated market maker mechanism for prediction markets. Because participants
interact with the market maker, which is the mechanism per se and behaves deterministically,
we only need to model the participants side of the market. This makes the generally challeng-
ing equilibrium analysis for extensive-form Bayesian games tractable for some information
structures in our setting.
Prior work [Chen et al., 2007, 2010b] has shown that when participants’ information is
conditionally independent given the true outcome of the event, there exists a unique family
of equilibria where every participant races to truthfully reveal all their information as soon
as possible. This is arguably the most desirable outcome for the market’s goal. This work
considers the market games with the two remaining classes of information structures:
• The I game: the participants’ private information is unconditionally independent, and
• The D game: the participants’ private information is both conditionally and uncondi-
tionally dependent.
3.1 Our Results
We characterize the unique family of equilibria of the I game with a ﬁnite number of partici-
pants and a ﬁnite number of stages. At any equilibrium in this family, if player i’s last stage
of participation in the market is after player j’s, player i only reveals his information after
19player j’s last stage of participation and on or before his own last stage of participation.
Qualitatively speaking, at any equilibrium of this game, participants race to delay revealing
their information, which is probably the least desirable outcome for the market’s goal. These
equilibria are in stark contrast to the equilibria of the market game when the participants’
information is conditionally independent given the realized outcome of the event.
We also provide insights on equilibria of the D game. It is in general challenging to
characterize equilibria of the D game because the information structure does not have any
clear mathematical property that we can leverage. We provide a systematic method for
identifying possible equilibrium strategies in the market game with any information structure.
With this method, we identify all possible PBE strategies for the players in a restricted 3-
stage D game with 2 participants Alice and Bob, the sequence of participation Alice Bob
and Alice, and 2 realized signals for Alice. Moreover, we show that there exist instances of
the D game that admit truthful equilibria. In particular, we give a su cient condition for a
truthful equilibrium to exist in the 3-stage D game and give a prior distribution satisfying
this condition.
3.2 Related Work
Our work closely follows the prior work by Chen et al. [2007], Dimitrov and Sami [2007],
and Chen et al. [2010b]. We model a prediction market as an extensive-form Bayesian game
as in these prior work. Chen et al. [2010b] considered both a ﬁnite-stage, ﬁnite-player and
an inﬁnite-stage, ﬁnite-player market game. They showed that when players’ information is
conditionally independent given the true state of the world, for both the ﬁnite- and inﬁnite-
stage games, there is a unique type of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE), where players
reveal their information truthfully and as soon as they can. When players’ information is
(unconditionally) independent, they proved that the truthful play is not an equilibrium for
both the ﬁnite- and inﬁnite-stage games. An earlier work by Nikolova and Sami [2007] also
20presented an instance in which the truthful strategy is not optimal in an extensive-form game
based on this market. However, when players have independent information, the existence of
aP B Ew a sl e f ta sa no p e nq u e s t i o n .I nt h i sw o r k ,w ec h a r a c t e r i z ea l lP B Eo ft h eﬁ n i t e - s t a g e
game with independent information and explore a special case of the setting when players’
information is neither conditionally nor unconditionally independent.
Instead of characterizing equilibria, Ostrovsky [2012] studied whether information is fully
aggregated in the limit at a PBE of an inﬁnite-stage, ﬁnite-player market game with risk-
neutral players. He characterized a separability condition under which the market price of a
security converges to its expected value conditioned on all information with probability 1 at
any PBE. If the security and the partition structure satisfy the separability condition, then
the following situation will never occur: every player believes the security to be of one value
in a particular state whereas the actual value of the security in this state is a di↵erent value.
In particular, the separability condition is always satisﬁed by complete markets, which is the
setting studied in this chapter. Thus Ostrovsky’s setting does not place any restriction on
the information structure of the market. Iyer et al. [2010a] extended the setting to risk-averse
players and characterized the condition for full information aggregation in the limit at any
PBE. However, whether a PBE exists in such market games remains an open question.
The 3-stage version of our prediction market model resembles the ones studied by Dim-
itrov and Sami [2010a] and our work in Chapter 4: they both study 2-player games and the
ﬁrst player has another chance of participation after the second player’s turn in the game.
However, both Dimitrov and Sami [2010a] and our work in Chapter 4 consider that the ﬁrst
player has utility for some event outside of the current market and the price in the current
market inﬂuences the outcome of this event. In this work, players only derive utilities from
their trades in the market.
Jian and Sami [2010] studied market scoring rule prediction markets in a laboratory
setting. In their experiment, participants may have conditionally or unconditionally inde-
pendent information and the trading sequence may or may not be structured (a trading
21sequence is structured if it is pre-speciﬁed and is common knowledge to all participants).
They conﬁrmed previous theoretical predictions of the strategic behavior by Chen et al.
[2010b] when the trading sequence is structured. This study suggests that the behavior
of participants in a prediction market critically depends on whether they reason about the
other participants’ private information.
There are experimental and empirical studies on price manipulation in prediction markets
using double auction mechanisms. The results are mixed, some giving evidence for the
success of price manipulation [Hansen et al., 2004b] and others showing the robustness of
prediction markets to price manipulation [Camerer, 1998, Hanson et al., 2007, Rhode and
Strumpf, 2004, 2007]. In the literature on ﬁnancial markets, participants have been shown
to manipulate market prices [Allen and Gale, 1992, Chakraborty and Yilmaz, 2004, Kumar
and Seppi, 1992].
3.3 The Market Game
We model a logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR) [Hanson, 2007b] prediction market as a
Bayesian extensive-form game. Our setting is similar to that of these prior work [Chen et al.,
2010b, 2007, Dimitrov and Sami, 2007, Ostrovsky, 2012]. We study the LMSR market for
forecasting a binary event where ⌦ = {0,1} denotes the outcome space and ! 2 ⌦d e n o t e s
the realized outcome of this event. Many real-world prediction markets focus on such binary
events, for example “whether the UK economy will go into recession in 2013”, “whether the
movie Lincoln will win the Academy Award for Best Picture”, and “whether a Democrat
will win the US Presidential election in 2016”.
3.3.1 The Finite-Stage Market Game
Our LMSR market game has n stages and m  n players. The players participates in
one or more stages of the market game, following a pre-deﬁned sequence, which is common
22knowledge1.
Each player i has private information about the event given by a private signal si 2 Si
with signal space Si and |Si| = ni.E a c h s i g n a l i s o n l y o b s e r v e d b y t h e i n t e n d e d p l a y e r .
The prior distribution of the event outcomes and the players’ private signals, denoted by
P :⌦⇥ S1 ⇥···⇥Sm ! [0,1], is common knowledge. Before the market starts, nature
draws the realized event outcome and the private signals of the players according to P.T h e
players receive their private signals before the market opens, and the realized event outcome
is revealed after the market closes.
The players are risk-neutral Bayesian agents. The belief of the player participating in
stage t can depend on the reported estimates in the ﬁrst t   1s t a g e sa sw e l la so nh i so w n
private signal.
The 3-Stage Market Game. The simplest version of the market game that admits non-
trivial strategic play is a 2-player 3-stage game. The two players are Alice and Bob, and
the sequence of participation is Alice, Bob, and then Alice. Alice and Bob received private
signals sA 2 SA,|SA| = nA and sB 2 SB,|SB| = nB respectively. The analysis of this 3-stage
market game will serve as building blocks for our analysis of the ﬁnite-stage market game.
3.3.2 Information Structure
The prior distribution P is a critical component of each instance of the market game. It
encodes the relationship between the players’ private signals and the event outcome, and it
enables players with private signals to reason about other players’ signals and the realized
event outcome. We refer to P as the “information structure” of the market game. The
primary goal of this work is to characterize the strategic play in a market game with a given
information structure.
1It is an interesting future direction to consider a model where players endogenously choose when to
participate. However, our equilibrium results for the D game with a pre-deﬁned participation order imply
that players will delay revealing their information as much as possible in the D game even with endogenously
chosen participation order. We discuss these implications in section 3.5 after our equilibrium results.
23Three Classes of Information Structures
There are three classes of information structures: conditionally independent (CI game),
unconditionally independent (I game), and neither conditionally independent nor uncondi-
tionally independent (D game). These three classes are mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
The ﬁrst two types impose natural independence assumptions on the prior distribution P,
and they were ﬁrst separately studied by Chen et al. [2007] and Dimitrov and Sami [2007],
and later in their joint work [Chen et al., 2010b].
In a CI game, players’ signals are independent conditioned on the realized event outcome.
Prior work [Chen et al., 2007, 2010b] showed that there is a unique type of perfect Bayesian
equilibria (PBE) for the CI game where players honestly report their estimates as early as
possible. Thus, in this work, we focus on analyzing the I and D games.
For I games, players’ signals are unconditionally independent from one another, but they
are not independent of and may stochastically inﬂuence the event outcome. Formally, the
prior distribution P for an I game must satisfy: P(si)P(sj)=P ( si,s j),8si 2 Si,s j 2 Sj for
any two players i and j.D i m i t r o va n dS a m i[ 2 0 0 7 ]a n dC h e ne ta l .[ 2 0 1 0 b ]s h o w e dt h a tt h e
Ig a m ed o e sn o th a v eat r u t h f u lP B Ew h e r ee v e r yp l a y e rh o n e s t l yr e p o r t sh i se s t i m a t ea s
early as he can, but they left the existence of PBE as an open question.
The I information structure can be motivated by several examples. For stylized ones,
consider a setting where each player independently observes a coin ﬂip. The event to be
predicted is some aggregate information about all of the independent coin ﬂips, for example,
whether more than 1/3o ft h ec o i nﬂ i p sa r eh e a d s .I nt h i se x a m p l e ,t h ep l a y e r s ’s i g n a l sa r e
independent because the coin ﬂips are independent events. For an abstract example, each
player’s private information can be thought of as a single piece of a jigsaw puzzle, and the
event being forecasted is related to the completed picture. For a more realistic example,
consider a ﬂu prediction scenario. Several doctors live in di↵erent regions of the country.
Each doctor gets information about the ﬂu by treating his own patients living in his region.
So the doctors’ information about the ﬂu is arguably independent because the patients’
24health conditions in di↵erent regions are independent.
Even though the CI and I information structures capture events in some natural settings,
they impose strong independence assumptions on the relationship between the players’ pri-
vate signals. Ideally, we would like to understand the players’ strategic behavior in the
market game without restricting to a particular information structure. For this reason, we
study the D information structure consisting of signals that are neither conditionally inde-
pendent nor unconditionally independent. In other words, the signals in a D game are both
conditionally dependent and unconditionally dependent. Formally, a prior distribution P in
aDg a m es a t i s ﬁ e s :9si 2 Si,s j 2 Sj, s.t. P(si)P(sj) 6=P ( si,s j)f o rt w op l a y e r si and j and
9si0 2 Si,s j0 2 Sj,! 2 ⌦, s.t. P(si0,s j0|!) 6=P ( si0|!)P(sj0|!)f o rt w op l a y e r si0 and j0.I t
would be interesting to explore whether the D information structure could be further divided
up into smaller classes with intuitive properties.
The Distinguishability Condition
To avoid degenerate cases in our analysis, we assume that the prior distribution P satisﬁes
the following distinguishability condition, consisting of two parts.
Deﬁnition 1. The prior distribution P satisﬁes the distinguishability condition if for all i
it satisﬁes inequality (3.1)
P(1|s i,s i) 6= P(1|s i,s
0
i),8s i 2 S i,8si,s
0
i 2 Si [{  },s i 6= s
0
i (3.1)
where si =   means player i’s private signal is not observed, and S i = {S1 [{  }} ⇥ ··· ⇥
{Si 1 [{  }} ⇥ {Si+1 [{  }} ⇥ ··· ⇥ {Sm [{  }}, and inequality (3.2)
X
si2Si
psi P(1|si,s) 6=
X
si2Si
psi P(1|si,s
0) (3.2)
where s 6= s0 are any two di↵erent vectors of realized signals of any subset of players excluding
i, and the vector (psi)si2Si is any probability distribution over Si.
Inequality (3.1) generalizes the general informativeness condition by Chen et al. [2010b].
25The inequality is satisﬁed if di↵erent signal realizations of player i always lead to di↵erent
posterior probabilities of ! = 1, for any vector of realized signals for any subset of the other
players (including unobserved signals). In other words, a player’s signal always contains some
information. Inequality (3.2) is similar to the distinguishability assumption used by Dimitrov
and Sami [2010a]. It requires that for any two realizations of signals of a subset of players,
they lead to di↵erent estimates for outcome ! =1g i v e na n yb e l i e fa b o u tp l a y e ri’s signal.
This condition allows other players to infer the signals of the subset of players whenever they
reveal their information truthfully.
While the distinguishability condition may be a nontrivial technical restriction, it al-
lows us to focus on interesting strategic decisions in the game play without encountering
degenerated cases.
3.3.3 Solution Concept and Players’ Strategies
We use the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), which is informally a subgame perfect reﬁne-
ment of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, as our solution concept. A PBE requires specifying
each player’s strategy given a realized signal at each stage of the game as well as the player’s
belief about the signals of players participating in all of the previous stages. The strategies
and the beliefs of the players form a PBE of the market game if and only if, for each player,
his strategy at every stage is optimal given the beliefs, and the beliefs are derived from the
strategies using Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
By properties of the logarithmic scoring rule, at a player’s last chance to participate in
the market, the player has the strictly dominant strategy of truthfully revealing his private
information. So at any PBE, all private information is fully incorporated into the market
estimate at the end of the market game. Thus, the focus of our analysis is on how quickly
information gets incorporated into the market estimate throughout the game. In the follow-
ing paragraphs, we distinguish between truthful and non-truthful strategies for a player in
terms of when the player’s private information is ﬁrst revealed in the market game.
26We use the term truthful strategy (also called truthful betting) to refer to the strategy
where at a player’s ﬁrst chance to participate in the market, the player changes the market
estimate to his posterior probability of outcome ! =1g i v e nh i ss i g n a la n dh i sb e l i e fa b o u t
other players’ signals. The truthful strategy fully reveals a player’s private information as
early as possible.
In contrast to the truthful strategy, a player may choose to misreport his information and
manipulate the market estimate. For instance, a player can play a mixed strategy and reveal
a noisy version of his signal to the subsequent players in the game. Alternatively, a player may
try to withhold his private information from the other players by not changing the market
estimate at all. Such non-truthful strategies hurt information aggregation in the market by
causing the market estimate to contain inaccurate information at least temporarily.
3.4 The 3-Stage Market Game with Any Information
Structure
Before diving into the PBE analysis of the ﬁnite-stage market game, we describe some prelim-
inary analysis of the 3-stage market game with any information structure. In section 3.4.1,
we justify that, in order to describe a PBE of the 3-stage market game, it su ces to describe
Alice’s strategy in the ﬁrst stage and Bob’s belief in the second stage. This allows us to
greatly simplify our exposition in later analyses. Next, we prove a theorem in section 3.4.2,
which allows us to systematic identify candidate PBE strategies for the players. This theo-
rem gives us a useful method to make educated guesses about the possible PBE strategies
in order to tackle the PBE existence question and to construct a PBE if one exists for the
3-stage market game with a given prior distribution. Finally, in section 3.4.3, we describe
ac o n s i s t e n c yc o n d i t i o n ,w h i c hm u s tb es a t i s ﬁ e db yap l a y e r ’ ss t r a t e g yi na n yP B Eo ft h e
3-stage game.
273.4.1 Describing PBE of the 3-Stage Market Game
We present a preliminary analysis of the 3-stage market game and introduce some notations
for our later analyses.
In the 3-stage game, Alice and Bob observe their realized signals sA and sB respectively
at the beginning of the market. In the ﬁrst stage, Alice changes the market estimate for
outcome ! = 1 from the initial market estimate r0 to rA of her choice. In the second stage,
Bob observes Alice’s ﬁrst-stage report rA and changes the market estimate to rB.I n t h e
third stage, upon observing Bob’s second-stage report rB, Alice changes the market estimate
from rB to rf,a n dt h e nt h em a r k e tc l o s e s .
Alice’s ﬁrst-stage strategy is a mapping   : SA !  ([0,1]) where  ([0,1]) is the set of
probability distributions over [0,1]. For clarity of analysis and presentation, we assume that
the support of Alice’s ﬁrst-stage strategy is ﬁnite. The results in this work however hold even
if the support of Alice’s ﬁrst-stage strategy is inﬁnite. Let  sA(rA)d e n o t et h ep r o b a b i l i t y
that Alice reports rA in the ﬁrst stage after observing the signal sA according to the strategy
 .
In the second stage, when Bob observes Alice’s ﬁrst-stage report rA, he forms a belief
about Alice’s signals. Bob’s belief speciﬁes the likelihood that Alice received signal sA when
Alice reported rA and Bob received signal sB.L e t µrA,sB(sA)d e n o t et h ep r o b a b i l i t yt h a t
Bob’s belief assigns for Alice’s sA signal when Alice reported rA and Bob received signal
sB. µrA,sB(sA)i sd e ﬁ n e df o ra n yrA 2 [0,1]. At any PBE, we need to describe Bob’s belief
both on and o↵ the equilibrium path. When rA is in the support of Alice’s ﬁrst-stage PBE
strategy, the game is on the equilibrium path and µrA,sB(sA) is derived from Alice’s strategy
using Bayes’ rule according to the PBE deﬁnition. However, when rA is not in the support of
Alice’s equilibrium strategy, that is, the game is o↵ the equilibrium path, µrA,sB(sA)i ss t i l l
important for a PBE because the belief needs to ensure that Alice does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to deviate from her PBE strategy. O↵ the equilibrium path, there are often more than one
set of Bob’s beliefs that can satisfy this requirement.
28Bob only participates once, in the second stage of this game. By properties of strictly
proper scoring rules, Bob has a strictly dominant strategy to report his posterior probability
estimate of the event truthfully, given his belief. Thus, at any PBE, Bob must be using
a pure strategy, which is fully determined by his belief, his signal, and Alice’s ﬁrst-stage
report. Let xsB(rA)d e n o t eB o b ’ so p t i m a lr e p o r tg i v e nh i ss i g n a lsB and Alice’s ﬁrst-stage
report rA.A ta n yP B E ,B o b ’ so p t i m a lr e p o r txsB(rA)c a nb ed e t e r m i n e df r o mh i sb e l i e fa s
follows:
xsB(rA)=
X
sA
µrA,sB(sA)P(1|sA,s B), 8sA 2 SA,s B 2 SB,r A 2 [0,1].
In the third stage, Alice observes Bob’s report and may change the market estimate
again. At any PBE, knowing Bob’s PBE strategy, Alice’s belief on the equilibrium path can
be derived from Bob’s strategy using Bayes’ rule. This is Alice’s last stage of participation.
Thus, by properties of strictly proper scoring rules, Alice has a strictly dominant strategy
to report her probability estimate truthfully. Similar to Bob’s strategy, Alice’s third-stage
strategy must be a pure strategy and it is fully determined by her belief, her signal, and
Bob’s report. We note that Alice’s belief o↵ the equilibrium path in the third stage is not
important, because Bob has a dominant strategy in the second stage and will not deviate
from it no matter what belief Alice has.
The above analysis shows that, to describe a PBE of the 3-stage market game, it su ces
to specify Alice’s strategy in the ﬁrst stage and Bob’s belief in the second stage. The rest of
the strategic play is completely determined given them.
Moreover, for clarity in our analysis, we specify Bob’s strategy rather than Bob’s be-
lief at a PBE. We can easily derive a belief of Bob such that Bob’s strategy is opti-
mal given it, shown as follows. First, Bob’s strategy is valid if and only if xsB(rA) 2
[minsA P(1|sA,s B),maxsA P(1|sA,s B)] for any sB,b e c a u s ef o ra n yp o s s i b l eb e l i e ff o rB o b ,
his posterior probability should always fall into this interval. When rA is in the support of
Alice’s PBE strategy, Bob’s belief is derived from Alice’s PBE strategy using Bayes’ rule.
29When rA is not in the support of Alice’s PBE strategy, the PBE deﬁnition requires that
Bob’s belief be derived from a possible strategy for Alice using Bayes’ rule. For such an rA
and for any sB,w ek n o wt h a tm i n sA P(1|sA,s B)  xsB(rA)  maxsA P(1|sA,s B)h o l d sa n d
one of the two inequalities must be strict due to the distinguishability assumption. For a
given sB,l e ts0
A =a r gm i n sA P(1|sA,s B)a n ds00
A =a r gm a x sA P(1|sA,s B). Then consider a
possible strategy satisfying  s0
A(rA)=p,  s00
A(rA)=1  p and  sA(rA)=0f o ra n yo t h e rsA,
where p =
P(s00
A|sB)(x P(1|s00
A,sB))
P(s0
A|sB)(P(1|s0
A,sB) x)+P(s00
A|sB)(x P(1|s00
A,sB)). This strategy for Alice is valid, and thus
we can derive Bob’s o↵ the equilibrium path belief for rA from this strategy using Bayes’
rule.
3.4.2 Systematically Identify Candidate PBE Strategies
To tackle the PBE existence problem and construct a PBE if one exists, it is essential that
we make an educated guess of the players’ possible PBE strategies. Theorem 1 below allows
us to pinpoint a possible PBE strategy for Alice in the 3-stage game with any information
structure, by comparing Alice’s ex-ante expected total payo↵ (of both the ﬁrst and the third
stages) when using di↵erent ﬁrst-stage strategies assuming that Bob knows and conditions
on Alice’s strategy.
For Theorem 1 below, for any of Alice’s strategy  1,l e t⇡A( 1,  1) be Alice’s ex-ante
expected payo↵ when Alice uses strategy  1 in the ﬁrst stage, Bob knows Alice’s ﬁrst-stage
strategy  1 and conditions his belief on this strategy. This means that, for any r in the
support of Alice’s ﬁrst-stage strategy  1,B o b ’ sb e l i e fi sd e r i v e df r o ms t r a t e g y 1 by using
Bayes’ rule. For any other r,t h e r ei sn or e s t r i c t i o no nB o b ’ sb e l i e fa sl o n ga si ti sv a l i d .
In the proof of Theorem 1, we make an important distinction between a player’s ex-ante
and ex-interim expected payo↵. A player’s ex-ante expected payo↵ is his expected payo↵
without observing his signal, whereas his ex-interim expected payo↵ is his expected payo↵
given his signal.
Theorem 1. For the 3-stage market game, if two di↵erent ﬁrst-stage strategies  1 and  2
30for Alice satisfy inequality (3.3), then strategy  2 cannot be part of any PBE of this game.
⇡A( 1,  1) >⇡ A( 2,  2)( 3 . 3 )
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose that two di↵erent ﬁrst-stage strategies  1
and  2 for Alice satisfy inequality (3.3), and Alice’s ﬁrst-stage strategy  2 is part of a PBE of
the 3-stage market game. Let µB denote Bob’s belief at this PBE. µB speciﬁes a distribution
over Alice’s signals for every possible ﬁrst-stage report r 2 [0,1] and any of Bob’s signals
sB. Alice’s ex-ante expected payo↵ at this PBE is ⇡A( 2,  2). This proof holds for any valid
belief for Bob at this PBE.
Suppose that Alice deviates from this PBE to play the strategy  1 in the ﬁrst stage and
Bob has the same belief µB as before. Let ⇡A( 1,  2) denote Alice’s total ex-ante expected
payo↵ in the game at this deviation. The expression ⇡A( 1,  2) is well deﬁned since Alice
knows Bob’s belief and strategy at the original PBE. Similarly, let ⇡B( 1,  2)d e n o t eB o b ’ s
ex-ante expected payo↵ in the second stage at this deviation.
At any PBE of this game, in the third stage, Alice can always infer Bob’s signal given
Bob’s report by the distinguishability condition. So Alice always changes the market estimate
to P(1|sA,s B) in the third stage given Alice’s signal sA and Bob’s signal sB.T h u s ,t h et o t a l
expected payo↵ that Alice and Bob can get at any PBE of the 3-stage market game is
⇡AB =
X
sA,sB
⇢
P(1,s A,s B)log
P(1|sA,s B)
r0 +P ( 0 ,s A,s B)log
P(0|sA,s B)
1   r0
 
which is ﬁxed given the initial probability r0 and the prior distribution P. Note that the
above result holds not only at a PBE but whenever Bob reveals all of his information and
Alice knowing his strategy maximizes her expected payo↵. Therefore, by deﬁnition of ⇡AB,
we must have
⇡AB = ⇡A( 1,  2)+⇡B( 1,  2),8 1,  2 (3.4)
31Inequality (3.3) is satisﬁed by assumption, so we have
⇡A( 1,  1) >⇡ A( 2,  2)
)⇡AB   ⇡A( 1,  1) <⇡ AB   ⇡A( 2,  2)( 3 . 5 )
)⇡B( 1,  1) <⇡ B( 2,  2)( 3 . 6 )
where equation (3.5) is due to equation (3.4).
For a ﬁxed ﬁrst-stage strategy of Alice and for any belief of Bob, Bob’s ex-ante expected
payo↵ is maximized when his belief is derived from Alice’s ﬁrst-stage strategy using Bayes’
rule. This can be proven as follows. When Bob’s belief is derived from Alice’s ﬁrst-stage
strategy by using Bayes’ rule, then in the second stage, Bob changes the market estimate
to xsB(rA) when Alice reports rA in the ﬁrst stage and Bob receives the sB signal. Recall
that by deﬁnition, xsB(rA)=P ( 1 |rA,s B)=
P
sA P(sA|rA,s B)P(1|sA,s B). In this case, Bob’s
expected payo↵ in the second stage is
X
sB,rA
P(sB,r A)
⇢
xsB(rA)log
xsB(rA)
rA
+( 1  xsB(rA))log
1   xsB(rA)
1   rA
 
. (3.7)
When Bob has another belief, let ˆ x denote Bob’s optimal report with this belief. Then Bob’s
expected payo↵ in the second stage is
X
sB,rA
P(sB,r A)
⇢
xsB(rA)log
ˆ x
rA
+( 1  xsB(rA))log
1   ˆ x
1   rA
 
. (3.8)
The di↵erence in Bob’s ex-ante expected payo↵ for the two di↵erent beliefs for Bob is (3.7)
-( 3 . 8 ) :
X
sB,rA
P(sB,r A)
⇢
xsB(rA)log
xsB(rA)
ˆ x
+( 1  xsB(rA))log
1   xsB(rA)
1   ˆ x
 
which is nonnegative by properties of the relative entropy.
Therefore, for any two ﬁrst-stage strategies  1 and  2 for Alice, we have shown that
⇡B( 1,  2)  ⇡B( 1,  1)( 3 . 9 )
32Combining inequalities (3.6) and (3.9), we have
⇡B( 1,  2) <⇡ B( 2,  2)
)⇡AB   ⇡A( 1,  2) <⇡ AB   ⇡A( 2,  2)
)⇡A( 1,  2) >⇡ A( 2,  2). (3.10)
According to inequality (3.10), if Alice uses the ﬁrst-stage strategy  2 at a PBE, then
she can improve her ex-ante expected payo↵ by deviating to using the strategy  1.T h e n
there must exist at least one realized signal for Alice, say sA, such that Alice’s ex-interim
expected payo↵ after receiving the sA signal is higher when she deviates to the strategy  1
than when she follows the strategy  2. (Otherwise, if Alice’s ex-interim expected payo↵ for
every realized signal is lower when she deviates to using the strategy  1 than when she follows
the strategy  2,t h e nh e re x - a n t ee x p e c t e dp a y o ↵m u s ta l s ob el o w e rw h e ns h ed e v i a t e st o
using the strategy  1 than when she follows the strategy  2,c o n t r a d i c t i n gi n e q u a l i t y( 3 . 1 0 ) . )
As a result, when Alice receives the sA signal, she can improve her ex-interim expected payo↵
by deviating to using the strategy  1 and this contradicts with our assumption that Alice’s
ﬁrst-stage strategy  2 is part of a PBE of the 3-stage market game.
According to Theorem 1, to ﬁnd Alice’s possible PBE strategies for the 3-stage market
game, it su ces to compare Alice’s ex-ante expected payo↵s for all possible ﬁrst-stage strate-
gies assuming Bob knows Alice’s strategy, and only the strategies maximizing Alice’s ex-ante
expected payo↵ can possible be Alice’s PBE strategy. This gives us a systematic way to iden-
tify possible PBE strategies without worrying about constructing Bob’s o↵-equilibrium path
beliefs.
3.4.3 The Consistency Condition
Our analyses of the 3-stage game frequently make use of a consistency condition described in
Theorem 2 by Chen et al. [2010b]. For completeness, we re-state this condition as a lemma
33below. The consistency condition requires that, at a PBE of the 3-stage game, for any rA in
the support of Alice’s ﬁrst-stage strategy  ,t h ep o s t e r i o rp r o b a b i l i t yo fo u t c o m e! =1g i v e n
  and rA should be equal to rA. Intuitively, this requires that, Alice’s ﬁrst-stage strategy
must not leave free payo↵ for Bob to claim in the second stage. If Alice’s ﬁrst-stage strategy
does not satisfy the consistency condition, then Bob can get positive expected payo↵ simply
by changing the market estimate to a value satisfying the consistency condition, and Bob
can claim this positive expected payo↵ without having any private information about the
event being predicted. This is contrary to Alice’s goal of minimizing Bob’s expected payo↵
since the 3-stage market game is a constant-sum game in expectation at any PBE.
Lemma 1 (Consistency Condition for 3-Stage Market Game). At a PBE of the 3-stage
market game, if   is Alice’s ﬁrst-stage strategy and r is in the support of strategy   (i.e.
9sA 2 SA,  sA(r) > 0), then   must satisfy the following consistency condition:
P(1| ,r)=r
3.5 PBE of the Finite-Stage I Game
We characterize all PBE of the ﬁnite-stage I game in this section. Our analysis begins
with the 3-stage I game. Alice participates twice in the game, so she may have incentives to
manipulate the market estimate in the ﬁrst stage. We ﬁrst identify a unique candidate PBE
strategy for Alice by showing that if a PBE exists for the 3-stage I game, then Alice’s ﬁrst-
stage strategy must be changing the market estimate to the prior probability of the event.
This is equivalent to Alice delaying her participation until the third stage if the market
starts with the prior probability of the event. We refer to this strategy as Alice’s delaying
strategy for the 3-stage I game. Alice’s delaying strategy reveals absolutely no information
to Bob about her signal. Next, we explicitly construct a PBE of the 3-stage I game in which
Alice uses the delaying strategy in the ﬁrst stage. These two results together imply that, the
delaying PBE is unique for this game, in the sense that Alice must use the delaying strategy
34in every PBE of this game, even though Bob’s belief can be di↵erent o↵ the equilibrium
path.
Given the delaying PBE of the 3-stage I game, we construct a family of PBE for the
ﬁnite-stage I game using backward induction. Suppose that the players in the ﬁnite-stage
Ig a m ea r eo r d e r e db yt h e i rl a s ts t a g e so fp a r t i c i p a t i o n . T h e na te v e r yP B Eo ft h eﬁ n i t e -
stage I game, each player i withholds his private information until after player i 1ﬁ n i s h e s
participating in the game, and then player i may truthfully reveal his private information in
any of the subsequent stages in which he participates. In particular, there exists a particular
PBE in this family where each player does not reveal any private information until his last
stage of participation, and this is arguably the worst PBE of this game for the goal of
information aggregation.
3.5.1 Delaying PBE of 3-stage I Game
We argue below that the delaying strategy is the only candidate PBE strategy for Alice in
the 3-stage I game. Theorem 2 essentially proves that the delaying PBE of the 3-stage I
game is unique with respect to Alice’s strategy, if a PBE exists for this game. Part of the
proof of Theorem 2 uses the argument in the proof of Theorem 2 in Chen et al. [2010b].
Theorem 2. If the 3-stage I game has a PBE, then Alice’s strategy at the PBE must be the
delaying strategy, i.e. changing the market estimate to the prior probability of the event in
the ﬁrst stage.
The proof of Theorem 2 is included in Appendix A.1.1.
Sketch. We ﬁrst argue that if a PBE exists for the 3-stage I game, then Alice’s ﬁrst-stage
strategy at this PBE must be a deterministic strategy. We show this by contradiction by
assuming that there are at least two points in the support of Alice’s ﬁrst-stage PBE strategy.
Then we construct another ﬁrst-stage strategy achieving a better expected payo↵ for Alice,
which means that the original strategy cannot be a PBE strategy by Theorem 1. By the
35consistency condition, if Alice’s ﬁrst-stage strategy is deterministic, it must be the strategy
of changing the market estimate to the prior probability of the event.
While the delaying strategy is the only possible PBE strategy for the 3-stage I game,
we still don’t know whether a PBE exists. In order for a PBE to exist, there must exist a
belief of Bob to ensure that Alice does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate from the delaying
strategy to any other strategy. Identifying such a belief for Bob can be challenging because
essentially we need to specify what Bob will do upon observing every possible report of Alice
in [0,1]. In Theorem 3, we give an explicit construction of a PBE of the 3-stage I game
in which Alice uses the delaying strategy in the ﬁrst stage. At this PBE, Alice’s ﬁrst-stage
strategy reveals no information to Bob about her private signal, and Bob’s belief makes this
delaying strategy the optimal choice for Alice.
Theorem 3. There exists a PBE of the 3-stage I game where Alice’s ﬁrst-stage strategy is
 sA(P(1)) = 1, 8sA 2 SA
and Bob’s second-stage strategy is
xsB(rA)=
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
fsB(↵min
sB ),r A 2 [0,↵ min
sB )
fsB(rA),r A 2 [↵min
sB ,↵ max
sB ]
fsB(↵max
sB ),r A 2 (↵max
sB ,1]
, 8sB 2 SB
where
fsB(rA)=
P(1|sB)P(0)rA
P(1)P(0|sB)+( P(1|sB)   P(1))rA
 
min
sB =min
sA
P(1|sA,s B), 
max
sB =m a x
sA
P(1|sA,s B)
↵
min
sB =f
 1
sB ( 
min
sB ),↵
max
sB = f
 1
sB ( 
max
sB )
The proof of Theorem 3 is included in Appendix A.1.2.
Sketch. We describe the ﬁrst part of the proof below showing that Bob’s strategy is a valid
36PBE strategy.
First, Bob’s belief on the equilibrium path is derived from Alice’s ﬁrst-stage strategy
using Bayes’ rule since xsB(P(1)) = P(1|sB). Moreover, for Bob’s strategy to be a valid PBE
strategy, it must satisfy xsB(rA) 2 [minsA P(1|sA,s B),maxsA P(1|sA,s B)],8sB,r A 2 [0,1]. To
show this, note that by deﬁnition,  min
sB <  max
sB , ↵min
sB <↵ max
sB ,a n dfsB(rA)i sm o n o t o n i c a l l y
increasing in rA 2 [0,1] since
df sB(rA)
drA
=
P(1)(1   P(1))P(1|sB)(1   P(1|sB))
{P(1)P(0|sB)+( P ( 1 |sB)   P(1))rA}
2 > 0
Hence the domain of xsB(rA)i sw e l l - d e ﬁ n e d .I na d d i t i o n ,w eh a v e
 
min
sB = fsB(↵
min
sB )  xsB(rA)  fsB(↵
max
sB )= 
max
sB ,8rA 2 [0,1].
Thus, Bob’s strategy is valid. The rest of the proof then proves that Alice’s delaying strategy
is a best response to Bob’s strategy.
Based on Theorems 2 and 3 above, we have established both the existence and the
uniqueness (with respect to Alice’s ﬁrst-stage strategy) of the PBE for the 3-stage I game.
3.5.2 A Family of PBE for the Finite-Stage I Game
We are ready to characterize the PBE of the ﬁnite-stage I game. By using backward induction
and the delaying PBE of the 3-stage I game, we characterize a family of PBE of the ﬁnite-
stage I game in Theorem 4. At any PBE in this family, players delay revealing their private
information as much as possible.
We ﬁrst generalize the consistency condition for the 3-stage game to the ﬁnite-stage
game in Lemma 2. This consistency condition dictates that, for any stage k,t h ep o s t e r i o r
probability of ! =1g i v e nt h ep a r t i c i p a n t s ’s t r a t e g i e sa n dr e p o r t si nt h eﬁ r s tk stages must
be equal to the report of the participant in stage k at any PBE of this game.
Lemma 2 (Consistency Condition for Finite-Stage Market Game). At a PBE of the ﬁnite-
37stage I game, suppose that  k and rk are the strategy and the report for the participant of
stage k respectively, then for every k, the participants’ strategies and reports must satisfy
equation (3.11).
P(1|r
1,...,r
k, 
1,..., 
k)=r
k (3.11)
The proof of Lemma 2 is included in Appendix A.1.3.
In Lemma 3 below, we analyze the tail of the ﬁnite-stage I game starting from the second-
to-last stage of participation for the last player to the last stage of the game. The theorem
shows that, in terms of strategic play, this portion of the ﬁnite-stage I game essentially
reduces to a 3-stage I game. Thus, at any PBE, the last player chooses to not participate
in the game in his second-to-last stage of participation. This key argument will be used
repeatedly in the proof of the PBE of the ﬁnite-stage I game.
For Lemma 3 and Theorem 4, let the m players of the ﬁnite-stage I game be ordered by
their last stages of participation. That is, for any 1  i  m,l e tti denote player i’s last
stage of participation, such that ti <t j for any 1  i<j m. Without loss of generality,
we assume that player m has more than one stages of participations.
Lemma 3. Let stage k be the second to last stage of participation for player m (k<t m).A t
any PBE of the ﬁnite-stage I game, player m does not change the market estimate in stage
k.
The proof of Lemma 3 is included in Appendix A.1.4.
Finally, in Theorem 4, we prove the existence of a family of PBE of the ﬁnite-stage I
game.
Theorem 4. At any PBE of the ﬁnite-stage I game, the players use the following strategies:
• From stage 1 to stage t1   1, player 1 uses any strategy that satisﬁes the consistency
condition. In stage t1, player 1 truthfully reveals his signal.
38• For any 2  i  m   1, from stage 1 to stage ti 1   1, player i does not participate in
the game. From stage ti 1 +1to stage ti   1, player i uses any strategy that satisﬁes
the consistency condition. In stage ti, player i truthfully reveals his signal.
• From stage 1 to stage tm   1, player m does not participate in the game. In stage tm,
player m truthfully reveals his signal.
The proof of Theorem 4 is included in Appendix A.1.5.
Sketch. We describe the argument for player m and m   1h e r e .
By properties of LMSR, player m truthfully reveals his signal in stage tm,w h i c hi st h e
last stage of the game. If stage t⇤ denotes the second to last stage of participation for player
m,t h e nt h eg a m ef r o ms t a g et⇤ to tm can be reduced to a 3-stage I game (where player m is
Alice and other players participating between t⇤ and tm are a composite Bob). By Lemma 3,
player m does not participate in stage t⇤. Now remove this stage and let t⇤ be the new second
to last stage of participation for player m,a n dt h eg a m ef r o ms t a g et⇤ to tm again reduces
to a 3-stage I game. Applying Lemma 3 again, we know that player m does not participate
in stage t⇤ either. Inferring recursively, player m does not participate in any stage from 1 to
tm   1.
For player m   1, he truthfully reveals his signal in stage tm 1 by properties of LMSR.
From stage tm 2 +1t otm 1   1, player m   1i st h eo n l yp a r t i c i p a n tb e c a u s ep l a y e r s1
to m   2 already ﬁnished participating and player m does not participate by our earlier
argument. Thus, player m   1u s e sa n ys t r a t e g ys a t i s f y i n gt h ec o n s i s t e n c yc o n d i t i o nf r o m
stage tm 2+1totm 1 1. We combine the stages from tm 2+1totm 1 1( d e n o t e dt⇤⇤)a s
the new last stage for player m   1. Let t⇤ be the new second to last stage of participation
for player m 1, and note that t⇤ <t m 2. Again, the game from stage t⇤ to t⇤⇤ reduces to a
3-stage I game (where player m 1 is Alice). By Lemma 3, player m 1d o e sn o tp a r t i c i p a t e
in stage t⇤.I n f e r r i n gr e c u r s i v e l y ,p l a y e rm   1d o e sn o tp a r t i c i p a t ei na n ys t a g ef r o m1t o
tm 2   1.
39To understand Theorem 4, consider dividing the ﬁnite-stage I game into m segments with
player i being the owner of the segment from stage ti 1 +1t os t a g eti.A ta n yP B E ,e a c h
player does not participate in any stage before his segment, uses a strategy satisfying the
consistency condition within his segment, and truthfully reveals his private signal at the last
stage of his segment.
Figure 3.1 illustrates a particular PBE of a ﬁnite-stage I game. The letters A, B,a n dC
denote the three players and their sequence of participation. A black letter means that the
player truthfully reveals his signal in that stage. If the letter is gray, then the player uses
a strategy satisfying the consistency condition. Note that the strategy of not changing the
market estimate satisﬁes the consistency condition. A white letter means that the player is
scheduled to participate but does not change the market estimate in that stage. The thick
vertical bars mark the boundaries of the players’ segments in the game.
Figure 3.1: A PBE of a Finite-Stage I Game with 3 players
The multiple PBE of the ﬁnite-stage I game di↵er by how early each player chooses to
truthfully reveal his signal within his segment of the game. For the purpose of information
aggregation, the best case is when every player chooses to truthfully reveal his signal in the
ﬁrst stage of his own segment. However, there exists a PBE where every player waits until
the last stage of his segment to truthfully reveal his information, and this is arguably the
worst PBE for the goal of information aggregation.
Although our model assumes a pre-speciﬁed participation order, our results still provide
useful insights for the I game if the players endogenously choose when to participate in the
game. Consider the I game with n stages and m<nplayers where each player endogenously
chooses in which stage to participate in the game. Our results for the I game suggest that, at
any PBE all players will choose to delay their participation and no information is reveal in the
ﬁrst n m stages. The exact characterization of PBE would critically depend on how multiple
40trades submitted in the same stage are executed. This dependency is generally undesirable.
Our assumption of pre-speciﬁed participation order circumvents this dependency and we
believe our results still provide useful insights for players’ behavior in this setting.
3.5.3 Discussion
The delaying PBE for the I game is arguably the worst outcome for the purpose of information
aggregation since each player’s private information may be incorporated into the market at
his last chance to trade in the market. For our market game, closing the market early may
to solve this problem by ensuring that each player’s information is incorporated early in
the market, as long as each player gets to trade at least once in the market. However, in
practice, closing the market early may not solve this problem. First, for our model, we
make the simplifying assumption that all players receive their private information before the
market opens and they do not receive new information later on. In practice, players do receive
new information over time, and closing the market early may prevent these new information
from being incorporated into the market. Moreover, another simplifying assumption in our
model is that player’s participation order is exogenously determined. In practice, players
endogenously determine when to participate in the market. Thus, if we reduce the time the
market is open, then some players may not be able to participate in the market, and thus
their information does not get incorporated into the market forecast.
When comparing the PBE of the ﬁnite-stage I game with the truthful PBE of the ﬁnite-
stage CI game [Chen et al., 2010b], it is interesting to note how two di↵erent information
structures can induce equilibrium behavior at the opposite ends of the spectrum: The players
in the CI game race to reveal their private information as early as possible, whereas the
players in the I game delay as much as possible to reveal their private information.
This di↵erence is spiritually consistent with the concepts of complementarity and sub-
stitution of private signals deﬁned by Chen et al. [2010b]. Consider the ex ante expected
payo↵s of players. In the I games, players’ private signals can be intuitively considered as
41complements. When the current market prediction is the prior probability, the sum of play-
ers’ expected payo↵s when each player reports a posterior probability conditioned only on
his own private signal is strictly less than the total expected payo↵ that can be earned by
reporting a posterior probability conditioned on all of the available private signals in any I
game. This means that, every player in the I game prefers to wait for other players to make
their reports ﬁrst since observing more reports and thus inferring more signals improve the
player’s expected payo↵. In contrast, in the CI games, players’ private signals are substi-
tutes. For any current market prediction, the sum of players’ expected payo↵s when each
player reports a posterior probability conditioned only on his own private signal is strictly
greater than the total expected payo↵ that can be earned by reporting a posterior probability
conditioned on all of the available private signals. Thus, players prefer to race to capitalize
on their private information early in the game.
3.6 The 3-Stage D Game
The CI and I games admit two families of PBE that seem to lie at the two extremes of the
spectrum: players race to reveal information early in the CI game, but race to withhold
information in the I game. It is interesting to ask whether some instances of the D game
may give rise to one of these two types of equilibria too. Yet, it is challenging to perform
equilibrium analysis for the D game, because the dependency among the players’ signals
does not provide precise mathematical conditions that we can leverage.
Our goal in this section is moderate. We would like to explore a restricted 3-stage D
game and obtain insights on what the players’ PBE strategies may look like for this game
if a PBE exists. We do not prove the existence of a PBE for this class. Nevertheless, we
provide a su cient condition for the prior distribution, which guarantees the existence of a
truthful PBE for the D game. We also provide an example distribution that satisﬁes this
condition.
42In this section, we consider the 3-stage D game where Alice’s private signal has only 2
realizations. For this special case, we use a0 and a1 to denote Alice’s two possible signals.
3.6.1 An Expression for Alice’s Ex-Interim Expected Payo↵
To characterize PBE of the 3-stage D game, one major challenge is to construct Bob’s o↵-
equilibrium-path belief, that is, Bob’s belief for any Alice’s report that is not in the support
of Alice’s ﬁrst-stage PBE strategy. One easy way to construct Bob’s belief is to assume that
any Alice’s report r is always in the support of Alice’s ﬁrst-stage PBE strategy. In other
words, we can construct Bob’s belief for any Alice’s report r as if his belief is always on the
equilibrium path. Given this assumption, as long as the consistency condition is satisﬁed,
Bob’s belief for any r is uniquely determined.
In what follows, we derive an expression for Alice’s ex-interim expected payo↵ for a
given signal ai and a particular ﬁrst-stage report r (denoted uai(r),i=0 ,1) at any PBE of
the 3-stage market game. When deriving uai(r), we assume that Alice’s ﬁrst-stage payo↵
satisﬁes the consistency condition, Alice and Bob know each other’s strategies and beliefs,
and mostly importantly Bob’s belief for any Alice’s report r is derived as if the belief is on
the equilibrium path for any given r. That is, for any Alice’s report r,w ea s s u m et h a tt h e
report r is always in the support of Alice’s ﬁrst-stage strategy, and we construct Bob’s belief
for r using Bayes’ rule accordingly. The expression of uai(r)i sg i v e nb e l o w .T h ec o m p l e t e
derivation is included in Appendix A.2.1.
uai(r)= P ( 1 |ai)log
r
P(1)
+P ( 0 |ai)log
1   r
1   P(1)
+
X
sB
⇢
P(1,s B|ai)log
P(1|ai,s B)
xsB(r)
+P ( 0 ,s B|ai)log
P(0|ai,s B)
1   xsB(r)
 
(3.12)
where xsB(r)i s
xsB(r)=
P(1,s B|a0)(P(1|a1)   r)+P ( 1 ,s B|a1)(r   P(1|a0))
P(sB|a0)(P(1|a1)   r)+P ( sB|a1)(r   P(1|a0))
43This expression is useful for our following discussion in several ways. First, given uai(r),
we can easily calculate Alice’s ex-ante expected payo↵ for using a particular strategy and use
it to identify Alice’s candidate PBE strategies by using Theorem 1. Second, to construct a
PBE of the market game using a particular Alice’s ﬁrst-stage strategy, we must check whether
uai(r)s a t i s ﬁ e st h er e q u i r e m e n t so faP B Ef o ra n yr e p o r tr in the support of Alice’s ﬁrst-stage
strategy. For instance, if r1 and r2 are both in the support of Alice’s ﬁrst-stage strategy for
Alice’s signal ai,t h e nt h eP B Er e q u i r e m e n t ss p e c i f yt h a tw em u s th a v euai(r1)=uai(r2).
Finally, to construct a PBE of the 3-stage D game, we must specify Bob’s o↵ equilibrium
path belief. One easy way to construct Bob’s belief is to treat every Alice’s report r as if
it is on the equilibrium path. Given this assumption and the consistency condition, Bob’s
belief for every possible Alice’s report r is uniquely determined. Given that Bob’s belief is
constructed in this way, we can use uai(r) to check whether a given Alice’s ﬁrst-stage strategy
and Bob’s belief can form a PBE of the 3-stage D game.
3.6.2 Three Candidate PBE Strategies for Alice
We identify three candidate PBE strategies for Alice in the 3-stage D game. These three
strategies are the truthful strategy, the delaying strategy, and a mixed strategy in which
Alice makes a deterministic report r for one realized signal and she mixes between reporting
r and reporting her true posterior probability estimate for the other realized signal. The
proof of Theorem 5 is included in Appendix A.1.6.
Theorem 5. If there exists a PBE of the 3-stage D game, then Alice must play one of the
following three strategies at the PBE 2:
• the truthful strategy:  ai(P(1|ai)) = 1,i=0 ,1
2Technically, Alice’s PBE strategy could be of the form  ai(P(1|ai)) = 1   p, ai(r)=
p, a1 i(P(1|a1 i)) = 1   q, a1 i(r)=q, for some p,q 2 [0,1], r 2 [minai P(1|ai),maxai P(1|ai)]. How-
ever, if there exists a PBE of a 3-stage D game where Alice plays this mixed strategy, then there also exists
a truthful PBE for this game. So we include this strategy as a special case when the 3-stage D game has a
truthful PBE.
44• the delaying strategy:  ai(P(1)) = 1,i=0 ,1
• the mixed strategy:
 ai(P(1|ai)) = 1   p, ai(r)=p, a1 i(r)=1 , (3.13)
where p =
P(a1 i)(r P(1|a1 i))
P(ai)(P(1|ai) r) and uai(P(1|ai)) = uai(r) is satisﬁed
for some r 2 (minai2SA P(1|ai),P(1)) [ (P(1),maxai2SA P(1|ai)), i =0 ,1.
3.6.3 A Su cient Condition for the Truthful PBE
In this section, we show in Theorem 6 that a monotonicity condition is su cient for the
existence of a truthful PBE of the 3-stage D game. This monotonicity condition requires
that, for a ﬁxed i =0 ,1, Alice’s ex-interim expected payo↵ uai(r)i sm o n o t o n i c a l l yd e c r e a s i n g
as the value of r changes from P(1|ai)t oP ( 1 |a1 i). The proof of Theorem 6 is included in
Appendix A.1.7.
Intuitively, to construct a truthful equilibrium, we need to construct Bob’s belief such
that Alice’s ex-interim expected payo↵ given Bob’s belief is maximized when she reports
truthfully (i.e. r =P ( 1 |ai),8i =0 ,1). We construct Bob’s belief for every Alice’s report r
by assuming that r is always in the support of Alice’s ﬁrst-stage strategy. Then, a truthful
equilibrium exists if and only if uai(r) is maximized when r =P ( 1 |ai),8i =0 ,1f o ra n y
r 2 [max(P(1|ai),P(1|a1 i)),min(P(1|ai),P(1|a1 i))]. The monotonicity condition described
in Theorem 6 is simply a stronger condition, which ensures that Alice’s ex-interim expected
payo↵ is maximized at her truthful report given either of her signals.
Theorem 6. If for any i =0 ,1, uai(r) is monotonically decreasing as the value of r changes
from P(1|ai) to P(1|a1 i), then there exists a PBE of the 3-stage D game where Alice’s
ﬁrst-stage strategy is
 ai(P(1|ai)) = 1,8i =0 ,1
45and Bob’s second-stage strategy is
xsB(r)=
P(1,s B|a0)(P(1|a1)   r)+P(1,s B|a1)(r   P(1|a0))
P(sB|a0)(P(1|a1)   r)+P(sB|a1)(r   P(1|a0))
,8sB 2 SB (3.14)
Next, we give an example of a D information structure satisfying the monotonicity con-
dition above. The example was found through exhaustive search of the space of the D
information structures with a reasonable discretization factor. Nevertheless, it was rela-
tively easy to identify the example because it was easy to check whether uai(r)s a t i s ﬁ e st h e
monotonicity condition.
Example 1. Consider an instance of the 3-stage D game where the prior distribution P
is given by Table 3.1. For this example, Bob only has two possible realized signals b0 and
b1. This prior distribution satisﬁes the monotonicity condition speciﬁed in Theorem 6. As r
increases from P(1|a0) to P(1|a1), ua0(r) decreases and ua1(r) increases.
! =1 ! =0
a0 a1 a0 a1
b0 0.15 0.2 b0 0.2 0.05
b1 0.05 0.05 b1 0.25 0.05
Table 3.1: An example prior distribution. Each cell gives the value of P(!,ai,b j)f o rt h e
realized outcome !, Alice’s signal ai and Bob’s signal bj.
3.7 Conclusion and Future Work
We analyze how the the participants’ knowledge of one another’s private information, also
called the information structure, a↵ects their strategic behavior when trading in a prediction
market. We model the logarithmic market scoring rule prediction market as an extensive-
form Bayesian game, and characterize perfect Bayesian equilibria of this market game for
di↵erent information structures. When the participants’ private information is uncondition-
ally independent (I game), we show that there exists a unique family of PBE for the market
game with a ﬁnite number of players and a ﬁnite number of stages. At any PBE in this
46family, assuming that the players are ordered by their last stages of participation, each player
does not participate in the game before the previous player’s last stage of participation. In
particular, there exists a PBE where every player waits until their last stage of participation
to truthfully reveal their information, and this is arguably the worst outcome for information
aggregation. An immediate future direction is to determine whether a PBE exists for the I
game with a ﬁnite number of players but an inﬁnite number of stages.
We also study a restricted version of the market game with 2 players and 3 stages where
the players’ private information is neither conditionally independent nor unconditionally
independent (D game). Our result narrows down the possible PBE strategies to three simple
strategies if a PBE exists. We conjecture that, there exists a PBE of this restricted D game
where the ﬁrst participant plays one of these three strategies. For future work, we are
interested in proving the existence of the PBE of the D game for any information structure,
characterizing su cient and necessary conditions for each type of PBE to exist, and exploring
whether the PBE results extend to the game with a ﬁnite or an inﬁnite number of stages.
Regarding assumptions of our market model, an interesting future direction is to analyze
the PBE of a di↵erent model of prediction markets where the participants endogenously
choose when to trade in the market, instead of following a pre-speciﬁed participation se-
quence. This model better captures how participants trades in practice markets and may
provide more insights on how information is aggregated in prediction markets in practice.
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Prediction Markets with Outside
Incentives
Prediction markets are powerful tools created to aggregate information from individuals
about uncertain events of interest. As a betting intermediary, a prediction market allows
traders to express their private information by wagering on event outcomes and rewards their
contributions based on the realized outcome. The reward scheme in a prediction market is
designed to o↵er incentives for traders to reveal their private information. For instance,
Hanson’s market scoring rule [Hanson, 2007a] incentivizes risk-neutral, myopic traders to
truthfully reveal their probabilistic estimates by ensuring that truthful betting maximizes
their expected payo↵s. Substantial empirical work has shown that prediction markets pro-
duce remarkably accurate forecasts [Berg et al., 2001, Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004, Forsythe
et al., 1992, 1999, Debnath et al., 2003, Chen and Plott, 2002].
In many real-world applications, the ultimate purpose to adopt prediction markets is to
inform decision making. If a forecast gives early warning signs for a suboptimal outcome,
companies may want to take actions to try to inﬂuence and improve the outcome. For
example, if the forecasted release date of a product is later than expected, the company may
want to assign more resources to the manufacturing of the product. If the box o ce revenue
48for a movie is forecasted to be less than expected, the production company may decide to
increase its spending on advertising for the movie. In 2005 and 2006, GE Energy piloted what
was called Imagination Markets where employees traded securities on new technology ideas
and the ideas with the highest average security price during the last ﬁve days of the trading
period were awarded research funding [Lacomb et al., 2007]. Subsequently, the GE-wide
Imagination Market was launched in 2008. In these scenarios, little is understood of how the
decision making process a↵ects the incentives for the participants of the prediction market.
If a market participant stands to beneﬁt from a particular decision outcome, then he/she
may have conﬂicting incentives from inside and outside of the market. Moreover, when
the potential outside incentive is relatively more attractive than the payo↵ from inside the
market, the participant may have strong incentives to strategically manipulate the market
probability and deceive other participants.
We use ﬂu prevention as a speciﬁc motivating example. Suppose that in anticipation of
the upcoming ﬂu season, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) would
like to purchase an appropriate number of ﬂu vaccines and distribute them before the ﬂu
season strikes. To accomplish this, the CDC could run a prediction market to generate a
forecast of the ﬂu activity level for the upcoming ﬂu season, and decide on the number of ﬂu
vaccines to purchase and distribute based on the market forecast. In this case, suppliers of
ﬂu vaccines, such as pharmaceutical companies, may have conﬂicting incentives inside and
outside of the market. A pharmaceutical company can maximize its payo↵ within the market
by truthfully reporting its information in the market or increase its proﬁt from selling ﬂu
vaccines by driving up the ﬁnal market probability. This outside incentive may cause the
pharmaceutical company to manipulate the market probability in order to mislead the CDC
about the expected ﬂu activity level.
When participants have outside incentives to manipulate the market probability, it is
questionable whether information can be fully aggregated in the prediction market, leading
to an accurate forecast. In this work, we investigate information aggregation in predic-
49tion markets when such outside incentives exist. We characterize multiple perfect Bayesian
equilibria (PBE) of our game and try to identify a desirable equilibrium among them. In
particular, many of these equilibria are separating PBE, where the participant with the out-
side incentive makes a costly move in order to credibly reveal her private information and
information is fully aggregated at the end of the market. Our results are summarized in the
next section.
4.1 Our Results
We study a Bayesian model of a logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR) [Hanson, 2007a]
prediction market with two participants. Following a predeﬁned sequence, each participant
makes a single trade. The ﬁrst participant has an outside incentive, which is certain and
common knowledge. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst participant receives an additional payo↵ from out-
side of the market, which is a result of a decision made based on the ﬁnal market probability
before the outcome of the event is realized. Due to the presence of this outside incentive, the
ﬁrst participant may want to mislead the other participant in order to maximize her total
payo↵ from inside and outside of the market. Surprisingly, we show that there may exist a
separating PBE, where every participant changes the market probability to di↵erent values
when they receive di↵erent private information. In general, a separating equilibrium is desir-
able because all the private information gets incorporated into the ﬁnal market probability.
For our model, the existence of a separating PBE requires that the prior distribution and
the outside incentive satisfy a particular condition and a separating PBE is achieved because
the ﬁrst participant makes a costly move in order to gain trust of the other participant.
When a separating PBE exists, we characterize all pure strategy separating PBE of our
game. However, regardless of the existence of separating PBE, there also exist pooling PBE,
where the ﬁrst participant changes the market probability to the same value after receiving
di↵erent private information. At a pooling PBE, information loss occurs because the ﬁrst
50participant is unable to convince the other participant of her intention to be honest, even if
she intends to be honest. We characterize a set of pooling equilibria of our game in which
the behavior of the ﬁrst participant varies from revealing most of her private information to
revealing nothing.
Although it is di cult to conclude which PBE will be reached in practice, we show that,
under certain conditions, two separating PBE, denoted SE1 and SE2,a r em o r ed e s i r a b l e
than many other PBE. By applying domination-based belief reﬁnement, we show that in
every separating PBE satisfying the reﬁnement, the ﬁrst participant’s strategy is identical to
her strategy in SE1. Under certain conditions, this belief reﬁnement also excludes a subset
of the pooling PBE of our game. Moreover, we establish that any separating PBE maxi-
mizes the total expected payo↵s of the participants, if the outside incentive is an increasing
convex function of the ﬁnal market probability. In addition, we analyze the PBE from the
perspective of a particular participant. The expected payo↵ of the ﬁrst participant who
has the outside incentive is maximized in the separating PBE SE1,a m o n ga l ls e p a r a t i n g
PBE of our game. Under certain conditions, the ﬁrst participant also gets a larger expected
payo↵ in the separating PBE SE1 compared to a set of pooling PBE of our game. For the
second participant, his expected payo↵ is maximized in the separating PBE SE2 among all
separating PBE of our game. Such evidence suggests that the separating PBE SE1 and SE2
are more desirable than other equilibria of our game.
Finally, we examine more general settings. Our results of the basic model are extended
to other market scoring rules. When the existence of the outside incentive is uncertain, we
derive a negative result that there does not exist a separating PBE where information is
fully aggregated. When a separating PBE exists for our game, we discuss a mapping from a
subset of the separating PBE of our game to the set of separating PBE of Spence’s job market
signaling game [Spence, 1973]. This mapping provides nice intuitions for the existence of
this subset of separating PBE.
514.2 Related Work
In a prediction market, participants may have incentives from inside or outside of the market
to manipulate the market probability. Our work analyzes the strategic behavior of market
participants due to outside incentives. In the literature, the work by Dimitrov and Sami
[2010b] is the closest to our own. They study a model of two market scoring rule prediction
markets for correlated events with two participants, Alice and Bob. Alice trades in the ﬁrst
market, and then trades in the second market after Bob. When considering the ﬁrst market,
Alice has an outside incentive because her trade in the ﬁrst market can mislead Bob and she
can obtain a higher proﬁt in the second market by correcting Bob’s mistake. In our model
with only one market, the ﬁrst participant also has an outside incentive, but the incentive is a
payo↵ that monotonically increases with the ﬁnal market probability. In addition, Dimitrov
and Sami [2010b] focus on deriving properties of the players’ equilibrium payo↵s, whereas
we explicitly characterize equilibria of our game and analyze the players’ payo↵s at these
equilibria.
Even if there is no outside incentive, a participant in a prediction market may still have
incentive from within the market to behave strategically. For instance, if a participant has
multiple opportunities to trade in a market scoring rule prediction market, he may choose to
withhold information in the earlier stages in order to make a larger proﬁt later on, causing
information loss in the process. Chen et al. [2010a] and our work in Chapter 3 show that
the equilibria and information revelation in such settings depend on the structure of the
participants’ private information. Ostrovsky [2011] and Iyer et al. [2010b] focus on studying
information aggregation at any PBE of a prediction market instead of directly characterizing
the equilibria. Ostrovsky [2011] analyzes an inﬁnite-stage, ﬁnite-player market game with
risk-neutral players. He characterized a condition under which the market price of a security
converges in probability to its expected value conditioned on all information at any PBE. Iyer
et al. [2010b] extend the setting of Ostrovsky [2011] to risk-averse players and characterized
the condition for full information aggregation in the limit at any PBE. In this work, to
52isolate the e↵ect of outside incentives, we focus on settings where participants do not have
incentives inside the market to manipulate the market probability.
Some recent studies consider incentives for participants to misreport their probability
estimates in di↵erent models of information elicitation and decision making. Shi et al.
[2009] consider a setting in which a principal elicits information about a future event while
participants can take hidden actions outside of the market to a↵ect the event outcome. They
characterize all proper scoring rules that incentivize participants to honestly report their
probability estimates but do not incentivize them to take undesirable actions. Othman
and Sandholm [2010] pair a scoring rule with a decision rule. In their model, a decision
maker needs to choose an action among a set of alternatives; he elicits from an expert the
probability of a future event conditioned on each action being taken; the decision maker then
deterministically selects an action based on the expert’s prediction. They ﬁnd that for the
max decision rule that selects the action with the highest reported conditional probability for
the event, no scoring rule strictly incentivizes the expert to honestly report his conditional
probabilities. Chen and Kash [2011] and Chen et al. [2011] extend the model of Othman and
Sandholm to settings of stochastic decision rules with a single expert and decision markets
with multiple experts respectively and characterized all scoring rules that incentivize honest
reporting of conditional probabilities. The above three studies [Othman and Sandholm, 2010,
Chen and Kash, 2011, Chen et al., 2011] assume that experts do not have an inherent interest
in the decision and they derive utility only from the scoring rule payment. Boutilier [2012]
however considers the setting in which an expert has an inherent utility in the decision and
develop a set of compensation rules that when combined with the expert’s utility induces
proper scoring rules. Our work does not intend to design mechanisms to achieve good
incentive properties in the presence of outside incentives. Instead, we study the impact
of outside incentives on trader behavior and information aggregation in prediction markets
using standard mechanisms.
In this work, we model a participant’s outside incentive as a function of the ﬁnal market
53price. This is to capture scenarios where the participant’s utility will be a↵ected by some
external decision, which will be made based on the ﬁnal market price but prior to the
realization of the event outcome. In some other scenarios, however, a participant may simply
have preferences over event outcomes, i.e. the participant’s utility is state-dependent. For
example, a pharmaceutical company may make more proﬁt when the ﬂu activity level is
widespread than when it is sporadic. In such scenarios, the participant with state-dependent
utility, if risk averse, may trade in the prediction market for risk hedging and potentially
a↵ect the information aggregation in the market. We assume that all participants are risk
neutral and hence this work does not capture the risk hedging setting. If the participant
with state-dependent utility is risk neutral, her payo↵ inside the market is independent of
her utility outside of the market. The problem then reduces to market manipulation without
outside incentives studied by Chen et al. [2010a], us in Chapter 3, and Ostrovsky [2011].
There are some experimental and empirical studies on price manipulation in prediction
markets due to incentives from outside of the market. The studies by Hansen et al. [2004a]
and by Rhode and Strumpf [2004] analyze historical data of political election betting mar-
kets. Both studies observe that these markets are vulnerable to price manipulations because
media coverage of the market prices may inﬂuence the population’s voting behavior. For in-
stance, Hansen et al. [2004a] describe an email communication in which a party encouraged
its members to acquire contracts for the party in order to inﬂuence the voters’ behaviors
in the 1999 Berlin state elections, and it had temporary e↵ects on the contract price. Ma-
nipulations in these studies were attempts not to derive more proﬁt within the market but
instead to inﬂuence the election outcome. These studies inspire us to theoretically study
price manipulation due to outside incentives.
In a similar spirit, Hanson et al. [2007] conducted a laboratory experiment to simulate an
asset market in which some participants have an incentive to manipulate the prices. In their
experiment, subjects receive di↵erent private information about the common value of an as-
set and they trade in a double auction mechanism. In their Manipulation treatment, half of
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manipulators) have an incentive to raise the prices regardless of their private information.
Hanson et al. [2007] observed that, although the manipulators attempted to raise the prices,
they did not a↵ect the information aggregation process and the price accuracy because the
non-manipulators accepted trades at lower prices to counteract these manipulation attempts.
This experiment closely resembles our setting because the incentive to manipulate is a payo↵
as a function of the market prices. However, there are two important di↵erences. First, the
additional payo↵ depends on the transaction prices throughout the entire trading period
whereas in our setting the additional payo↵ depends only on the ﬁnal market price. Second,
in Hanson’s experiment, although the existence of manipulators is common knowledge, the
identities of these manipulators are not known. In our model, we assume that the manip-
ulators’ identities are common knowledge. These di↵erences may account for the di↵erent
results in the two settings where manipulations did not have signiﬁcant e↵ect in Hanson’s
experiment whereas in our model there exist pooling equilibria where manipulations can
cause information loss. In particular, the separating equilibria in our setting may not be
achievable in Hanson’s experiment because the anonymous manipulators cannot establish
credibility with the other participants.
There are also experiments studying the e↵ects of price manipulations on the information
aggregation process in prediction markets without specifying the reasons for such manipula-
tions. Camerer [1998] tried to manipulate the price in a racetrack parimutuel betting market
by placing large bets. These attempts were unsuccessful and he conjectured the reason to
be that not all participants tried to make inferences from these bets. In their laboratory ex-
periment, Jian and Sami [2010] set up several market scoring rule prediction markets where
participants may have complementary or substitute information and the trading sequence
may or may not be structured. They found that previous theoretical predictions of strategic
behavior by Chen et al. [2010a] are conﬁrmed when the trading sequence is structured. Both
studies suggest that whether manipulation can have a signiﬁcant impact on price accuracy
55depends critically on the extent to which the participants know about other participants
and reason about other participants’ actions. In our setting, we assume that all information
is common knowledge except each participant’s private information, so manipulation can
have a signiﬁcant impact on price accuracy because participants can make a great amount
of inference about each other and about the market price.
When separating PBE of our game exist, our game has a surprising connection to Spence’s
job market signaling game [Spence, 1973]. In the signaling game, there are two types of
workers applying for jobs. They have di↵erent productivity levels that are not observable
and they can choose to acquire education, the level of which is observable. Spence show that,
there exist separating PBE where the high productivity workers can use costly education
as a signal to the employers in order to distinguish themselves from the low productivity
workers. In our setting, we derive a similar result that at a separating PBE, one type of
the ﬁrst participant takes a loss by misreporting her information as a signal to the second
participant in order to distinguish herself from her other type. We discuss this connection
in detail in Section 4.7.
4.3 The Market Game
4.3.1 The 2-Stage Market Game
In this work, we study the MSR market with two rational, risk-neutral participants Alice
and Bob. They receive private signals described by the random variables SA and SB with
realizations sA, sB 2{ H,T}1.L e tP denote a joint prior probability distribution over ⌦, SA
and SB.W ea s s u m eP is common knowledge and omit it in our notation for brevity.
1Our results can be easily extended to a more general setting in which Bob’s private signal has a ﬁnite
number n of realizations where n>2. However, it is non-trivial to extend our results to the setting in which
Alice’s private signal has any ﬁnite number n of possible realizations. The reason is that our analysis relies
on ﬁnding an interval for each of Alice’s signals, where the interval represents the range of reports that do
not lead to a guaranteed loss for Alice when she receives this signal, and ranking all endpoints of all such
intervals. The number of possible rankings is exponential in n, making the analysis challenging.
56We deﬁne fsA,; =P ( ! =1 |SA = sA)a n df;,sB =P ( ! =1 |SB = sB)t or e p r e s e n tt h e
posterior probability for ! = 1 given Alice’s and Bob’s private signal respectively. Similarly,
fsA,sB =P ( ! =1 |SA = sA,S B = sB)r e p r e s e n t st h ep o s t e r i o rp r o b a b i l i t yf o r! =1g i v e n
both signals. We assume that Alice’s H signal indicates a strictly higher probability for ! =1
than Alice’s T signal, for any realized signal sB for Bob, i.e. fH,sB >f T,sB,8sB 2{ H,T}.
In addition, we assume that without knowing Bob’s signal, Alice’s signal alone also predicts
as t r i c t l yh i g h e rp r o b a b i l i t yf o r! =1w i t ht h eH signal than with the T signal and Alice’s
signal alone can not predict ! with certainty, i.e. 0 <f T,; <f H,; < 1.
In the context of our ﬂu prediction example, we can interpret the realization ! =1a s
the event that the ﬂu is widespread and ! = 0 as the event that it is not. Then the two
private signals can be any information acquired by the participants about the ﬂu activity,
such as the person’s own health condition.
In our basic model, the market game has two stages. The sequence of participation is
Alice and then Bob. Alice changes the market probability from r0 to rA in stage 1 and Bob,
observing Alice’s report rA in stage 1, changes the market probability from rA to rB in stage
2.
In addition to Alice and Bob’s payo↵s from within the market, Alice also has an outside
payo↵ Q(rB), which is a real-valued, non-decreasing function of the ﬁnal market probability
rB. In the ﬂu prediction example, this outside payo↵ may correspond to the pharmaceutical
company’s proﬁt from selling ﬂu vaccines. The outside payo↵ function Q(·)i sc o m m o n
knowledge.
Even though our described setting is simple, with two participants, two realized signals
for each participant, and two stages, our results of this basic model are applicable to more
general settings. For instance, Bob can represent a group of participants who only participate
after Alice and do not have the outside payo↵. Also, our results remain the same if another
group of participants come before Alice in the market as long as these participants do not
have the outside payo↵ and they only participate in the market before Alice’s stage of
57participation. We examine more general settings in Section 4.6.
4.3.2 Solution Concept and Players’ Strategies
Our solution concept is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) [Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991],
which is a subgame-perfect reﬁnement of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Informally, a strategy-
belief pair is a PBE if the players’ strategies are optimal given their beliefs at any time in
the game and the players’ beliefs can be derived from other players’ strategies using Bayes’
rule whenever possible.
Alice’s ﬁrst-stage strategy is a mapping   : {H,T}! ([0,1]), where  ([0,1]) is the set
of probability distributions over [0,1]. When a strategy maps to a report with probability
1f o rb o t hs i g n a l s ,t h es t r a t e g yi sapure strategy; otherwise, it is a mixed strategy.W e
use  sA(rA) to denote the probability for Alice to report rA after receiving the sA signal.
We further assume that the support of Alice’s strategy is ﬁnite2. If Alice does not have
an outside payo↵, her optimal equilibrium strategy facing the market scoring rule would be
to report fsA,; with probability 1 after receiving the sA signal, since she only participates
once. However, Alice has the outside payo↵ in our model. So she may ﬁnd reporting other
values more proﬁtable if by doing so she can a↵ect the ﬁnal market probability in a favorable
direction.
In stage 2 of our game, Bob changes the market probability from rA to rB.W ed e n o t e
Bob’s belief as a mapping µ : {H,T}⇥[0,1] !  ({H,T}), and we use µsB,rA(sA)t od e n o t e
the probability that Bob assigns to Alice having received the sA signal given that she reported
rA and Bob’s signal is sB. Since Bob participates last and faces a strictly proper scoring rule
in our game, his strategy at any equilibrium is uniquely determined by Alice’s report rA,h i s
realized signal sB and his belief µ;h ew i l lr e p o r trB = µsB,rA(H)fH,sB + µsB,rA(T)fT,sB.
Thus, to describe a PBE of our game, it su ces to specify Alice’s strategy and Bob’s belief
2This assumption is often used to avoid the technical di culties that perfect Bayesian equilibrium has
for games with a continuum of strategies. See the work by Cho and Kreps [Cho and Kreps, 1987] for an
example.
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is uniquely determined by his belief. To show that Alice’s strategy and Bob’s belief form a
PBE of our game, we only need to show that Alice’s strategy is optimal given Bob’s belief
and Bob’s belief can be derived from Alice’s strategy using Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
In our PBE analysis, we use the notions of separating and pooling PBE, similar to the
solution concepts used by Spence [Spence, 1973]. These PBE notions mainly concern Alice’s
equilibrium strategy because Bob’s optimal PBE strategy is always a pure strategy. In
general, a PBE is separating if for any two types of each player, the intersection of the
supports of the strategies of these two types is an empty set. For our game, Alice has
two possible types, determined by her realized signal. A separating PBE of our game is
characterized by the fact that the supports of Alice’s strategies for the two signals do not
intersect with each other. At a separating PBE, information is fully aggregated since Bob
can accurately infer Alice’s signal from her report and always make the optimal report. In
contrast, a PBE is pooling if there exist at least two types of a particular player such that,
the intersection of the supports of the strategies of these two types is not empty. At a pooling
PBE of our game, the supports of Alice’s strategies have a nonempty intersection and Bob
may not be able to infer Alice’s signal from her report.
For our analysis on separating PBE, we focus on characterizing pure strategy separating
PBE. These pure strategy equilibria have succinct representations, and they provide clear
insights into the participants’ strategic behavior in our game.
4.4 Known Outside Incentive
In our basic model, it is certain and common knowledge that Alice has the outside payo↵.
If Alice reports truthfully in the market and Bob believes that she is being truthful, then
Alice’s outside payo↵ when she receives the H signal is larger than her outside payo↵ when
she receives the T signal. Due to the presence of the outside payo↵, Alice may want to
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signal T, in order to drive up the ﬁnal market probability and gain a higher outside payo↵.
Bob recognizes this incentive, and in equilibrium should discount Alice’s report accordingly.
In an equilibrium of the market, Alice balances these two conﬂicting forces. Therefore, we
naturally expect information loss in equilibrium due to Alice’s manipulation.
However, from another perspective, Alice’s welfare is also hurt by her manipulation since
she incurs a loss in her outside payo↵ when having the favorable signal H due to Bob’s
discounting.
In the following analysis, we characterize (pure strategy) separating and pooling PBE of
our basic model. We emphasize on separating PBE because they achieve full information
aggregation at the end of the market. By analyzing Alice’s strategy space, we derive a
succinct condition that is necessary and su cient for a separating PBE to exist for our
game. If this condition is satisﬁed, at any separating PBE of our game, Alice makes a costly
statement, in the form of a loss in her market scoring rule payo↵, in order to convince Bob that
she is committed to fully revealing her private signal, despite the incentive to manipulate.
If the condition is violated, there does not exist any separating PBE and information loss is
inevitable.
4.4.1 Truthful vs. Separating PBE
The ideal outcome of this game is a truthful PBE where each trader changes the market
probability to the posterior probability given all available information. A truthful PBE is
desirable because information is immediately revealed and fully aggregated. However, we
focus on separating PBE. The class of separating PBE corresponds exactly to the set of PBE
achieving full information aggregation, and the truthful PBE is a special case in this class.
Even when a truthful PBE does not exist, some separating PBE may still exist. We describe
an example of the nonexistence of truthful PBE below.
60At a truthful PBE, Alice’s strategy is
 H(fH,;)=1 ,  T(fT,;)=1 , (4.1)
whereas at a (pure strategy) separating PBE, Alice’s strategy can be of the form
 H(p1)=1 ,  T(p2)=1 . (4.2)
for any p1,p 2 2 [0,1] and p1 6= p2.
In our market model, Alice maximizes her expected market scoring rule payo↵ in the
ﬁrst stage by reporting fsA,; after receiving the sA signal. If she reports rA instead, then she
incurs a loss in her expected payo↵. We use L(fsA,;,r A) to denote Alice’s expected loss in
market scoring rule payo↵ by reporting rA rather than fsA,; after receiving the sA signal as
follows:
L(fsA,;,r A)=fsA,; log
fsA,;
rA
+( 1  fsA,;)log
1   fsA,;
1   rA
, (4.3)
which is the Kullback-Leibler divergence DKL(fsA||r)w h e r efsA =( fsA,;,1   fsA,;)a n d
r =( rA,1   rA). The following proposition describes some useful properties of L(fsA,;,r A)
that will be used in our analysis in later sections.
Proposition 1. For any fsA,; 2 (0,1), L(fsA,;,r A) is a strictly increasing function of rA and
has range [0,+1) in the region rA 2 [fsA,;,1); it is a strictly decreasing function of rA and
has range [0,+1) in the region rA 2 (0,f sA,;]. For any rA 2 (0,1), L(fsA,;,r A) is a strictly
decreasing function of fsA,; for fsA,; 2 [0,r A] and a strictly increasing function of fsA,; for
fsA,; 2 [rA,1].
The proposition can be easily proven by analyzing the ﬁrst-order derivatives of L(fsA,;,r A).
For completeness, we include the proof in Appendix B.1. Lemma 4 below gives a su cient
condition on the prior distribution and outside payo↵ function for the nonexistence of the
truthful PBE.
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is satisﬁed, Alice’s truthful strategy given by (4.1) is not part of any PBE of this game.
L(fT,;,f H,;) <E SB[Q(fH,SB)   Q(fT,SB) | SA = T]( 4 . 4 )
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Suppose that inequality (4.4) is satisﬁed and there exists
a PBE of our game in which Alice uses her truthful strategy. At this PBE, Bob’s belief on
the equilibrium path must be derived from Alice’s strategy using Bayes’ rule, that is,
µsB,fH,;(H)=1 ,µ sB,fT,;(T)=1 . (4.5)
Given Bob’s belief, Alice can compare her expected payo↵ of reporting fH,; with her
expected payo↵ of reporting fT,; after receiving the T signal. If Alice chooses to report fH,;
with probability 1 after receiving the T signal, then her expected gain in outside payo↵ is
ESB[Q(fH,SB) Q(fT,SB) | SA = T] (RHS of inequality (4.4)) and her expected loss in market
scoring rule payo↵ is L(fT,;,f H,;) (LHS of inequality (4.4)). Because of (4.4), Alice has a
positive net gain in her total expected payo↵ if she reports fH,; instead of fT,; after receiving
the T signal. This contradicts the assumption that the truthful strategy is an equilibrium
strategy.
Intuitively, the RHS of inequality (4.4) computes Alice’s maximum possible gain in out-
side payo↵ when she has the T signal assuming Bob (incorrectly) believes that Alice received
the H signal. Thus, if the outside payo↵ increases rapidly with the ﬁnal market probability,
Alice’s maximum potential gain in outside payo↵ can outweigh her loss inside the market
due to misreporting, which is given by the LHS of inequality (4.4).
In Appendix B.2, we present and discuss Example 2, which shows a prior distribution
and an outside payo↵ function for which inequality (4.4) is satisﬁed and thus the truthful
PBE does not exist. This is one of many examples where the truthful PBE does not exist.
When we discuss the nonexistence of any separating PBE in section 4.4.3, we will present
another pair of prior distribution and outside payo↵ function in Example 3 where a truthful
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4.4.2 A Deeper Look into Alice’s Strategy Space
Alice’s strategy space is the interval [0,1] as she is asked to report a probability for ! =1 .
Her equilibrium strategy critically depends on the relative attractiveness of her expected
market scoring rule payo↵ and her expected outside payo↵, which depends on the prior
distribution and the outside payo↵ function. In this section, we partition Alice’s strategy
space using some some key values in order to facilitate our equilibrium analysis.
First, to illustrate the intuition, we deﬁne the the key values in Alice’s strategy space
by partitioning Alice’s strategy space in the following way, illustrated in Figure 4.1. For
each signal sA, the blue regions contain values for Alice’s reports that are dominated by her
truthful reports, regardless of Bob’s strategy. The white regions contain values for Alice’s
reports that are not dominated by her truthful reports, for some strategy for Bob. This
partition shows that, given a particular realized signal, it only makes sense for Alice to
consider reporting values in the white regions. For Alice’s signal sA,w ed e ﬁ n eYsA and Y sA
to be the upper and lower bound values for the white regions respectively. These values
are well deﬁned and uniquely determined given the prior joint distribution and the outside
payo↵ function.
Next, we formally deﬁne YsA and Y sA.G i v e n a p r i o r d i s t r i b u t i o n P and an outside
payo↵ function Q,f o rsA 2{ H,T},w ed e ﬁ n eYsA to be the unique value in [fsA,;,1] satisfying
equation (4.6) and Y sA to be the unique value in [0,f sA,;]s a t i s f y i n ge q u a t i o n( 4 . 7 ) :
L(fsA,;,Y sA)= ESB[Q(fH,SB)   Q(fT,SB) | sA], (4.6)
L(fsA,;,Y  sA)= ESB[Q(fH,SB)   Q(fT,SB) | sA]. (4.7)
The RHS of the above two equations take expectations over all possible realizations of Bob’s
signal given Alice’s realized signal sA.T h u s , t h e v a l u e s o f YsA and Y sA depend only on
Alice’s realized signal sA and are independent of Bob’s realized signal.
63Figure 4.1: An illustration of YH and YT by partitioning Alice’s strategy space. The blue
regions contain Alice’s reports that are dominated by truthful reports. The white regions
contain Alice’s reports that are not dominated by truthful reports. YH and YT are the upper
bound values for the white regions.
Note that the RHS of equations (4.6) and (4.7) are nonnegative because fH,sB >f T,sB for
all sB and Q(·)i san o n - d e c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o n .B yt h ep r o p e r t i e so ft h el o s sf u n c t i o nL(fsA,;,r A)
described in Proposition 1, YsA and Y sA always exist and are well deﬁned — given any pair
of prior distribution and outside payo↵ function, there always exist YsA 2 [fsA,;,1) and
Y sA 2 (0,f sA,;]s u c ht h a te q u a t i o n s( 4 . 6 )a n d( 4 . 7 )a r es a t i s ﬁ e d .W en o t et h a tYsA < 1a n d
Y sA > 0b e c a u s eL(fsA,;,r) !1as r ! 0o rr ! 1.
Intuitively, YsA and Y sA are the maximum and minimum values that Alice might be
willing to report in order to convince Bob that she has the H signal, after receiving the
sA signal respectively. The RHS of equations (4.6) and (4.7) are Alice’s maximum possible
expected gain in outside payo↵ by reporting some value rA when she has the sA signal. This
maximum expected gain would be achieved if Bob had the belief that Alice has the H signal
when she reports rA and the T signal otherwise. So YsA and Y sA are reports for Alice such
that her loss in market scoring rule payo↵ is exactly equal to her maximum and minimum
expected gain in outside payo↵ respectively. Thus, for any realized signal sA, Alice would
not report any value outside of the range [Y sA,Y sA] because doing so is strictly dominated
64by reporting truthfully, regardless of Bob’s belief.
For each realized signal sA, Alice’s strategy space is partitioned into three distinct ranges,
[0,Y  sA], (Y sA,Y sA), and [YsA,1]. However, the partition of Alice’s entire strategy space
depends on the relative positions of YH, Y H, YT,a n dY T,w h i c hi nt u r nd e p e n do nt h e
prior distribution and the outside payo↵ function. In the proposition below, we state several
relationships of YH, Y H, YT, Y T, fH,;,a n dfT,; that hold for all prior distributions and
outside payo↵ functions.
Proposition 2. For all prior distributions and outside payo↵ functions, the following in-
equalities are satisﬁed:
YH   fH,;   Y H, (4.8)
YT   fT,;   Y T, (4.9)
YH   Y T. (4.10)
Proof. (4.8) and (4.9) hold by deﬁnition of YsA and Y sA.B e c a u s ew ea s s u m efH,; >f T,;,
we have YH   fH,; >f T,;   Y T.T h u s ,YH   Y T.
The relationships between YH and YT, YT and Y H,a n dY H and Y T depend on the prior
distribution and the outside payo↵ function. Next, we prove Proposition 3 below, which is
useful for later analyses.
Proposition 3. L(fH,;,Y T)  L(fH,;,Y  T) and the equality holds only when YT = Y T.
This proposition is a direct consequence of Proposition 1. We include the proof in Ap-
pendix B.3.
4.4.3 A Necessary and Su cient Condition for Pure Strategy Sep-
arating PBE
If a separating PBE exists for our game, it must be the case that when Alice receives the H
signal, she can choose to report a particular value which convinces Bob that she is revealing
65her H signal truthfully. We show that this is possible if and only if the condition YH   YT is
satisﬁed. When YH   YT, if Alice receives the T signal, reporting rA 2 [YT,Y H]i sd o m i n a t e d
by reporting fT,;. (Alice may be indi↵erent between reporting YT and fT,;.O t h e r w i s e ,t h e
domination is strict.) So by reporting a high enough value rA 2 [YT,Y H]a f t e rr e c e i v i n g
the H signal, Alice can credibly reveal to Bob that she has the H signal. However, when
YH <Y T,t h i si sn o tp o s s i b l e .W es h o wb e l o wt h a tYH   YT is necessary and su cient for a
separating PBE to exist for this game.
Su cient Condition
To show that YH   YT is a su cient condition for a separating PBE to exist, we characterize
ap a r t i c u l a rs e p a r a t i n gP B E ,d e n o t e dSE1 when YH   YT. At this separating PBE, Alice’s
strategy   and Bob’s belief µ are given below:
SE1 :
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
 H(max(YT,f H,;)) = 1,  T(fT,;)=1
When Y T <Y T,µ sB,rA(H)=
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
1, if rA 2 [YT,1]
0, if rA 2 (Y T,Y T)
1, if rA 2 [0,Y  T]
.
When Y T = YT,µ sB,rA(H)=
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
1, if rA 2 (YT,1]
0, if rA = YT = Y T
1, if rA 2 [0,Y  T)
.
(4.11)
The special case Y T = YT only happens when Y T = fT,; = YT,w h e r eSE1 is a truthful
betting PBE. Intuitively, when fH,; <Y T, Alice is willing to incur a high enough cost by
reporting YT after receiving the H signal, to convince Bob that she has the H signal. Since
Bob can perfectly infer Alice’s signal by observing her report, he would report fsA,sB in stage
2 and information is fully aggregated. Alice lets Bob take a larger portion of the market
scoring rule payo↵ in exchange for a larger outside payo↵.
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with the T signal (rA >Y T), Bob believes that she received the H signal. This is reasonable
since Alice has no incentive to report a value that is greater than YT when she receives the
T signal by the deﬁnition of YT. Similarly, if Alice makes a report that is too low to be
consistent with the T signal (rA <Y  T), Bob also believes that she received the H signal.
If Alice reports a value such that reporting this value after receiving the T signal is not
dominated by reporting fT,; (rA 2 (Y T,Y T)), then Bob believes that she received the T
signal.
Theorem 7. If YH   YT, SE1 described in (4.11) is a separating PBE of our game.
Proof. First, we show that if YH   YT, then Alice’s strategy is optimal given Bob’s belief.
When Alice receives the T signal, by deﬁnition of YT, Alice would not report any rA >Y T,
and furthermore she is indi↵erent between reporting YT and fT,;.B yd e ﬁ n i t i o no fY T, Alice
would not report any rA <Y  T,a n ds h ei si n d i ↵ e r e n tb e t w e e nr e p o r t i n gY T and fT,;. Any
other report that is less than YT and greater than Y T is dominated by a report of fT,; given
Bob’s belief. Therefore, it is optimal for Alice to report fT,; after receiving the T signal.
When Alice receives the H signal and Y T <Y T,g i v e nB o b ’ sb e l i e f ,s h em a x i m i z e sh e r
expected outside payo↵ by reporting any rA 2 [0,Y  T] [ [YT,1]. Now we consider Alice’s
expected market scoring rule payo↵. By Proposition 3, if fH,; <Y T,r e p o r t i n ga n yrA  Y T
is strictly dominated by reporting YT and Alice maximizes her expected market scoring rule
payo↵ by reporting YT. Otherwise, if fH,;   YT, then Alice maximizes her expected market
scoring rule payo↵ by reporting fH,;. When Alice receives the H signal and Y T = YT,
it must be that fH,; >Y T. Given Bob’s belief in this case, Alice maximizes her expected
market scoring rule payo↵ by reporting fH,;. Therefore, when Alice receives the H signal, it
is optimal for her to report max(YT,f H,;).
Moreover, we can show that Bob’s belief is consistent with Alice’s strategy by mechani-
cally applying Bayes’ rule (argument omitted). Thus, SE1 is a PBE of this game.
67Necessary Condition
In Theorem 7, we characterized a separating PBE when YH   YT. In this part, we show
that if YH <Y T,t h e r en ol o n g e re x i s t sas e p a r a t i n gP B E .I n t u i t i v e l y ,w h e nYH <Y T,e v e ni f
Alice is willing to make a costly report of YH — which is the maximum value she would be
willing to report after receiving the H signal — she still cannot convince Bob that she will
report her T signal truthfully since her costly report is not su cient to o↵set her incentive
to misreport when having the T signal.
We ﬁrst prove two useful lemmas. Lemma 5 states that, at any separating PBE, after
receiving the T signal, Alice must report fT,; with probability 1. Lemma 6 says that at
any separating PBE, after receiving the H signal, Alice does not report any rA 2 (Y T,Y T).
Then we show in Theorem 8 that YH   YT is a necessary condition for a separating PBE to
exist.
Lemma 5. In any separating PBE of our game, Alice must report fT,; with probability 1
after receiving the T signal.
Proof. Suppose that Alice reports rA 6= fT,; after receiving the T signal. At any separating
PBE, Bob’s belief must be µsB,rA(H)=0 ,a n dµsB,fT,;(H)   0i no r d e rt ob ec o n s i s t e n tw i t h
Alice’s strategy. However, if Alice reports fT,; instead, she can strictly improve her market
scoring rule payo↵ and weakly improves her outside payo↵, which is a contradiction.
Note that Lemma 5 does not depend on the speciﬁc scoring rule that the market uses.
It holds for any MSR market using a strictly proper scoring rule. In fact, we will use this
lemma in Section 4.6 when extending our results to other MSR markets.
Lemma 6. In any separating PBE of our game, Alice does not report any rA 2 (Y T,Y T)
with positive probability after receiving the H signal.
Proof. We show this by contradiction. Suppose that at a separating PBE, Alice reports
rA 2 (Y T,Y T)w i t hp o s i t i v ep r o b a b i l i t ya f t e rr e c e i v i n gt h eH signal. Since this PBE is
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By Lemma 5, in any separating PBE, Alice must report fT,; after receiving the T signal and
Bob’s belief must be µsB,fT,;(H)=0 . T h u s ,f o rrA 2 (Y T,Y T), by deﬁnitions of YT and
Y T, Alice would strictly prefer to report rA rather than fT,; after receiving the T signal,
which is a contradiction.
Theorem 8. If YH <Y T, there does not exist a separating PBE of our game.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose that YH <Y T and there exists a separating
PBE of our game. At this separating PBE, suppose that Alice reports some rA 2 [0,1] with
positive probability after receiving the H signal.
By deﬁnitions of YH and Y H,w em u s th a v erA 2 [Y H,Y H]. By Lemma 6, we know that
rA / 2 (Y T,Y T). Next, we show that YH <Y T implies Y H >Y  T.
By deﬁnitions of YH and Y H,w eh a v eL(fH,;,Y  H)=L(fH,;,Y H). By Proposition 1
and YH <Y T,w eh a v eL(fH,;,Y H) <L (fH,;,Y T). By Proposition 3, we have L(fH,;,Y T) 
L(fH,;,Y  T). To summarize, we have the following:
L(fH,;,Y  H)=L(fH,;,Y H) <L (fH,;,Y T)  L(fH,;,Y  T) ) Y H >Y  T (4.12)
Thus, rA 2 [Y H,Y H]a n drA / 2 (Y T,Y T)c a nn o th o l ds i m u l t a n e o u s l y . W eh a v eac o n t r a -
diction.
When is YH   YT satisﬁed?
Since YH   YT is a necessary and su cient condition for a separating PBE to exist, it
is natural to ask when this condition is satisﬁed. The values of YH and YT,a n dw h e t h e r
YH   YT is satisﬁed depend on the prior probability distribution P and the outside payo↵
function Q(·). When Alice’s realized signal is sA 2{ H,T}, YsA is the highest value that
she is willing to report if by doing so she can convince Bob that she has the H signal. The
higher the expected gain in outside payo↵ for Alice to convince Bob that she has the H signal
rather than the T signal, the higher the value of YsA.B e l o ww eﬁ r s ts h o wt h a tYH >Y T is
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Example 3 illustrating a scenario where YH <Y T is satisﬁed.
Proposition 4. For any outside payo↵ function Q, if the signals of Alice and Bob, SA and
SB, are independent, i.e. P(sB|sA)=P(sB),8sB,s A, then YH >Y T is satisﬁed.
Proof. When the signals of Alice and Bob are independent, Alice’s expected maximum gain
in outside payo↵ is the same, regardless of her realized signal. If we use the loss function
as an intuitive distance measure from fsA,; (the truthful report) to YsA (the maximum value
that Alice is willing to report), then the amount of deviation from fsA,; to YsA is the same
for the two realized signals. The monotonicity properties of the loss function and fH,; >f T,;
then imply YH >Y T.N o t et h a tt h i sa r g u m e n ti si n d e p e n d e n to ft h eo u t s i d ep a y o ↵f u n c t i o n
because this argument compares Alice’s strategy for both signals and the outside payo↵
function has identical e↵ects on both signals. We formalize this argument below.
By deﬁnitions of YH and YT and the independence of SA and SB,w eh a v e
L(fH,;,Y H)=ESB[Q(fH,SB)   Q(fT,SB)] = L(fT,;,Y T). (4.13)
By Proposition 1 and fT,; <f H,;  YH,w ek n o w
L(fT,;,Y H) >L (fH,;,Y H). (4.14)
Using (4.13) and (4.14), we can derive that
L(fT,;,Y H) >L (fH,;,Y H)=L(fT,;,Y T). (4.15)
Because YT   fT,; and YH >f T,;,a p p l y i n gP r o p o s i t i o n1a g a i n ,w eg e tYH >Y T.
The information structure with independent signals has been studied by Chen et al.
[2010a] and us in Chapter 3 in analyzing players’ equilibrium behavior in LMSR without
outside incentives. It is used to model scenarios where players obtain independent informa-
tion but the outcome of the predicted event is stochastically determined by their aggregated
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vote and win an election, in which case players’ votes can be viewed as independent signals
and the outcome is determined by all votes.
4.4.4 Pure Strategy Separating PBE
In section 4.4.3, we described SE1,ap a r t i c u l a rp u r es t r a t e g ys e p a r a t i n gP B Eo fo u rg a m e .
There are in fact multiple pure strategy separating PBE of our game when YH   YT.I nt h i s
section, we characterize all of them according to Alice’s equilibrium strategy 3.
By Lemma 5, at any separating PBE, Alice’s strategy must be of the following form:
 
S
H(rA)=1 , 
S
T(fT,;)=1 . (4.16)
for some rA 2 [0,1]. In Lemma 7, we further narrow down the possible values of rA in Alice’s
strategy at any separating PBE.
Lemma 7. If YH   YT, at any separating PBE, Alice does not report any rA 2 [0,Y  H) [
(Y T,Y T) [ (YH,1] with positive probability after receiving the H signal.
Proof. By deﬁnitions of YH and Y H, Alice does not report any rA <Y  H or rA >Y H after
receiving the H signal. By Lemma 6, Alice does not report any rA 2 (Y T,Y T)a f t e rr e c e i v i n g
the H signal.
Lemma 7 indicates that, at any separating PBE, it is only possible for Alice to report
rA 2 [max(Y H,Y T),Y H]o r ,i fY H  Y T, rA 2 [Y H,Y  T]w i t hp o s i t i v ep r o b a b i l i t ya f t e r
receiving the H signal.
The next two theorems characterize all separating PBE of our game when YH   YT is
satisﬁed. Theorems 9 shows that for every rA 2 [max(Y H,Y T),Y H]t h e r ei sas e p a r a t i n g
PBE where Alice reports rA after receiving the H signal. Given YH   YT,w em a yh a v e
3There exist other separating PBE where Alice plays the same equilibrium strategies as in our charac-
terization but Bob has di↵erent beliefs o↵ the equilibrium path.
71either Y H >Y  T or Y H  Y T.I f Y H  Y T,w es h o wi nT h e o r e m1 0t h a tf o re v e r y
rA 2 [Y H,Y  T], there exists a separating PBE at which Alice reports rA after receiving
the H signal. The proofs of these two theorems are provided in Appendices B.5 and B.6
respectively.
Theorem 9. If YH   YT, for every rA 2 [max(Y H,Y T),Y H], there exists a pure strategy
separating PBE of our game in which Alice’s strategy is  S
H(rA)=1 , S
T(fT,;)=1 .
Theorem 10. If YH   YT and Y H  Y T, for every rA 2 [Y H,Y  T], there exists a pure
strategy separating PBE in which Alice’s strategy is  S
H(rA)=1 , S
T(fT,;)=1 .
4.4.5 Pooling PBE
Regardless of the existence of separating PBE, there may exist pooling PBE for our game
in which information is not fully aggregated at the end of the market. If fH,; <Y T,t h e r e
always exists a pooling PBE in which Alice reports fH,; with probability 1 after receiving
the H signal. In general, if the interval (max(Y H,Y  T),min(YH,Y T)) is nonempty, for every
rA 2 (max(Y H,Y  T),min(YH,Y T))\{fT,;},i frA satisﬁes certain conditions, there exists a
pooling PBE of our game in which Alice reports rA with probability 1 after receiving the H
signal. However, it is possible that no pooling PBE exists for a particular prior distribution
and outside payo↵ function. We characterize a su cient condition for pooling PBE to exist
for our game in this section.
For any k 2 (max(Y H,Y  T),min(YH,Y T))\{fT,;}, consider the following pair of Alice’s
strategy and Bob’s belief:
PE 1(k):
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
 P
H(k)=1 , P
T (k)= (k), P
T (fT,;)=1   (k)
µP
sB,rA(H)=
8
> > <
> > :
g( (k),s B), if rA = k
0, if rA 2 [0,k) [ (k,1]
(4.17)
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g( (k),s B)=
P(SA = H|sB)
P(SA = H|sB)+P ( SA = T|sB) (k)
, (4.18)
and  (k)i sd e ﬁ n e dt ob et h em a x i m u mv a l u ew i t h i n[ 0 ,1] such that the following inequality
is satisﬁed.
L(fT,;,k)  ESB[Q(g( (k),S B)fH,SB +( 1  g( (k),S B))fT,SB)   Q(fT,SB) | SA = T]
(4.19)
Intuitively,  (k) represents the probability weight that Alice shifts from reporting fT,; to
reporting k after receiving the T signal. The choice of  (k) ensures that Alice’s expected
loss in her market scoring rule payo↵ by misreporting is less than or equal to the expected
potential gain in her outside payo↵. So if  (k)s a t i s ﬁ e se q u a t i o n( 4 . 1 9 ) ,t h e n (k)=1 .
Otherwise,  (k) is set to a value such that the LHS and RHS of equation (4.19) are equal.
It is easy to see that  (k)i sw e l ld e ﬁ n e df o re v e r yk 2 (max(Y H,Y  T),min(YH,Y T))\{fT,;}.
The RHS of inequality (4.19) is strictly monotonically decreasing in  (k). When  (k)=0 ,
the RHS equals L(fT,;,Y T)a n dL(fT,;,Y  T). Because Y T <k<Y T,w ek n o wt h a t (k) > 0.
By (4.17), Bob believes that Alice received the T signal if her report is not equal to k.
If Alice reports k and Bob receives sB signal, Bob believes that Alice received the H signal
with probability g( (k),s B).
In Theorem 11, we show that PE 1(k)i sap o o l i n gP B Ei ft h ef o l l o w i n gi n e q u a l i t yi s
satisﬁed:
L(fH,;,k)  ESB[Q(g( (k),S B)fH,SB +(1 g( (k),S B))fT,SB) Q(fT,SB) | SA = H]. (4.20)
Inequality (4.20) ensures that when Alice receives the H signal, she is better o↵ reporting k
rather than reporting fH,; given Bob’s belief in PE 1(k). When k = fH,;,i n e q u a l i t y( 4 . 2 0 )
is automatically satisﬁed because the LHS of inequality (4.20) is 0 and the RHS of inequal-
ity (4.20) is positive. However, for other values of k,w h e t h e ri n e q u a l i t y( 4 . 2 0 )i ss a t i s ﬁ e d
depends on the prior distribution and the outside payo↵ function. This means that, if
73fH,; <Y T, which ensures the interval (max(Y H,Y  T),min(YH,Y T)) is nonempty and con-
tains fH,;, then there always exists a pooling PBE of our game where Alice reports fH,; with
probability 1 after receiving the H signal.
Theorem 11. If (max(Y H,Y  T),min(YH,Y T)) is nonempty, for any
k 2 (max(Y H,Y  T),min(YH,Y T))\{fT,;}, PE 1(k) is a pooling PBE of our game if inequal-
ity (4.20) is satisﬁed.
Proof. We’ll ﬁrst show that Alice’s strategy is optimal given Bob’s belief.
When Alice receives the H signal and k 6= fH,;,f o rrA 2 [0,1]\{k},i ti so p t i m a lf o r
Alice to report fH,; since her outside payo↵ is constant and her market scoring rule payo↵
is maximized. By inequality (4.20), Alice weakly prefers reporting k than reporting fH,;.
Enforcing the consistency with Bob’s belief, we know that Alice’s optimal strategy must be
reporting k.When Alice receives the H signal and k = fH,;, it is also optimal for Alice to
report k because by doing so she maximizes both the expected market scoring rule payo↵
and the outside payo↵ given Bob’s belief.
When Alice receives the T signal, for rA 2 [0,1]\{k}, Alice maximizes her total payo↵
by reporting fT,;. So the support of Alice’s equilibrium strategy after receiving the T signal
includes at most fT,; and k.B y t h e d e ﬁ n i t i o n o f  (k), either Alice is indi↵erent between
reporting fT,; and k,o rs h em a ys t r i c t l yp r e f e rr e p o r t i n gk when  (k)=1 . E n f o r c i n gt h e
consistency of Bob’s belief, we know that Alice’s optimal strategy must be reporting k with
probability  (k)a n dr e p o r t i n gfT,; with probability 1    (k).
Moreover, we can show that Bob’s belief is consistent with Alice’s strategy by mechani-
cally applying Bayes’ rule (argument omitted). Given the above arguments, Alice’s strategy
and Bob’s belief form a PBE of our game.
Babbling PBE
For Bob’s belief in PE 1(k), it is possible that for some k,  (k) = 1. In this case, Alice’s
strategy and Bob’s belief become the following:
74BE1(k):
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
 B
H(k)=1 , B
T (k)=1
µB
sB,rA(H)=
8
> > <
> > :
P(SA = H|sB), if rA = k
0, if rA 2 [0,k) [ (k,1]
(4.21)
This special case of the pooling PBE is often alluded to as a babbling PBE. At this
babbling PBE, if Alice reports k,t h e nB o bb e l i e v e st h a ts h er e c e i v e dt h eH signal with
the prior probability P(sA = H|sB). Otherwise, if Alice reports any other value, then Bob
believes that she received the T signal for sure. This belief forces Alice to make a completely
uninformative report by always reporting k no matter what her realized signal is. This PBE
is undesirable since Alice does not reveal her private information.
4.5 Identifying Desirable PBE
The existence of multiple equilibria is a common problem to many dynamic games of in-
complete information. This is undesirable because there is no clear way to identify a single
equilibrium that the players are likely to adopt and hence it is di cult to predict how the
game will be played in practice. In our setting, this problem arises because we have a great
deal of freedom in choosing beliefs o↵ the equilibrium path. A common way to address this
problem is to use some criteria to identify one or more equilibria to be more desirable than
others. An equilibrium is more desirable than other equilibria if it satisﬁes reasonable belief
reﬁnements or optimizes certain desirable objectives.
In this section, we give evidence suggesting that two separating PBE SE1 (deﬁned in
equation (4.11)) and SE2 (deﬁned in equation (4.27)) are more desirable than many other
PBE of our game, according to several di↵erent objectives. First, in every separating PBE
that satisﬁes the domination-based belief reﬁnement, Alice plays the same strategy as her
strategy in SE1.T h i sr e ﬁ n e m e n ta l s oe x c l u d e sas u b s e to fp o o l i n gP B Eo fo u rg a m eu n d e r
certain conditions. With the goal of maximizing social welfare, we show that any separating
75PBE maximizes the social welfare of our game among all PBE if Alice’s outside payo↵
function Q(·)i sc o n v e x 4.T h i ss h o w st h a tb o t hSE1 and SE2 are more desirable than pooling
equilibria. Finally, we compare the multiple separating equilibria from the perspective of
a particular player. In terms of maximizing Alice’s total expected payo↵, the PBE SE1 is
more desirable than all other separating PBE and many pooling PBE of our game. From
the perspective of Bob, the PBE SE2 maximizes Bob’s total expected payo↵ among all
separating PBE of our game.
4.5.1 Domination-based Belief Reﬁnement
There has been a large literature in economics devoted to identifying focal equilibria through
reﬁnements. One simple PBE reﬁnement, as discussed by Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green [Mas-
Colell et al., 1995], arises from the idea that reasonable beliefs should not assign positive
probability to a player taking an action that is strictly dominated for her. Formally, we
deﬁne this reﬁnement for our game as follows:
Deﬁnition 2. [Domination-based belief reﬁnement] If possible, at any PBE satisfying domination-
based belief reﬁnement, Bob’s belief should satisfy µsB,rA(✓)=0if reporting rA for Alice’s
type ✓ is strictly dominated by reporting r0
A 2 [0,1] where r0
A 6= rA for any valid belief of Bob.
The qualiﬁcation “if possible” covers the case that reporting rA for all of Alice’s types
is strictly dominated by reporting some other r0
A for any valid belief for Bob. In this case,
if we apply the reﬁnement to Bob’s belief, then Bob’s belief must set µsB,rA(H)=0a n d
µsB,rA(T) = 0, which does not result in a valid belief for Bob. Therefore, in this case the
reﬁnement would not apply and Bob’s belief is unrestricted when Alice reports such a rA.
Using Deﬁnition 2 we can put restrictions on Bob’s belief at any PBE.
4Situations with a convex Q(·) function arise, for example, when manufactures have increasing returns
to scale, which might be the case in our ﬂu prediction example.
76Lemma 8. At any PBE satisfying the domination-based belief reﬁnement, if YH   YT, then
Bob’s belief should satisfy µsB,rA(T)=0for any rA 2 (YT,Y H] \ [Y H,Y H].I fY H  Y T,
then Bob’s belief should satisfy µsB,rA(T)=0for any rA 2 [Y H,Y  T).
Proof. By deﬁnition of YT and Y T,r e p o r t i n ga n yrA >Y T or rA <Y  T after receiving
the T signal is strictly dominated by reporting fT,; for Alice. By deﬁnition of YH and Y H,
reporting any rA >Y H or rA <Y  H after receiving the H signal is strictly dominated by
reporting fH,; for Alice.
For any rA 2 [0,min{Y H,Y  T}) [ (max(YT,Y H),1], Bob’s belief is unrestricted because
the domination-based belief reﬁnement does not apply. By Deﬁnition 2, it is straightforward
to verify that Bob’s belief should satisfy µsB,rA(T)=0f o ra n yrA 2 (YT,Y H] \ [Y H,Y H]
when YH   YT,a n df o ra n yrA 2 [Y H,Y  T)w h e nY H  Y T.
Given this reﬁnement on Bob’s belief at the PBE, we show below that at every separating
PBE of our game, Alice’s strategy must be the same as that in the separating PBE SE1
5.
Proposition 5. At every separating PBE satisfying the domination-based belief reﬁnement,
Alice’s strategy must be  H(max(fH,;,Y T)) = 1, and  T(fT,;)=1 .
We provide the complete proof in Appendix B.7.
Sketch. By Theorem 9, for every rA 2 [max(Y H,Y T),Y H], there exists a pure strategy
separating PBE in which Alice reports rA with probability 1 after receiving the H signal.
We show that Alice would not report rA 2 [max(Y H,Y T),Y H]\max(fH,;,Y T)a f t e rr e c e i v i n g
the H signal at any PBE satisfying the domination-based belief reﬁnement.
By Theorem 10, if YH   YT and Y H  Y T,f o re v e r yrA 2 [Y H,Y  T], there exists a
pure strategy separating PBE in which Alice reports rA with probability 1 after receiving the
H signal. First, we show that Alice would not report rA 2 [Y H,Y  T)a ta n yP B Es a t i s f y i n g
5Bob’s belief can be di↵erent from that in SE1.
77the domination-based belief reﬁnement. Then we show that Alice also would not report Y T
at any such PBE.
Finally, we show that SE1 described in (4.11) satisﬁes the domination-based belief re-
ﬁnement.
If fH,; >Y T,t h ed o m i n a t i o n - b a s e dr e ﬁ n e m e n tc a na l s oe x c l u d ea l lp o o l i n gP B Ea n d
the unique PBE satisfying the reﬁnement is the truthful PBE. We show below that, when
fH,; >Y T, at every PBE of our game, Alice’s strategy is  H(fH,;)=1 ,  T(fT,;)=1 ,w h i c h
is Alice’s strategy in the separating PBE SE1.
Proposition 6. At every PBE of our game satisfying the domination-based reﬁnement, if
fH,; >Y T, then Alice’s strategy must be  H(fH,;)=1and  T(fT,;)=1 .
Proof. Since fH,; 2 (YT,Y H], then by Lemma 8, Bob’s belief must set µsB,fH,;(T)=0 . I f
Alice receives the H signal, then her market scoring rule payo↵ is strictly maximized by
reporting fH,; and her outside payo↵ is weakly maximized by reporting fH,;. Therefore, it
is optimal for Alice to report fH,; after receiving the H signal.
If Alice receives the T signal, reporting fH,; is strictly dominated by reporting fT,; for
any valid belief for Bob because fH,; >Y T. Therefore, Alice does not report fH,; after
receiving T signal, and any PBE of the game must be a separating PBE. By Proposition 5,
any separating PBE satisfying the reﬁnement has Alice play the strategy  H(fH,;)=1a n d
 T(fT,;)=1 .
If fH,;  YT,a p p l y i n gt h ed o m i n a t i o n - b a s e dr e ﬁ n e m e n td o e sn o te x c l u d ea l lp o o l i n g
PBE of this game. In the proposition below, we show that the domination-based reﬁnement
excludes a subset of pooling PBE in which Alice reports a low enough value after receiving
the H signal. The proof of the proposition is provided in Appendix B.8.
Proposition 7. At every PBE of our game satisfying the domination-based reﬁnement, if
fH,;  YT, then Alice does not report any rA  r after receiving the H signal where r is the
unique value in [0,f H,;] satisfying L(fH,;,r)=L(fH,;,Y T).
784.5.2 Social Welfare
We analyze the social welfare achieved in the PBE of our game. In general, social welfare
refers to the total expected payo↵s of all players in the game. In our setting, the social
welfare of our game is deﬁned to be the total ex-ante expected payo↵ of Alice and Bob
excluding any payo↵ for the market institution. Alice’s total expected payo↵ includes her
market scoring rule payo↵ and her outside payo↵.
Since all separating PBE fully aggregate information, they all result in the same (max-
imized) total ex-ante expected payo↵ inside the market – all that changes is how Alice and
Bob split this payo↵ – and the same outside payo↵ for Alice. If the outside payo↵ function
Q(·) is convex, we show in Lemma 9 that Alice’s expected outside payo↵ is also maximized in
any separating PBE of our game. Therefore, given a convex Q(·), social welfare is maximized
at any separating PBE. We prove this claim in Theorem 12.
Lemma 9. If Q(·) is convex, among all PBE of the game, Alice’s expected outside payo↵ is
maximized in any separating PBE.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary PBE of this game. Let V denote the union of the supports of
Alice’s strategy after receiving the H and the T signals at this PBE. Let uG
A denote Alice’s
expected outside payo↵ at this PBE and let uS
A denote Alice’s expected outside payo↵ at
any separating PBE. We’ll prove below that uG
A  uS
A.W e s i m p l i f y o u r n o t a t i o n b y u s i n g
79P(SA,S B)t od e n o t eP ( SA = sA,S B = sB).
u
G
A =
X
v2V
(P(H,H) H(v)+P ( T,H) T(v))
Q
✓
P(H,H) H(v)
P(H,H) H(v)+P ( T,H) T(v)
fHH +
P(T,H) T(v)
P(H,H) H(v)+P ( T,H) T(v)
fTH
◆
+( P ( H,T) H(v)+P ( T,T) T(v))
Q
✓
P(H,T) H(v)
P(H,T) H(v)+P ( T,T) T(v)
fHT +
P(T,T) T(v)
P(H,T) H(v)+P ( T,T) T(v)
fTT
◆

X
v2V
(P(H,H) H(v)Q(fHH)+P ( H,T) H(v)Q(fHT)
+P ( T,H) T(v)Q(fTH)+P ( T,T) T(v)Q(fTT)) (4.22)
=P(H,H)Q(fHH)+P ( H,T)Q(fHT)+P ( T,H)Q(fTH)+P ( T,T)Q(fTT)
=u
S
A
where inequality (4.22) was derived by applying the convexity of Q(·).
Theorem 12. If Q(·) is convex, among all PBE of the game, social welfare is maximized at
any separating PBE.
Proof. By deﬁnition, at any separating PBE, the total market scoring rule payo↵ is maxi-
mized since information is fully aggregated. By Lemma 9, any separating PBE maximizes
Alice’s expected outside payo↵ if Q(·)i sc o n v e x .T h e r e f o r e ,a n ys e p a r a t i n gP B Em a x i m i z e s
the social welfare.
4.5.3 Alice’s Total Expected Payo↵
In this section, we compare the multiple PBE of our game in terms of Alice’s total expected
payo↵. If Alice’s total expected payo↵ at a particular PBE is greater than her total expected
payo↵ in many other PBE of this game, it gives us conﬁdence that she is likely to choose to
play this particular PBE in practice.
First, we compare Alice’s expected payo↵ in the multiple separating PBE of our game.
80We show in Theorem 13 that the separating PBE SE1 maximizes Alice’s expected payo↵
among all separating PBE of this game. This is easy to see when fH,;   YT since the
separating PBE SE1 is also the truthful PBE of this game. Otherwise, if fH,; <Y T, YT is
the minimum deviation from fH,; that Alice can report in order to convince Bob that she
has the H signal.
Theorem 13. Among all pure strategy separating PBE of our game, Alice’s expected payo↵
is maximized in the pure strategy separating PBE SE1 as stated in (4.11).
Proof. In all separating PBE, Alice’s expected outside payo↵ is the same.
By Lemma 5, in any separating PBE, Alice must report fT,; after receiving the T signal.
Therefore, Alice’s expected payo↵ after receiving the T signal is the same at any separating
PBE.
When fH,;   YT, according to Theorem 7, Alice reports fH,; after receiving the H signal
and this is the maximum expected payo↵ she could get after receiving the H signal.
When fH,; <Y T,a f t e rr e c e i v i n gt h eH signal, Alice’s strategy in SE1 is to report YT.
She is strictly worse o↵ reporting any value greater than YT after receiving the H signal in
any PBE. For rA <Y T,i fY H <Y  T, it is only possible for Alice to report rA 2 [Y H,Y  T)
after receiving the H signal at any separating PBE. However, reporting rA 2 [Y H,Y  T)
makes Alice strictly worse o↵ than reporting YT because
rA <Y  T ) L(fH,;,Y T)  L(fH,;,Y  T) <L (fH,;,r A). (4.23)
where the inequality L(fH,;,Y T)  L(fH,;,Y  T)i sd u et oP r o p o s i t i o n3 . T h e r e f o r e ,w h e n
fH,;  YT, the separating PBE in which Alice reports YT maximizes Alice’s expected payo↵
after receiving the H signal.
Hence, the separating PBE SE1 maximizes Alice’s expected payo↵ among all separating
PBE of our game.
Theorem 13 suggests that SE1 is likely a desirable PBE of our game. In Theorems 14
81and 15, we compare Alice’s expected payo↵ in SE1 with her expected payo↵ in the pool-
ing PBE of this game. Again, when fH,;   YT, SE1 is essentially the truthful PBE and
therefore Alice’s expected payo↵ is higher in SE1 than in any pooling PBE for convex
Q(·). When fH,; <Y T,t h er e l a t i o n s h i pi sl e s sc l e a r . I nT h e o r e m1 5 ,w es h o wt h a t ,i f
k 2 (max(Y H,Y  T),Y T)\{fT,;} satisﬁes inequality (4.24), then Alice’s expected payo↵ in
SE1 is greater than her expected payo↵ in the pooling PBE PE 1(k).
Theorem 14. If Q(·) is convex, YH   YT and fH,;   YT, Alice’s expected payo↵ is maximized
in the pure strategy separating PBE SE1 among all PBE of our game.
Proof. By Lemma 9, any separating PBE maximizes Alice’s expected outside payo↵ if Q(·)
is convex. When fH,;   YT, SE1 is the truthful PBE and strictly maximizes Alice’s expected
market scoring rule payo↵.
Theorem 15. If Q(·) is convex, YH   YT, and fH,; <Y T, Alice’s expected payo↵ in the
pure strategy separating PBE SE1 is greater than her expected payo↵ in PE 1(k) for any
k 2 (max(Y H,Y  T),Y T)\{fT,;} if k satisﬁes inequality (4.24) below.
P(sA = H)L(fH,;,Y T)  P(sA = H)L(fH,;,k)+P(sA = T) (k)L(fT,;,k). (4.24)
Proof. By Lemma 9, if Q(·) is convex, then any separating PBE maximizes Alice’s expected
outside payo↵.
Fix a particular k 2 (Y T,min{YH,Y T}). Compared to Alice’s expected payo↵ when
using a truthful strategy, Alice’s expected payo↵ in SE1 given in Theorem 7 is less by
P(sA = H)L(fH,;,Y T), and Alice’s payo↵ in PE 1(k)i sl e s sb yP ( sA = H)L(fH,;,k)+P(sA =
T) (k)L(fT,;,k). Therefore, if Alice’s expected payo↵ SE1 is greater than or equal to
Alice’s expected payo↵ in PE 1(k), then we must have P(sA = H)L(fH,;,Y T)  P(sA =
H)L(fH,;,k)+P ( sA = T) (k)L(fT,;,k), which is stated in inequality (4.24).
Note that inequality (4.24) is automatically satisﬁed for any k  r where r is the unique
82value in [0,f H,;]s a t i s f y i n gL(fH,;,r)=L(fH,;,Y T)s i n c e
P(sA = H)L(fH,;,Y T)= P ( sA = H)L(fH,;,r)  P(sA = H)L(fH,;,k)( 4 . 2 5 )
<P(sA = H)L(fH,;,k)+P ( sA = T) (k)L(fT,;,k). (4.26)
However, for k   r,w h e t h e rk satisﬁes inequality (4.24) depends on the prior distribution
and the outside payo↵ function.
4.5.4 Bob’s Expected Payo↵
In this section, we compare all separating PBE of our game from Bob’s perspective. If
Bob’s expected payo↵ at a particular PBE is greater than his expected payo↵ in many
other PBE of this game, then Bob is more likely to choose to play this particular PBE in
practice. We show below that among all separating PBE of our game, Bob’s expected payo↵
is maximized in the separating PBE SE2 in equation (4.27), which is the same as SE2(YH)
deﬁned in equation (B.24) in Appendix B.5. We state SE2 below for convenience. The proof
of Theorem 16 is included in Appendix B.9.
Theorem 16. Among all pure strategy separating PBE of our game, Bob’s expected payo↵
is maximized in the following pure strategy separating PBE SE2.
SE2 :
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
 H(YH)=1 ,  T(fT,;)=1
µsB,rA(H)=
8
> > <
> > :
1, if rA 2 [YH,1]
0, if rA 2 [0,Y H)
.
(4.27)
4.6 Extensions
We have developed our results for the basic setting, with LMSR, two players, two stages,
and binary signals for each player. In this section, we extend our separating PBE results to
other market scoring rules. We also consider an extension of our setting where the outside
83incentive is uncertain, but occurs with a ﬁxed probability. We show that this uncertainty is
detrimental to information aggregation and there does not exist any separating PBE in this
setting.
4.6.1 Other Market Scoring Rules
For our basic model using LMSR, we characterize a necessary and su cient condition for a
separating PBE to exist. In this section, we generalize this condition for other MSR markets
using strictly proper scoring rules. The main di culty in this generalization is that, for
an arbitrary market scoring rule, YsA and Y sA for sA 2{ H,T} may not be well deﬁned,
whereas they are always well deﬁned for LMSR because the loss function is not bounded
from above. As a result, when generalizing the condition, we need to take into account of
the cases when YsA and/or Y sA are not well deﬁned.
As deﬁned in section 4.3.1, let s(!,r)d e n o t eas t r i c t l yp r o p e rs c o r i n gr u l eo fab i n a r y
random variable ⌦ where ! is the realization of ⌦ and r is the reported probability of ! =1 .
Then the loss function Ls(fsA,;,r A)f o rt h es t r i c t l yp r o p e rs c o r i n gr u l es(!,r)c a nb ed e ﬁ n e d
as follows:
Ls(fsA,;,r A)=fsA,;{s(1,f sA,;)   s(1,r A)} +( 1  fsA,;){s(0,f sA,;)   s(0,r A)} (4.28)
For a particular market scoring rule, a su cient condition for a separating PBE to exist
can be expressed by the the following two inequalities.
Ls(fT,;,1)  ESB[Q(fH,SB)   Q(fT,SB) | SA = T]( 4 . 2 9 )
Ls(fH,;,max(fH,;,Y T)) ESB[Q(fH,SB)   Q(fT,SB) | SA = H]( 4 . 3 0 )
If inequality (4.29) is satisﬁed, we know that YT is well deﬁned. Then, if inequality (4.30)
is also satisﬁed, reporting max(fH,;,Y T) for Alice is not dominated by reporting fH,; after
receiving the H signal. So if both inequalities are satisﬁed, then there exists a separating PBE
where Alice reports max(fH,;,Y T)a f t e rr e c e i v i n gt h eH signal. Note that if inequality (4.29)
84is violated, then the quantity YT is not well deﬁned, so inequality (4.30) is not a well deﬁned
statement as well.
Similarly, another su cient condition for a separating PBE is given by the following two
inequalities.
Ls(fT,;,0)  ESB[Q(fH,SB)   Q(fT,SB) | SA = T]( 4 . 3 1 )
Ls(fH,;,Y  T) ESB[Q(fH,SB)   Q(fT,SB) | SA = H]( 4 . 3 2 )
Again, inequality (4.31) ensures that Y T is well-deﬁned. If inequality (4.32) is satisﬁed,
then there exists a belief for Bob such that for Alice, reporting Y T is not dominated by
reporting fH,; after receiving the H signal. Therefore, these two inequalities ensure that
there exists a separating PBE where Alice reports Y T after receiving the H signal.
We show below in Theorem 17 that satisfying at least one of these two pairs of inequalities
is necessary and su cient for a separating PBE to exist for any market scoring rule.
Theorem 17. A separating PBE of our game exists if and only if at least one of the pair of
inequalities (4.29) and (4.30) and the pair of inequalities (4.31) and (4.32) is satisﬁed.
We include the complete proof in Appendix B.10.
4.6.2 Uncertain Outside Incentive
In our basic model, Alice’s outside incentive is certain and common knowledge. In this
section, however, we show that any uncertainty about Alice’s outside incentive could be
detrimental to information aggregation. Suppose that there is a ﬁxed probability ↵ 2 (0,1)
for Alice to have the outside payo↵. Even if the value of ↵ is common knowledge, information
loss in equilibrium is inevitable if Alice has a su ciently large outside incentive. In particular,
when Alice has an outside payo↵ and has received the T signal, she can report fH,; to pretend
not to have the outside payo↵ and to have received the H signal. This results in these two
types pooling, so the overall equilibrium is, at best, semi-separating and there is information
85loss.
Theorem 18. Suppose that Alice has the outside payo↵ with a ﬁxed probability ↵ 2 (0,1),
which is common knowledge. If fH,; <Y T, then there does not exist any PBE in which Alice’s
type with the H signal and no outside payo↵ separates from her type with the T signal and
the outside payo↵.
Proof. Proof by contradiction. Suppose that a separating PBE exists. At this separating
PBE, with probability (1   ↵), Alice reports fH,; after receiving the H signal and reports
fT,; after receiving the T signal. To be consistent with Alice’s strategy, Bob’s belief on the
equilibrium path must be µsB,fH,;(H)=1a n dµsB,fT,;(H) = 0. Given this belief, however,
when Alice has the outside payo↵, she strictly prefers to report fH,; after receiving the T
signal since YT >f H,;,w h i c hi sac o n t r a d i c t i o n .
4.7 Connection to Spence’s Job Market Signaling Game
In this section, we describe the connection between a subset of separating PBE of our game
and a set of separating PBE of Spence’s job market signaling game [Spence, 1973]. When
as e p a r a t i n gP B Ee x i s t sf o ro u rg a m e ,YH   YT holds and there exists a set of separating
PBE where Alice reports rA 2 [max(Y H,Y T),Y H]a f t e rr e c e i v i n gH signal. If in addition
Y H  Y T also holds, then there also exists a set of separating PBE where Alice reports
rA 2 [Y H,Y  T]a f t e rr e c e i v i n gt h eH signal. In the following analysis, we consider a set of
separating PBE where Alice reports rA 2 [max(fH,;,Y T),Y H]a f t e rr e c e i v i n gt h eH signal,
which is a subset of the ﬁrst set of separating PBE described above, and we map these
separating PBE to the separating PBE of the signaling game.
We ﬁrst describe the setting of a signaling game using the notation of Mas-Colell, Whin-
ston, and Green [Mas-Colell et al., 1995]. In the signaling game, there are two types of
workers with productivities ✓H and ✓L,w i t h✓H >✓ L > 0, and these productivities are not
observable. Before entering the job market, each worker can get some amount of education,
86and the amount of education that a worker receives is observable. Getting education does
not a↵ect a worker’s productivity, but the high-productivity workers in the job market may
use education to distinguish them from the low-productivity workers. The cost of obtaining
education level e for a type ✓ worker is given by the twice continuously di↵erentiable function
c(✓,e), with c(✓,0) = 0, @
@ec(✓,e) > 0, @2
@e2c(✓,e) > 0, c(✓H,e) <c (✓L,e), for all e>0a n d
@
@ec(✓H,e) < @
@ec(✓H,e),8e>0. Both the cost and the marginal cost of education are lower
for workers with productivity ✓H.E a c hw o r k e rc a nc h o o s et ow o r ka th o m eo rw o r kf o ra n
employer. Working at home earns the worker no wage. If the worker chooses to work for an
employer, then his wage depends on the employer’s belief about the worker’s productivity
based on the worker’s education level. If a type ✓ worker chooses education level e and
receives wage !,t h e nh i sp a y o ↵ ,d e n o t e db yu(!,e | ✓), is equal to his wage less the cost of
getting education, i.e. u(!,e | ✓)=!   c(e,✓).
In separating PBE of the signaling game, many education levels for the high productivity
worker are possible and the low productivity worker chooses no education. In particular, any
education level in some range [˜ e,e1]f o rt h eh i g hp r o d u c t i v i t yw o r k e r sc a nb es u s t a i n e da t
aP B Eo ft h i sg a m e .I n t u i t i v e l y ,t h ee d u c a t i o nl e v e lo ft h eh i g hp r o d u c t i v i t yw o r k e rc a n n o t
be below ˜ e in a separating PBE because, if it were, the low productivity worker would ﬁnd
it proﬁtable and pretend to be of high productivity by choosing the same education level.
On the other hand, the education level of the high productivity worker cannot be above e1
because, if it were, the high productivity worker would prefer to get no education instead,
even if this meant that he would be considered to be of low productivity.
Consider our setting when a separating PBE exists (i.e. YH   YT), we can map elements
of our game to the signaling game. We can also map separating PBE of our game where
Alice reports rA 2 [max(fH,;,Y T),Y H]t ot h es e p a r a t i n gP B Eo ft h es i g n a l i n gg a m e . W e
outline details of this mapping in Table 4.1.
Alice’s two types H and T in our setting correspond to the two types of workers with
productivities ✓H and ✓L. If Alice chooses to report a value rA >f H,;,s h ei n c u r sal o s s
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✓H,h i g hp r o d u c t i v i t yw o r k e r H, Alice’s H type
✓L, low productivity worker T, Alice’s T type
e>0, education level rA >f H,;, Alice’s report rA
c(✓,e), cost of education as a
function of the level e and the
worker type ✓
L(fsA,;,r A), loss function with
respect to report rA and type
sA
@
@ec(✓,e) > 0,8e>0, cost of
education is increasing in edu-
cation level
@
@rAL(fsA,;,r A) > 0,8rA >
fH,;, loss is increasing in Al-
ice’s report
@2
@2ec(✓,e) > 0,8e>0, cost is
convex in education level
@2
@r2
AL(fsA,;,r A) > 0,8rA >
fH,;, loss is convex in Alice’s
report
c(✓H,e) <c (✓L,e),8e>0, cost
is lower for high productivity
worker
L(fH,;,r A) <
L(fT,;,r A),8rA >f H,;,
loss is lower for Alice’s H type
@
@ec(✓H,e) < @
@ec(✓L,e),8e>0,
marginal cost is lower for high
productivity worker
@
@rAL(fH,;,r A) <
@
@rAL(fT,;,r A),8rA >f H,;,
marginal loss is lower for
Alice’s H type
e1, highest education level
for high productivity worker
among all separating PBE
YH,h i g h e s tr e p o r tf o rH type
among all separating PBE
˜ e,l o w e s te d u c a t i o nl e v e lf o r
high productivity worker
among all separating PBE
max(fH,;,Y T), lowest report
for H type among the subset
of separating PBE
Table 4.1: Comparison between our setting and Spence’s job market signaling game
in the market scoring rule payo↵ for either type. This loss is the cost of misreporting and
corresponds to the cost of getting education for either worker type in the signaling game.
Moreover, the loss function and the cost function have similar properties: they are increasing
and convex in education level/report and they are lower for the ✓H/H type. Also the marginal
loss and cost functions are lower for the ✓H/H type. As a result of these properties, in both
settings, there exists a range of possible values for the education level/report of the ✓H/H
type reports whereas the ✓L/T type chooses no education/does not misreport at separating
PBE.
88In the signaling game, the fundamental reason that education can serve as a signal is that
the marginal cost of education depends on a worker’s type. The marginal cost of education is
lower for a high-productivity worker
 
@
@ec(✓H,e) < @
@ec(✓L,e)
 
. As a result, a ✓H type worker
may ﬁnd it worthwhile to get some positive level of education e>0t or a i s eh e rw a g eb y
some positive amount whereas a type ✓L worker may not be willing to get the same level
of education in return for the same amount of wage increase. As a result, by getting an
education in the range [˜ e,e1], a high-productivity worker could distinguish themselves from
their low-ability counterparts. Analogously, in our setting, the fundamental reason that a
separating PBE where Alice reports rA 2 [max(fH,;,Y T),Y H]e x i s t si st h a tr e p o r t i n gav a l u e
rA >f H,; has a marginally lower expected loss in market scoring rule payo↵ for Alice’s H
type than for Alice’s T type. Thus, Alice’s H type may be willing to report a value rA much
higher than fH,; in order to increase her outside payo↵ whereas Alice’s T type may not be
willing to report rA for the same amount of increase in her outside payo↵. Therefore, when
YH   YT,t h e r ee x i s t sar a n g eo fr e p o r t s ,[ m a x ( fH,;,Y T),Y H], such that Alice’s H type can
distinguish herself from Alice’s T type in our game.
Note that, if Y H  Y T holds in addition to YH   YT,i ti sa l s op o s s i b l et om a pt h e
set of separating PBE where Alice reports rA 2 [Y H,Y  T]t ot h es e p a r a t i n gP B Eo ft h e
signaling game. The only caveat is that, instead of mapping education e directly to Alice’s
report rA,w en e e dt om a pe d u c a t i o ne to the distance between Alice’s report rA and fH,;.
We omit the description of the mapping because it is nearly identical to Table 4.1. However,
many instances of our market game have separating PBE that cannot be mapped to the
separating PBE of the signaling game. For example, when YH >f H,; >Y T >Y  H,t h es e t
of separating PBE where Alice reports rA 2 [YT,f H,;)a f t e rr e c e i v i n gt h eH signal is left
unmapped. As a class of games, our market game in general has more equilibria than the
signaling game.
894.8 Conclusion and Future Directions
We study the strategic play of prediction market participants when there exist outside incen-
tives for the participants to manipulate the market probability. The main high level insight
from our analysis is that conﬂicting incentives inside and outside of a prediction market do
not necessarily damage information aggregation in equilibrium. In particular, under cer-
tain conditions, there are equilibria in which full information aggregation can be achieved.
However, there are also many situations where information loss is inevitable.
Although we only consider a 2-player model, our results remain valid for a much more
general setting. Our results can be easily extended to a setting in which multiple participants
trade in the market after Alice and before the end of the market, as long as each participant
only trades once in the market. Moreover, if there are participants trading before Alice in
the market, our results can be extended to this setting if all of the private information of the
participants trading before Alice are completely revealed before Alice’s stage of participation.
An immediate future direction is to consider a more general setting when Alice’s signal
has more than 2 realizations. As suggested by our analysis, with more realized signals, Alice’s
equilibrium behavior could become much more complicated depending on how these realized
signals inﬂuence her payo↵s from inside and outside of the market. Another interesting future
direction is to consider outside payo↵ functions with other structures, such as threshold
functions or non-monotone functions.
More broadly, one important future direction is to better understand information aggre-
gation mechanisms in the context of decision making, and design mechanisms to minimize or
control potential loss in information aggregation and social welfare when there are conﬂicting
incentives within and outside of the mechanism.
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An Experimental Evaluation of a Peer
Prediction Mechanism
Businesses and organizations often face the challenge of gathering accurate and informative
feedback or opinion from multiple individuals. Notably, community-based websites such as
Yelp, IMDb, Amazon, TripAdvisor, and Angie’s List that review products and services are
largely dependent on voluntary feedback contributed by their users. The proliferation of
online labor markets has also created an opportunity for outsourcing simple tasks, such as
classifying images and identifying o↵ensive content on the web, to a readily available online
workforce.
In all of these settings, there are some signiﬁcant barriers in getting participants to hon-
estly reveal their information. First, it is often costly to formulate and share an honest
opinion—for example, when evaluating qualities of books or restaurants—whereas uninfor-
mative contributions require little or no e↵ort. More importantly, it may be di cult or
impossible to verify individual contributions against an observable ground truth, because
either the information is inherently subjective or it is too costly to be veriﬁed.
These di culties led to the development of peer prediction mechanisms, pioneered by Miller
et al. [2005]. To incentivize truthful reports, these mechanisms leverage the stochastic cor-
91relation of participants’ information and reward each participant by comparing the par-
ticipant’s report with those of his peers. Existing theory on peer prediction focuses on
designing such monetary rewards to induce a truthful Bayesian Nash equilibrium among all
participants—it is in a participant’s best interest to report his information truthfully if he
believes all other participants will also be truthful.
Despite the existence of the truthful equilibrium, peer prediction theory provides little
assurance that participants will adhere to it in practice. This is because peer prediction
mechanisms also induce uninformative equilibria where participants can coordinate to make
as e to fr e p o r t st h a ta r ei n d e p e n d e n to ft h e i ri n f o r m a t i o n . M o r e o v e r ,s u c hu n i n f o r m a t i v e
equilibria are unavoidable in general [Jurca and Faltings, 2009, Waggoner and Chen, 2013].
Although Miller et al. [2005] argue that the truthful equilibrium is likely focal due to limited
communication or ethical preferences of participants, there is generally little theoretical or
empirical support for this conjecture.
In this work, we aim to understand how participants will behave towards the peer predic-
tion mechanisms in the presence of multiple equilibria. Speciﬁcally, we address the following
question:
Will the participants play one of the multiple equilibria of the peer prediction
mechanisms? If they do, which equilibrium will they choose and why?
To tackle this question, we tested participants’ behavior towards the Jurca and Faltings
[2009] (JF) mechanism by engaging them in a multiplayer, real-time and repeated game
through a controlled online experiment on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) [Mason
and Suri, 2012]. We allow the participants to repeatedly interact with the JF mechanism,
revealing their behavioral dynamics over time. Our work is the ﬁrst empirical evaluation
of participants’ behavior towards a peer prediction mechanism in terms of convergence to
game-theoretic equilibria.
In our particular experimental setting, we show that the truthful equilibrium is not focal
and that participants clearly favor the uninformative equilibria when paid by peer prediction.
92In contrast, a majority of the participants are consistently truthful when peer prediction is
not used. Speciﬁcally, for payment rules where the uninformative equilibria have higher
payo↵s, a majority of the players coordinated on an uninformative equilibrium. Moreover,
for payment rules where the symmetric uninformative equilibria do not exist or have less
payo↵ than the truthful equilibrium, we successfully deterred the players from choosing
the uninformative equilibria but still did not motivate truthful reports. Hence, our results
suggest that adopting peer prediction mechanisms may be harmful in scenarios where the
cost of being truthful is similar to that of acting strategically.
In answering our question about equilibrium play, we needed to infer the players’ intended
strategies, which are not directly observed in an experiment. This is a common challenge
in experimental studies of game-theoretic mechanisms. Researchers typically try to detect
equilibrium play by comparing the frequencies of players’ actions with equilibrium or other
strategies. In this work, we use the novel approach of a hidden Markov model (HMM)
to capture players’ strategies as latent variables. The HMM is ideal for game-theoretic
modeling because it allows us to infer strategies and equilibrium play from observed actions,
while allowing the strategies to evolve over time. Our analytical results show that there is
great potential in using probabilistic latent variable models to describe game-theoretic and
other experimental data.
5.1 Related Work
There have been considerable theoretical developments on peer prediction mechanisms. The
earlier mechanisms rely on a common prior assumption — the information structure, i.e. the
prior joint distribution of the participant’s signals and the event outcome, must be common
knowledge among the participants and known by the designer [Miller et al., 2005, Jurca and
Faltings, 2009, Zhang and Chen, 2014]. Miller et al. [2005] proposed the ﬁrst peer predic-
tion method, which rewards each participant for whether his report is predictive of another
93participant’s report using a proper scoring rule. While the Miller et al. [2005] mechanism
induces the truthful equilibrium, it also has uninformative equilibria where all participants
make the same report and reveal no information. Jurca and Faltings [2009] generalized and
improved the Miller et al. [2005] mechanism to eliminate or hamper the undesirable sym-
metric uninformative equilibria by making each participant’s payment depend on multiple
other reports instead of one other report.
The common prior assumption is quite stringent, particularly since the mechanism needs
to know the common prior in order to determine the payments. Several subsequent mecha-
nisms relax this assumption — they either do not require this assumption at all [Witkowski
and Parkes, 2012b], or do not require the mechanism to know the common prior [Prelec,
2004, Witkowski and Parkes, 2012a, Radanovic and Faltings, 2013]. In particular, the
robust Bayesian truth serum (RBTS) [Witkowski and Parkes, 2012a] improved upon the
Bayesian truth serum (BTS) [Prelec, 2004] by being incentive compatible for small popula-
tions, and Radanovic and Faltings [2013] devised a mechanism similar to RBTS [Witkowski
and Parkes, 2012a] for non-binary signals.
Regarding the elicitability of private information without observable ground truth, Wag-
goner and Chen [2013] proved the impossibility result that any peer prediction mechanism
has at least one uninformative equilibrium where the participants’ reports are independent
of their private information. Intuitively, an uninformative equilibrium can be reached if the
participants play the same game as if they do not possess any private information. More-
over, Radanovic and Faltings [2013] gave several impossibility results regarding the design
of peer prediction mechanisms with di↵erent assumptions on the common prior distribution,
focusing on the case when the participants have conditionally independent and identically
distributed signals. Zhang and Chen [2014] proved that the information structures satis-
fying stochastic relevance is the maximal set of information structures that are truthfully
elicitable. Moreover, they generalized the Miller et al. [2005] mechanism for the maximal
truthfully elicitable set of information structures when the designer knows the information
94structure, and they proposed a sequential mechanism for a slightly smaller set of information
structures when the designer does not know the information structure.
In recent work, Witkowski et al. [2013] and Dasgupta and Ghosh [2013] assume that
a participant can invest costly e↵ort, which improves the quality of his report, and they
proposed mechanisms to incentivize both truthfulness and high e↵orts. They consider binary
information elicitation tasks and assume that an agent could invest costly e↵ort to achieve a
certain quality or a probability of identifying the ground truth. By using negative payments
to penalize disagreement, Witkowski et al. [2013] designed an output-agreement mechanism
such that participants with quality above a threshold choose to participate and invest e↵ort
while those below do not participate. Dasgupta and Ghosh [2013] devised a mechanism
where exerting maximum e↵ort and truthful reporting is a Nash equilibrium with maximum
payo↵s to all participants. Their key contribution is a technique for penalizing low-e↵ort
agreement leading to the uninformative equilibria by using the presence of multiple tasks.
Very few experimental work has adopted peer prediction mechanisms. Among them, only
the work by John et al. [2012] aim to evaluate the incentives of a peer prediction mechanism,
speciﬁcally the Bayesian truth serum [Prelec, 2004]. This motivated us to experimentally
evaluate the incentives of other peer prediction mechanisms. John et al. [2012] asked psy-
chologists to report their engagements in questionable research practices in an anonymous
survey study, using BTS to incentivize truth telling. They showed that the self admission
rate was higher in the BTS group than in the control group.
Several experiments adopted but did not evaluate peer prediction mechanisms [Prelec and
Seung, 2006, Shaw et al., 2011, Gao et al., 2012]. Prelec and Seung [2006] demonstrated that
BTS can be used to infer the ground truth even if most participants’ subjective judgements
are wrong. Shaw et al. [2011] used the description of BTS as the contextual manipulation
for one ﬁnancial incentive tested in their online experiment, but did not pay the workers
according to the mechanism. Gao et al. [2012] used the Witkowski and Parkes [2012b]
mechanism to score judges on their evaluations of the quality of short tourism ads.
955.2 The Jurca and Faltings Mechanism
We describe the JF mechanism [Jurca and Faltings, 2009], which include the ﬁrst peer
prediction mechanism [Miller et al., 2005] as a special case.
We are interested in an item for which some people have opinions or subjective infor-
mation, given by their private signals, and we aim to design monetary payments so that
participants will truthfully reveal their signals about the item. The item has a type ! 2 ⌦;
we focus on the binary case with |⌦| = 2. Among N   3p a r t i c i p a n t sp r o v i d i n gt h e i r
opinions, participant i’s private opinion is a binary signal s 2 S,S = {s1,s 2} that only he
observes.
The JF mechanism assumes that the relationship between the participants’ signals and
the type of the item is common knowledge. This assumption allows inference about the
likelihood of one participant’s signal given another participant’s signal. The participants’
signals are assumed to be conditionally independent given the type of the item. Speciﬁcally,
the type of the item is drawn by nature according to a probability distribution P(!),!2 ⌦
where
P
!2⌦ P(!)=1 ,a n de a c hp a r t i c i p a n t ’ ss i g n a ls is independently drawn according to
the conditional probability distribution P(s | !),s 2 S,! 2 ⌦. Moreover, the mechanism
assumes that the prior P(!)a n dt h ec o n d i t i o n a ld i s t r i b u t i o nP ( s | !)a r ec o m m o nk n o w l e d g e
for all participants and the mechanism.
With their realized signals, each participant makes a report r 2 S to the mechanism.
The mechanism pays each participant according to the participant’s report r and nf reports
of his peers (1  nf  N   1), denoted the participant’s reference reports.F o r e x a m p l e ,
participant i’s reference report could be one other random participant’s report (nf =1 )o r
all other participants’ reports (nf = N   1). When nf =1 ,w eu s erf to denote the single
reference report.
The payment rule of the JF mechanism is designed to induce a truthful Bayesian Nash
equilibrium among rational and risk-neutral participants: a participant maximizes his ex-
pected payment by truthfully reporting his private signal if he believes that all other par-
96ticipants are reporting their signals truthfully. A payment rule that supports the truthful
equilibrium must satisfy the following linear constraints:
X
0mnf
P(m | si)(u(si,m)   u(s3 i,m))   0,8i =1 ,2
where u(r,m)( r 2 S, m 2 [1,n f]) denotes a participant’s payment if he reports r and m out
of his nf reference reports are s1 and P(m | s)d e n o t e st h ep r o b a b i l i t yt h a tg i v e nas i g n a lo f
s 2 S, m out of nf signals are s1.W eu s et h i sl i n e a rp r o g r a mw i t ha d d i t i o n a lc o n s t r a i n t st o
derive payment rules in our experiment.
Although the JF mechanism supports the truthful equilibrium by design, it always in-
duces other uninformative pure strategy equilibria. Furthermore, the uninformative equilib-
ria may yield higher payo↵s than the truthful equilibrium, making it questionable whether
participants will choose the truthful equilibrium in practice. For example, for the payment
rule in Table 5.1a, for every s 2 S, it is an equilibrium for all participants to report s re-
gardless of their signals. These equilibria yield higher payo↵ (1.20 or 1.50) than the truthful
equilibrium (0.91). In general, when a participant’s payment depends only on one reference
report, Jurca and Faltings [2009] proved that at least one of the symmetric pure strategy
coordinating equilibria must yield higher payo↵ than the truthful equilibrium.
r = s1 r = s2
rf = s1 1.50 0.30
rf = s2 0.10 1.20
(a) Example 1.
r = s1 r = s2
m =0 0.90 0.80
m =1 0.10 1.50
m =2 1.50 0.10
m =3 0.80 0.90
(b) Example 2.
r = s1 r = s2
m =0 0.10 0.15
m =1 0.10 0.90
m =2 1.50 0.15
m =3 0.15 0.10
(c) Example 3.
Table 5.1: Payment rule examples. In (a), each cell gives a player’s payo↵ if he reports r
and his reference report is rf.I n( b )a n d( c ) ,e a c hc e l lg i v e sap l a y e r ’ sp a y o ↵i fh er e p o r t sr
and m out of the nf reference reports are s1.).
Fundamentally, the existence of such uninformative equilibria is unavoidable as partici-
pants’ reports are only compared with one another and not with the ground truth. Although
we cannot make truthful reporting the unique pure strategy equilibrium, it is possible to mod-
97ify the payment rule to remove the symmetric pure strategy coordinating equilibria entirely
or make them less desirable than the truthful equilibrium. Either can be achieved if we
have at least 4 participants and a participant’s payment depends on all other participants’
reports [Jurca and Faltings, 2009].
Table 5.1b shows a payment rule without any symmetric coordinating equilibrium. If all
participants make the same report, then any participant can improve his payo↵ from 0.80 to
0.90 by reporting the other signal. However, this payment rule has asymmetric coordinating
equilibria where 3 participants always report s1 and the remaining participant always reports
s2 (or vice versa). These asymmetric coordinating equilibria also reveal no information but
may be harder to reach if the participants cannot communicate with one another.
Alternatively, we could make the symmetric coordinating equilibria less desirable than
the truthful equilibrium (Table 5.1c). This is possible because a participant’s payment is
maximized when his report agrees with the majority but not all of his reference reports. At
either symmetric coordinating equilibrium, every participant gets 0.15, which is much less
than the expected payo↵ of 0.50 at the truthful equilibrium.
5.3 Experiment Design and Setup
Among all peer prediction mechanisms, we chose to test the binary version of the JF mech-
anism for the following reasons. Compared to the Miller et al. [2005] mechanism, Jurca
and Faltings [2009] generalized and improved the Miller et al. [2005] mechanism to eliminate
or hamper the undesirable symmetric uninformative equilibria. One of our main goals is
to test whether eliminating or hamming the uninformative equilibria will promote truthful
behavior. Moreover, compared to the later peer prediction mechanisms, it is relatively easier
for the participants to understand and to reason about the payment rule of the Jurca and
Faltings [2009] mechanism. First, the Jurca and Faltings [2009] mechanism only requires the
participant to choose a value in a small discrete report space. Most later peer prediction
98mechanisms require participants to report probabilities, so they need to choose a value in a
continuous real-valued report space. It is psychologically easier for the participants to reason
about discrete rather than continuous values. It is known that that people have systematic
bias when reasoning about probabilities. Also, the Jurca and Faltings [2009] mechanism does
not use any complicated mathematical formula whereas the later peer prediction mechanisms
use complicated mathematical formulae such as proper scoring rules. As a result, it is much
easier to make the payment rule of the Jurca and Faltings [2009] mechanism accessible to
the lay participant compared to the later peer prediction mechanisms.
We evaluated the JF mechanism in a repeated setting, although it was deﬁned and an-
alyzed as a one-shot mechanism. In practice, it is natural to expect participants to learn
and adapt to the mechanism by providing their opinions for di↵erent products and services.
Hence, a repeated setting best captures the intended uses of peer prediction and the partic-
ipants’ learning dynamics. Such studies of one-shot games in a repeated setting are typical
in experimental economics [Shachat et al., 2012].
We conduct our experiment on MTurk. Peer prediction mechanisms are naturally suited
for online experiments, as their intended application is for web-based or impersonal settings.
Online participants enjoy greater anonymity and are not subject to the social norms typical of
real-world interaction. Additionally, online labor markets, such as MTurk, provide immediate
access to a large and diverse subject pool, which is not readily available through alternative
means. We recruited over 3000 unique participants in our experiment. Recent studies have
shown that online experiments are not only viable, but can be advantageous for large-scale
studies of behavior [Horton et al., 2011, Mason and Suri, 2012, Rand, 2012].
Trick or treat story In our experiment, we described the mechanism using a simple and
fun story about trick or treating on Halloween night:
A group of kids are trick or treating on Halloween night. There are two types of
houses, A and B, giving out two types of candies, M&M’s and gummy bears, in
di↵erent proportions. The kids randomly choose a house to go trick or treating.
The chosen house may be one of the two types with equal chance but the kids don’t
99know which type of house was chosen. Each kid secretly receives one randomly
selected candy from the chosen house. A clown shows up and asks each kid to
tell him the type of candy received, promising a payment in return. Each kid may
claim to have either type of candy to the clown. The clown collects reports from
all the kids, and then rewards each kid based on the kid’s claim and the other
kids’ claims according to a payment rule.
This story can be easily mapped to the setting of the JF mechanism. Each player is a
kid, the house is the type of the item, the candies are the signals and reports, and the clown
is the mechanism.
This story serves several purposes. First, it makes the mechanism accessible to partic-
ipants who may be unfamiliar with economic theory. Second, it satisﬁes the mechanism’s
common knowledge assumptions, which are required for their theoretical properties to hold.
The story also highlights the conditional independence of the signals given the type of the
item by emphasizing that the proportions of candies at each house remains the same regard-
less of the candies given out.
The story also explains that misreporting one’s private information is perfectly accept-
able. Although this is a common concept in game theory, it can be unintuitive for MTurk
workers since they often associate misbehavior with rejection or punishment. To counter this
bias, we stated that each player’s candy is obtained in secret and is not observed by anybody
else. We used the clown as a neutral character to represent the mechanism. The action of
“making a claim” is a neutral phrasing in lieu of words such as “lying” or “cheating” with
negative connotations. We also emphasized that each player can claim to have either type
of candy, and that the clown cannot verify whether the player’s claim matches the player’s
candy.
Setup Our experiment engaged the participants in a real-time, multiplayer, and repeated
game through MTurk. A ﬁxed number of players are matched together and play a game
repeatedly for a ﬁxed number of rounds. We use TurkServer [Mao et al., 2012], a framework
and API for real-time interaction between experiment participants, in our experiment.
We o↵er a $1.00 base payment for completing the task. Each player also receives a bonus
100payment equal to his average reward in the game (ranging from $0.10 to $1.50). We chose a
large bonus relative to the base payment to motivate workers to focus on their performance
in the game.
We controlled our subject pool in several ways. Each worker may participate only once
in the experiment, so that no worker has prior experience with the game. We also restricted
our tasks to US workers, for two reasons. Having US workers minimizes the likelihood of
connection issues since we require synchronous connections to a US-based server. Second,
controlling for geography avoids unexpected behavior if people from other regions have di↵er-
ent behavioral norms or a language barrier in understanding the instructions. Additionally,
we used common qualiﬁcations (> 95% HITs approved, > 100 HITs completed) to ensure
that workers are familiar with the MTurk system.
Task Users progress through the task in several sections. The ﬁrst page describes some
general information and requires consent, followed by an 11-page tutorial consisting mainly
of pictures. The tutorial describes the trick or treat story and the game interface. After
the tutorial, the participant must pass a short quiz testing their understanding of the task.
Each participant has 3 attempts to pass the quiz with a score of at least 80%. If they
fail all 3 attempts, they are permanently blocked from our experiment. After passing the
quiz, participants wait in a virtual lobby for enough players to start a new game. When
enough players arrive, a ’READY’ button appears for each player, starting a new game when
enough players press this button; this ensures that all players are paying attention when the
experiment starts. We explain the game interface in the next section. After the game, the
participants are asked to describe the strategies and reasoning they used in a short exit
survey.
Interface The game interface (Figure 5.1) describes some general information such as the
number of rounds and the number of other players at the top, the steps of the current round
on the left, and the history of game play on the right. Players cannot communicate with one
another during the task, other than viewing reports from previous rounds.
101Figure 5.1: The Game Interface
When designing the table showing the history of play, we carefully considered how to
show the optimal amount of information. With an abundance of information, a participant
may become distracted or confused, and pay less attention to the task. However, with
insu cient information, a participant may not be able to learn or improve his strategy by
observing other participants’ actions. After initial trials of our experiment, we ultimately
chose to display the other participants’ claims as an aggregate summary, which is a concise
yet still informative representation.
To control for position biases on the game interface, we randomize the row and column
order of the payment rule once for each participant and show this randomized table through-
out the task. We also randomize the order of questions on the quiz and the order of the
radio buttons for choosing claims.
Dealing with disconnections Due to the synchronicity of the experiment, disruptions
from connection issues are possible. To ensure that a game progresses smoothly when such
102T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
Number of players per game 3 3 4 4 1
Number of rounds 20 20 20 30 20
Number of games without expelled players 103 104 103 103 411
Table 5.2: Treatments
issues occur, we expel a participant from the game if he is disconnected for at least 1 minute
(a reasonable threshold since a typical game lasts 5 minutes). An expelled player cannot
reconnect to the game, and the server will choose truthful reports on behalf of the expelled
player. This ensures that other players experience the game as normal. Our analysis excludes
37 games with expelled players (4% of the games).
5.4 Treatments
We designed and conducted ﬁve treatments in sequence (Table 5.2). Because we had no a
priori prediction of players’ empirical behavior, we used the results of the earlier treatments
to design the later treatments. We allowed each participant to participate only once in any
treatment, and our quiz showed that participants have similar comprehension of the task in
all treatments.
For each game, we recruited a small number of players and allowed them to play for a
large number of rounds. Having a small number of players minimizes players’ waiting times
and potential connection issues, as well as making it easier for each player to reason about
other players’ actions. With a large number of rounds, we hoped to give players su cient
time to explore and improve their strategies.
For all payment rules, we chose the maximum payment of 1.50 to make it more attractive
than the 1.00 base payment, and the minimum payment of 0.10 to prevent extreme behavior
resulting from attempting to avoid a payment of zero.
Let ⌦ = {A,B} denote the two types of houses and let S = {MM,GB} be the common
signal and report space. We use the MM (or GB) equilibrium to refer to the symmetric
103coordinating equilibrium where all players always report MM (or GB), and let xMMyGB
denote an asymmetric coordinating equilibrium for a (x + y)-player game where x players
always report MM and y players always report GB.
The prior Aﬁ x e dp r i o ri su s e df o ra l lt r e a t m e n t s ,a ss h o w ni ne q u a t i o n( 5 . 1 ) .
P(A)=0 .5, P(MM | A)=0 .2, P(MM | B)=0 .7( 5 . 1 )
This prior has the nice property that if one player receives a given signal, other players are
more likely to have received the same signal. This reasoning may motivate players to be
truthful if they believe other players are also truthful.
Treatment 1 For treatments 1 and 2, we used payment rules where each player has one
reference report, chosen randomly from all other reports. For treatment 1 (Table 5.3a), all
four values in the payment rule are distinct and neither report strictly dominates the other.
At the truthful equilibrium, every player obtains 0.91 in expectation. Moreover, both the
MM and GB equilibria yield higher payments than the truthful equilibrium. Every player
gets the maximum payment of 1.50 at the MM equilibrium, making it the highest-paying
choice among all equilibria.
r =M M r =G B
rf =M M 1.50 0.30
rf =G B 0.10 1.20
(a) Treatment 1 payment rule.
r =M M r =G B
rf =M M 1.50 0.10
rf =G B 0.10 1.50
(b) Treatment 2 payment rule.
Table 5.3: Payment rules of treatments 1 and 2. The cell at (r,rf)g i v e sap l a y e r ’ sp a y m e n t
if the player reports r and his reference report is rf.
Treatment 2 For treatment 1, it’s easy to identify the MM equilibrium as having the
highest payment. Thus, in treatment 2, we modiﬁed the payment rule of treatment 1 to be
symmetric (Table 5.3b), such that the MM and GB equilibria have the same payments. We
hypothesized that such a payment rule may deter the players from reaching either the MM
or GB equilibrium, especially without direct communication.
104Treatment 3 For payment rules where each player has only one reference report, we
are inevitably limited in incentivizing truthful reporting because one of the MM and GB
equilibria will always yield higher payment than the truthful equilibrium [Jurca and Faltings,
2009]. To overcome this limitation we tested 4-player payment rules in treatments 3 and 4
where each player’s payment depends on all other players’ reports. We aim to either eliminate
the MM and GB equilibria altogether or make these equilibria yield worse payment than the
truthful equilibrium.
The payment rule for treatment 3 (Table 5.4a) does not have the MM and GB equilibria.
However, it does support the 3MM1GB and 1MM3GB equilibria and an equilibrium where
every player always reports the signal he did not receive. Compared to the truthful equi-
librium, the 3MM1GB or 1MM3GB equilibria seem more attractive. They give 3 players
the maximum payment of 1.50 and the remaining player 0.90, which is comparable to the
expected payment of 0.91 at the truthful equilibrium.
r =M M r =G B
nf =0 0.90 0.80
nf =1 0.10 1.50
nf =2 1.50 0.10
nf =3 0.80 0.90
(a) Treatment 3 payment rule.
r =M M r =G B
nf =0 0.10 0.15
nf =1 0.10 0.90
nf =2 1.50 0.15
nf =3 0.15 0.10
(b) Treatment 4 payment rule.
Table 5.4: Payment rules of treatments 3 and 4. The cell at (r,ff)g i v e sap l a y e r ’ sp a y m e n t
if the player reports r and nf of his reference reports are MM.
Treatment 4 For treatment 4’s payment rule, the MM and GB equilibria pay very little,
as shown in Table 5.4b. At the either MM or GB equilibrium, a player obtains a small
payment of 0.15, which is close to the minimum payment of 0.10. In contrast, every player
receives 0.50 in expectation at the truthful equilibrium.
We chose this payment rule for two reasons. First, it is impossible to eliminate all of the
MM, GB, 3MM1GB and 1MM3GB equilibria for any such 4-player payment rule. Moreover,
by supporting the MM and GB equilibria instead of the 3MM1GB and 1MM3GB equilibria,
105it is possible to make the payments from the coordinating equilibria much less than those of
the truthful equilibrium.
Non Peer-Prediction Treatment For comparison, we would like to understand how
players behave when they are not paid by any peer prediction mechanism. In this treatment,
each player is paid 0.90 in every round, which is comparable to a player’s expected payment
at the truthful equilibrium in treatments 1 and 3. Also, each player plays the game alone,
without observing other players’ reports. We believe that this setting is closest to how such
a constant payment would be used in practice.
5.5 Results
We collected results on a fairly large scale, recruiting 3533 unique subjects over 65 days for
both the pilot and the actual experiment. In the pilot experiment, 705 workers passed the
quiz and 542 of them played a total of 181 games. In the actual experiment, 2031 workers
passed the quiz and and 1988 of them played a total of 861 games.
We received generally positive feedback about the design of our task, suggesting that
peer prediction mechanisms can be made accessible to lay participants. Many participants
remarked that the game was easy to understand, quick, smooth and enjoyable. 79% of
all workers who attempted the quiz eventually passed it, suggesting that the quiz was of
appropriate di culty and the participants had adequate understanding of the mechanism.
5.5.1 Summary of Data
Figure 5.2 shows a summary of our experimental data: the percentage of players receiving
ap a r t i c u l a rs i g n a la n dm a k i n gas p e c i ﬁ e dr e p o r tf o re a c hr o u n di ne a c ht r e a t m e n t . I n
treatments 1 and 4, the percentage of players with GB signals and MM reports increases,
whereas in treatment 2, the percentage of players with MM signals and GB reports increases.
The total percentage of misreporting is smallest in treatment 5.
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Figure 5.2: Percentage of players with the speciﬁed signal and report
T1 T2 T3 T4
Actual payo↵ 1.13 1.05 0.87 0.57
Expected payo↵ at truthful equilibrium 0.91 0.98 0.90 0.50
Table 5.5: Comparison of actual payo↵ with expected payo↵ at truthful equilibrium
Table 5.5 compares the players’ average payo↵s in the game with their expected payo↵
at the truthful equilibrium in treatments 1-4. Compared to a player’s expected payo↵ at
the truthful equilibrium, the players’ average payo↵ is higher in treatments 1, 2, and 4, and
lower in treatment 3.
5.5.2 Learning a Hidden Markov Model
Our main goal is to answer the following question:
Will the players reach one of the multiple equilibria of the game, and if so which
equilibrium will the players choose and why?
107While equilibrium concepts are deﬁned based on players’ strategies, we only observe the
players’ signals and reports in our experiment. In fact, characterizing unobserved strategies
is a common challenge for experimentally testing game-theoretic predictions. A common
approach is to test whether a player’s actions are consistent with an equilibrium strategy, but
this heuristic assumes that a player’s actions are drawn from a stationary distribution [Selten
and Chmura, 2008]. Alternatively, one might directly elicit mixed strategies from players in
the form of a probability distribution over actions [Noussair and Willinger, 2011], but this
invasive elicitation method may signiﬁcantly inﬂuence players’ behavior.
We use the hidden Markov model [Rabiner, 1989] to accurately capture the players’
strategies in repeated games. Widely used in speech recognition, natural language processing,
and computational biology, the HMM allows us to infer strategies from actions and analyze
how they evolve over time without ﬁxing the strategies a priori. Recent work has adopted
similar probabilistic models to detect latent behavior in repeated games [Shachat et al., 2012,
Ansari et al., 2012].
We model the players’ behavior as follows. There are K latent states in the HMM. The
j-th state corresponds to the mixed strategy
(µj(MM,MM),µj(GB,MM))
where µj(s,r)=P ( r | s)i st h ep r o b a b i l i t yo fr e p o r t i n gr when receiving signal s for
strategy j 2{ 1,...,K}.E a c hp l a y e ri 2{ 1,...,N} chooses his starting strategy from the
distribution
⇡ =( ⇡1,...,⇡ K)
where ⇡j is the probability that a player adopts strategy j in the ﬁrst round. Players change
their strategies according a stochastic matrix A,w i t h
A(j,j
0)=P r (  
i
t+1 = j
0 |  
i
t = j), 8j,j
0 2{ 1,...,K}
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Figure 5.3: The graphical model for each player i implied by the HMM.
where  i
t is player i’s strategy in round t and A(j,j0)i st h ep r o b a b i l i t yt h a tap l a y e ra d o p t s
strategy j in round t and switches to strategy j0 in round t +1 .
This HMM makes several assumptions about players’ behavior. A player only chooses
strategies among the K states of the HMM. Moreover, a player’s distribution over strategies
in round t +1i sM a r k o v i a na n dd e p e n d so n l yo nh e rs t r a t e g yi nr o u n dt.T h u s , e a c h
player changes his strategy stochastically according to a ﬁxed transition distribution, and
this may not capture the scenario when players change their strategies in response to their
peers’ actions. However, by considering each player independently, the HMM describes the
population as a whole instead of capturing the intentions of individual players. It is thus a
natural ﬁrst step in studying the evolution of unobserved strategies.
Our experimental observations are pairs (si
t,r i
t), corresponding to player i’s signal si
t and
report ri
t in round t. The HMM deﬁnes the following probability distribution over players’
reports based on their signals and model parameters:
Pr(r | s,⇡,µ,A)=
N Y
i=1
 
T Y
t=2
µ i
t(s
i
t,r
i
t)A( 
i
t 1, 
i
t)
!
µ i
1(s
i
1,r
i
1) · ⇡( 
i
1)( 5 . 2 )
As shown in Figure 5.3, this model di↵ers from the canonical HMM as both the observed
signal si
t and the hidden state  i
t inﬂuence the observed action ri
t,b u tc a nb ee s t i m a t e d
using the same methods. We maximize equation (5.2) over ⇡,µ,a n dA using the Baum-
109Welch Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm, obtaining maximum likelihood values of
the parameters. These parameters reveal the set of strategies, the initial and the long-run
distribution over strategies.
Robustness The likelihood function for the HMM is not log-concave and so the local
optimum found by the EM algorithm depends on the initial parameters. To get closer to
the global optimum, we ran the EM algorithm with 100,000 restarts with random initial
parameters and chose the parameters with the highest log likelihood. Many of the restarts
produced equivalent “best” solutions. The equivalent solutions contain the same hidden
states and transition probabilities in di↵erent orders. Therefore, we feel conﬁdent that we
found solutions equivalent to the global optimum.
Model selection The number of states (strategies) K for the HMM may signiﬁcantly
impact our equilibrium convergence analysis. As K increases, there is a diminishing return
on the increase in the log likelihood. A common criterion for model selection is the Bayesian
information criterion (BIC) [Schwarz, 1978]. For all treatments, we chose K =4i no r d e rt o
maximize the BIC.
GB MM Truthful Mixed Mixed 2
Treatment 1 (0.13,0.09) (1.00,0.99) (0.99,0.04) (0.82,0.45)
Treatment 2 (0.01,0.00) (0.99,0.99) (0.96,0.01) (0.60,0.32)
Treatment 3 (0.02,0.03) (0.87,0.97) (0.97,0.05) (0.54,0.42)
Treatment 4 (0.96,0.97) (0.96,0.06) (0.73,0.61) (0.34,0.37)
Constant payment (0.02,0.00) (0.98,0.02) (0.16,0.96) (0.68,0.34)
Table 5.6: Each tuple gives the estimated strategy (µj(MM,MM),µ j(GB,MM)). All numbers
are rounded to 2 decimal places.
Estimated HMM parameters The HMMs estimated for all treatments are described
in detail in Appendix C.1. The interpretations of the 4 states of each HMM are shown in
Table 5.6. The majority of the estimated strategies are close enough to one of the pure
strategies (MM, GB or truthful) and are therefore interpreted correspondingly. Notably,
these strategies emerged as a result of estimating our model on the data without a priori
restrictions. Every state in each estimated HMM has a large self-transition probability
110(  0.9). This suggests that players rarely switch between strategies, and they play each
strategy for 10 rounds on average before switching to a di↵erent strategy.
When estimating each HMM, the number of strategies K a↵ects how the strategies
capture the players’ noisy behavior. When K increases, the pure strategies in the HMM
become less noisy and closer to their theoretical deﬁnitions. For instance, as K increases from
3t o4 ,t h et r u t h f u ls t r a t e g yi nt r e a t m e n t1c h a n g e sf r o m( 0 .91,0.22) to (0.99,0.04). When
K is small, the strategies are less pure because they must incorporate players’ exploratory
behavior. As K increases, the pure strategies become less noisy because the noisy behavior
can be captured using additional strategies.
Equilibrium convergence using HMM analysis The set of strategies in each HMM
only describes the population in aggregate. To better understand the actions of each player,
we use the Viterbi [1967] algorithm to estimate the most likely sequence of strategies used
by each player over the multiple rounds of the game. Formally, for given parameters µ,⇡,
and A, the Viterbi algorithm computes
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Having a sequence of most likely strategies for each player allows us to characterize equi-
librium convergence for each game—here, we are referring to convergence to game-theoretic
equilibria and not to the stationary distribution of the Markov chain for the HMM. In the
following results, we use the values  i⇤,i2{ 1,...,N},t od e s c r i b es t r a t e g i e sa n de q u i l i b r i a
in games.
Treatment 1 Results Treatment 1’s results are shown in Figure 5.4. Strikingly, many
players adopted more proﬁtable strategies and converged to the uninformative equilibria
during the game. In particular, they started with the truthful or mixed strategy but switched
to and stayed with the MM or GB strategy until the end (Figure 5.4a). The MM and GB
strategies are that are close to absorbing under the HMM interpretation.
Moreover, players particularly favored the MM equilibrium, which yields the highest
111payo↵. 1/3o ft h ep l a y e r su s e dt h eM Ms t r a t e g yt h r o u g h o u tt h eg a m ea n da n o t h e r1 /3
of the players switched to playing the MM strategy during the game (Figure 5.4a). The
percentage of games playing the MM equilibrium increased dramatically from 8% to around
46%, whereas the total percentage of games playing the GB or truthful equilibria remained
less than 10% (Figure 5.4b).
Unsurprisingly, few players are truthful due to the high payo↵s of the MM and GB
equilibria. Around 15% of the players are truthful throughout the game, but only 5% of the
games converged to the truthful equilibrium by the end.
(a) Each row shows how a single player’s strat-
egy evolves over multiple rounds.
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Figure 5.4: Treatment 1 Results.
Treatment 2 Results In treatment 2, we aimed to deter the players from choosing ei-
ther the MM or GB equilibrium by giving them the same payo↵ (Figure 5.5). This was
unsuccessful as 36% of the games converged to the GB equilibrium (Figure 5.5b).
Compared to treatment 1, this treatment is better at promoting truthful behavior in the
short term, but not in the long run. More players in this treatment adopted the truthful
strategy at the beginning—32% of the players in this treatment compared to 16% in treat-
ment 1 (Figures 5.4a and 5.5a). We hypothesize that this happened because it is harder to
coordinate on the GB equilibrium than to coordinate on the MM equilibrium in treatment 1.
112However, by the end of the game, less than 4% of the games in either treatment converged
to the truthful equilibrium (Figures 5.4b and 5.5b).
Interestingly, players clearly favored the GB equilibrium over the MM equilibrium al-
though they yield the same payo↵s. One reason for this seems to be a property of the prior:
the probability of the GB signal (55%) is higher than that of the MM signal. If players start
by being truthful, this property alone could naturally lead them to the GB equilibrium.
Indeed, we observe that nearly all players starting with the truthful strategy who switched,
changed to the GB rather than the MM strategy (Figure 5.5a). Moreover, players’ exit
survey answers revealed that they deliberately coordinated on the GB equilibrium once they
recognized that other players were more likely to receive the GB candy. These suggest that
players have a basic understanding of the prior and can use it to determine their strategies.
(a) Each row shows how a single player’s strat-
egy evolves over multiple rounds.
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Figure 5.5: Treatment 2 Results.
Treatment 3 Results In this treatment, we aimed to promote truthful behavior by elim-
inating the symmetric coordinating equilibria, although there still exist asymmetric coordi-
nating equilibria (Figure 5.6). As expected, it was empirically much more di cult for players
to ﬁnd and reach the asymmetric equilibria versus the symmetric equilibria. Less than 5%
of the games converged to an asymmetric equilibrium (Figure 5.6b) whereas more than 1/3
113of the games converged to a symmetric equilibrium in the ﬁrst two treatments (Figures 5.4b
and 5.5b).
However, the increased di culty of ﬁnding a coordinating equilibrium did not promote
truthful reporting. Not a single game converged to the truthful equilibrium (Figure 5.6b)
despite 20% of players being truthful over the entire game (Figure 5.6a).
The mixed strategy (0.54,0.42) used by more than half of the players may capture the
players’ random exploration because they are unable to decide on a strategy for this complex
payment rule. Alternatively, this strategy is very close to the random strategy (0.50,0.50),
which is part of a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, and 11% of games appear to reach
this mixed strategy equilibrium (Figure 5.6b).
(a) Each row shows how a single player’s strat-
egy evolves over multiple rounds.
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Figure 5.6: Treatment 3 Results.
Treatment 4 Results In this treatment, we made the MM and GB equilibria to have
very low payo↵s. Similar to treatment 3, this e↵ectively deterred the players from choosing
them (Figure 5.7). Less than 2% of the games reached the MM equilibrium and no game
reached the GB equilibrium (Figure 5.7b).
However, this did not promote truthful behavior. No game reached the truthful equi-
librium (Figure 5.7b) although 16% of the players were truthful during the entire game
114(Figure 5.7a).
Players strongly favored the MM strategy over the GB strategy, possibly because of the
higher payments in the MM column (Figure 5.4b). A large percentage (26%) of the players
adopted the MM strategy by the end of the game (Figure 5.7a). In contrast, they seemed to
not consider the GB strategy at all as none of the 4 estimated strategies (Table 5.6) is close
to the GB strategy (This is true even for K =6 ) .
(a) Fraction of games matching an equilibrium
strategy proﬁle in each round.
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Figure 5.7: Treatment 4 Results.
5.5.3 Classifying Convergence to Pure Strategy Equilibria
In contrast to the HMM analysis, a simpler approach to detect equilibrium convergence
is to compare players’ reports with an equilibrium strategy. Using this simple approach,
described below, we classiﬁed the convergence of each game to pure strategy equilibria of
the JF mechanism. In Table 5.7, we show that the classiﬁcation results using this simple
method and the HMM analysis are almost identical.
Informally, we characterize equilibrium convergence as follows. For round t,w ea s s u m e
that a player’s report is consistent with a pure strategy if the report is observed with positive
probability given the strategy. A report may be consistent with more than one pure strategy.
115Then, we conclude that all players in a game converged to a particular equilibrium in round t
if t is the earliest round such that all players’ reports from round t to round T are consistent
with this equilibrium. Finally, if the players in a game converge to more than one equilibrium,
we pick the equilibrium where the convergence occurred the earliest.
Formally, consider the one-shot peer prediction game with N players and T rounds, and
ap u r es t r a t e g ye q u i l i b r i u me 2 E of this game. Let  i(e)b ep l a y e ri’s strategy at this
equilibrium e,a n dl e t i
t be player i’s strategy in round t that we infer from this analysis.
Given player i’s signal si
t and report ri
t that we observed in round t,w ec o n j e c t u r et h a tp l a y e r
i is playing strategy  i(e)i nr o u n dt if his report is observed with positive probability given
the strategy and his signal, that is
µ i(e)(s
i
t,r
i
t) > 0 )  
i
t =  
i(e), 8i,t,e.
Note that a player’s report in each round may be consistent with multiple pure strategies.
Then we say that player i converged to equilibrium e at round
t
i(e)= m i n i m u mv a l u ei n{1,...,T} such that  
i
t =  i(e),8t
i(e)  t  T,
and that the game converged to equilibrium e at round
t(e)= m a x
1iN
t
i(e).
Players in a game may converge to di↵erent equilibria at di↵erent rounds. Hence, we
ﬁnd the equilibrium for which the convergence occurred earliest in the game. The game con-
verged to the equilibrium e⇤ =a r g m i n
e2E
t(e)a tr o u n dt⇤ =m i n
e2E
t(e)). If convergence occurred
su ciently early (t⇤  (T   5)), we classify that the game converged to the equilibrium e⇤
at round t⇤.O t h e r w i s e ,t h eg a m er e m a i n su n c l a s s i ﬁ e d .
116Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4
HMM Simple HMM Simple HMM Simple HMM Simple
Truthful 4 5 4 7 0 0 0 0
GB 5 4 37 34 - - 0 0
MM 47 47 7 7 - - 2 1
3MM1GB - - - - 4 4 - -
1MM3GB - - - - 1 1 - -
Unclassiﬁed 47 47 56 56 98 98 101 102
Table 5.7: Classiﬁcation of convergence to pure strategy equilibria using the simple method.
Each cell gives the number of games converging to the particular equilibrium in the speciﬁed
treatment. The symbol “-” means that the equilibrium does not exist for the payment rule
tested in the speciﬁed treatment.
5.5.4 Non Peer-Prediction Treatment
Remarkably, in the absence of peer prediction methods, this treatment was much more
successful in incentivizing truthful reports than all other treatments. 2/3o ft h ep l a y e r s
reported truthfully during the entire game (Figure 5.8), despite having no explicit incentive
to do so. We conjecture that the reason for these observations is that truthful reporting is the
easiest choice for players who are o↵ered a constant payment, since the cost of exploring and
adopting alternative strategies may be greater than that of being truthful in the design of
our trick or treat game. When peer prediction is used in the other treatments, it may prompt
and even motivate the players to explore non-truthful strategies, leading to the strategic play
observed. This implies that peer prediction mechanisms may be better suited for scenarios
where behaving truthfully is much more costly than acting strategically.
5.6 Experimental Challenges
In designing an online behavioral experiment to test an economic mechanism, we overcame
some unique challenges. We believe that awareness of these issues is important for future
experimental work.
117Figure 5.8: Non Peer-Prediction Treatment Results. Each row shows how a single player’s
strategy evolves over multiple rounds.
Coordinating simultaneous participation of multiple workers Our experiment re-
quires multiple unique workers to participate in each game simultaneously. This is unusual
for MTurk, where workers typically participate independently, without interaction, and com-
plete many similar tasks (HITs) at a time.
To coordinate the simultaneous participation of several workers, we built a virtual lobby,
where workers wait for enough others to start the game [Mason and Suri, 2012]. However,
simple posting such tasks on MTurk is not su cient to ensure a smooth experience for the
workers and to collect high quality data. In our pilot experiment, workers experienced a
long wait in the lobby because they accepted our tasks at very di↵erent times. This resulted
in games with workers not paying attention or accidentally disconnecting from the server,
causing further frustration for other workers.
We solved this problem by mimicking the recruitment process for lab experiments. In
as e p a r a t er e c r u i t m e n tt a s k ,w ed e s c r i b e do u re x p e r i m e n ta n dp a i d$ 0 .10 for workers to
consent to being contacted. We invite the recruits via email to participate in our experiment
at speciﬁed times. Each time, we posted the tasks during a 30-minute window to encourage
the timely arrival of the participants and to minimize their waiting time. This recruitment
process worked extremely well: we completed the experiment signiﬁcantly more quickly and
118collected higher quality data, compared to our pilot experiment. By establishing prior history
with a worker, we can compensate a worker for his time using a bonus payment if he could
not ﬁnish the experiment due to technical issues. Many of these features are now part of
the TurkServer [Mao et al., 2012] platform, and we encourage its use for deploying similar
experiments.
Ensuring attention and comprehension Using unique participants, we face the chal-
lenge of ensuring workers’ attention and comprehension with only a single interaction. Lab
experiments can easily ensure participants’ attention with location and time constraints. In
contrast, getting online workers’ full attention can be a luxury due to the distractions in
their environment. We addressed this issue in several ways. First, we went through several
design iterations to ensure that our task was clear, enjoyable and smooth. We also promised
a generous bonus payment contingent on workers’ performance in the task, motivating them
to pay attention. Finally, we used a built-in tutorial and quiz to ensure that workers have
adequate understanding of the task.
The MTurk meta-environment Ap l a t f o r ms u c ha sM T u r ki sas m a l lp a r to fam u c h
bigger online environment. Workers constantly communicate through various forums 1,r e -
view requesters on sites such as TurkOpticon2, and use third party services like TurkAlert to
monitor requester activities. These systems can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the results of online
experiments [Chandler et al., 2013].
While many such communities have policies to protect the integrity of research data,
workers may still unwittingly disclose details of our task that we do not want revealed, or
they may speculate and reach incorrect conclusions about the purpose of our experiment.
They may also share their confusion and frustration with other workers without notifying
the requester. The unique worker requirement also makes the task less attractive than other
1Popular sites include http://www.turkernation.com, http://www.reddit.com/r/mturk, http://
www.mturkforum.com, http://www.cloudmebaby.com, and http://www.mturkgrind.com.
2http://turkopticon.ucsd.edu
119tasks that allow repeated participation. Furthermore, a requester’s reputation on review
sites such as TurkOpticon can seriously inﬂuence his ability to recruit participants in the
future.
As a result, we carefully designed our task and conducted our experiments to provide
workers with a positive experience. We promptly responded to email communications from
workers at all times, especially during the time window when tasks were posted. We made
sure our payments compared fairly to market wages, and paid workers promptly upon task
completion. We also extensively monitored workers’ activities on the various online commu-
nities, advertising our presence to prevent intentional discussion of our task, and responding
quickly to workers’ questions. This also allowed us to recruit workers from the broader online
community. Despite only able to participate once, many workers left positive TurkOpticon
reviews for us and said that they would be happy to work on our tasks again.
5.7 Conclusion and Future Work
In our experimental setting, we did not observe truthful behavior when participants are
rewarded using the Jurca and Faltings [2009] mechanism. Players easily converged to the
uninformative equilibria, and hampering these equilibria did not induce truthful behavior.
In contrast, players are generally truthful in the absence of economic incentives.
This observation, however, may be due to several features of our setting. First, in our
setting, the costs of truthful reporting and behaving strategically. This property makes it
more likely for the participants to be truthful in the absence of economic incentives. From
this perspective, we are interested in the direction of evaluating peer prediction mechanisms
in a setting when truthful reporting is much more costly than behaving otherwise. Moreover,
in our experiment, we assign players to ﬁxed groups and let them play the game repeatedly
with the same peers. This essentially tests the peer prediction as a repeated game. While
there is an equilibrium of the repeated game where every player in every round adopts his
120strategy at an equilibrium of the stage game (i.e. the one-shot peer prediction game), the
repeated game may have other equilibria where players’ behavior in each round is di↵erent
from their behavior at any equilibrium of the stage game. For future work, to alleviate the
repeated game e↵ects, we would like to test peer prediction by recruiting a large number
of players and randomly rematching the players for each round of the game. Finally,
we are also excited about exploring other social, psychological and economic techniques for
motivating truthful behavior. For instance, if we inform the participants of the existence of
the truthful equilibrium, the participants’ behavior may be very di↵erent than what we’ve
observed.
Our work shows the promise of evaluating game theoretic mechanisms through online be-
havioral experiments, especially for mechanisms inherently designed for an online or crowd-
sourced setting. Online infrastructures allow for conducting experiments at a much greater
scale, as we show in recruiting over 3000 participants for our experiment. In addition, our
results also motivate the general use of probabilistic models for analyzing game-theoretic
and other experimental data, demonstrating the potential of greatly improved explanatory
power of participants’ behavior over existing techniques.
121Chapter 6
Adaptive Polling for Information
Aggregation
Decision making often relies on collecting small pieces of relevant information from many
individuals and aggregating such information into a consensus to forecast some event of inter-
est. Such information elicitation and aggregation is especially challenging when the outcome
space of the event is large, due to the inherent di culties in reasoning over and propagating
information through the large outcome space in a consistent and e cient manner.
In recent years, online labor markets, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), have
become a burgeoning platform for human computation [Law and von Ahn, 2011]. MTurk
provides easy access to an ever-growing workforce that is readily available to solve complex
problems such as image labeling, translation, and speech-to-text transcriptions. One salient
feature of MTurk is that the tasks typically o↵er small monetary rewards (e.g. 10 cents) and
involve simple, one-shot interactions. This leads to a natural problem solving approach where
ac o m p l e xp r o b l e mi sd e c o m p o s e di n t om a n ys i m p l e ,m a n a g e a b l es u b t a s k s ,s u c ht h a te a c h
worker can make a small, relatively independent contribution towards the overall solution.
The algorithm then takes care of integrating the solutions to the subtasks into a coherent
ﬁnal solution to the entire problem.
122In this work, we examine whether we can leverage online labor markets’ easy access
to participants to e↵ectively solve the information elicitation and aggregation problem for
an event with an exponentially large outcome space. Our proposed algorithm, through
simple, one-shot interactions, adaptively collects many small pieces of potentially imprecise
information from a large number of participants recruited through an online labor market,
and integrates these information together into an accurate solution.
We consider a setting with n competing alternatives, each characterized by a hidden
strength parameter. Our goal is to produce accurate estimates of the alternatives’ strength
parameters in order to rank them. Participants have noisy information about the strengths
of the alternatives. We design an adaptive algorithm which produces probabilistic estimates
of the strength parameters based on collected pairwise comparison data. Moreover, our
adaptive algorithm uses an active learning approach to choose each pairwise comparison
question to myopically maximize the expected information gain from each participant. We
then evaluate our algorithm through an MTurk experiment for a set of alternatives for which
we know the underlying true ranking. Our experimental results show that the adaptive
method can gradually incorporate small pieces of collected information and improve the
estimates of the strength parameters over time. Compared with presenting a random pairwise
comparison question at each step, adaptive questioning has the advantage of reducing the
uncertainty of and increasing the accuracy of the estimates more quickly. Interestingly, this
is achieved by asking more pairwise comparison questions that are less likely to be answered
correctly.
6.1 Related Work
Many elaborate approaches have been developed for event forecasting. For example, predic-
tion markets [Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004] allow participants to wager on the outcomes of
uncertain events and make proﬁts by improving market predictions. There have been sev-
123eral attempts to design expressive prediction markets [Chen et al., 2008, Abernethy et al.,
2011, Xia and Pennock, 2011, Pennock and Xia, 2011], especially for forecasting an event
with a combinatorial outcome space (e.g. permutation of n alternatives). However, these
combinatorial prediction markets can be computationally intractable to operate, and it is
more complicated for humans to interact with the markets than participate in simpler elici-
tation mechanisms such as surveys. A study by Goel et al. [2010] showed that, for predicting
outcomes of binary sports events, the relative advantage of using prediction markets in-
stead of polls was very small. This suggests that methods requiring simple interactions with
participants may still provide accurate results for the purpose of eliciting and aggregating
information.
There is a rapidly evolving human computation literature on designing workﬂows for
solving complex problems using crowdsourcing platforms. The simpler approaches either
allow for participants to iteratively improve the solution, or to work on the same problems in
parallel [Little et al., 2009, 2010]. More complex workﬂows attempt to break a problem down
into small chunks so that the participants can make relatively independent contributions to
the ﬁnal solution [Kittur et al., 2011, Liem et al., 2011, Noronha et al., 2011]. Our method can
be seen as a workﬂow that aggregates pairwise comparison results from many participants
using an adaptive algorithm, and integrates these results into an accurate total ordering of
the alternatives.
Our adaptive algorithm characterizes the participants’ noisy information on the strength
parameters using the Thurstone-Mosteller model [Thurstone, 1927, Mosteller, 1951], which is
a special case of the well known random utility model (RUM) [McFadden, 1974] in economics
with Gaussian noise. The Thurstone-Mosteller model has a long history in psychology,
econometrics, and statistics, and has been used in preference learning [Brochu et al., 2007,
Houlsby et al., 2011] and rating chess players [Elo, 1978]. In a recent work, Mao et al. [2013]
use voting rules to reconstruct an underlying ranking given noisy full rankings elicited from
human subjects. One of their voting rules is created using the Thurstone-Mosteller model.
124Carterette et al. [2008] demonstrate from an information retrieval perspective that pairwise
comparisons such as used in the Thurstone-Mosteller model are more natural and e↵ective
for human preference elicitation than absolute judgments. When the noise follows a Gumbel
distribution, the RUM model becomes the Plackett-Luce model [Plackett, 1975, Luce, 2005].
For pairwise comparison, the Plackett-Luce model reduces to the well known Bradley-Terry
model [Bradley and Terry, 1952]. We choose to use the Thurstone-Mosteller model because
of the tractability in model estimation when using Gaussian noise.
Our algorithm takes an active learning approach to choose the pair of alternatives to
query for each participant. Active learning allows us to generate more accurate estimates
with fewer pairwise comparisons and less cost. Interested readers can refer to Settles [2009]
for a comprehensive survey on active learning. An active learning algorithm may use one
of many strategies to evaluate the informativeness of the expected data and to choose the
next query. For instance, the algorithm can choose the query that would most change the
current model, that would most reduce the generalization error, or that would minimize the
variance [Settles, 2009]. We choose the next pair of alternatives to maximize the expected
change to our estimates — maximize the expected distance between the current and updated
estimated parameter distributions using the Kullback-Leibler divergence as the distance met-
ric. Alternatively, this could be interpreted as choosing the next query to maximize expected
information gain according to an information-theoretic metric. Glickman and Jensen [2005]
also used this metric to optimally ﬁnd pairs for tournaments using the Bradley-Terry model.
Parallel to our work is a new research area called “learning to rank” in machine learning.
The goal of this area is to rank a list of items given full or partial orderings of the items. Our
work is closest to the work by Azari Souﬁani et al. [2013b,a]. Azari Souﬁani et al. [2013b]
assume that the participants’ preferences are generated by generalized random utility model
and they use adaptive elicitation according to classical criteria in Bayesian experimental
design. The Thurstone-Mosteller model that we use is a special case of generalized random
utility model. Our active learning approach is closely related to D-optimality, which is a well
125studied criterion in Bayesian experimental design. However, they elicit a full ranking from
each participant whereas we only elicit a pairwise comparison. The algorithm developed
by Azari Souﬁani et al. [2013a] breaks the full rankings into pairwise comparisons, but they
did not use active learning for elicitation. Ailon [2011] developed an algorithm to rank some
items given pairwise comparisons, and the goal of the algorithm is to produce a ranking which
disagrees with as a few pairwise comparisons as possible. They also use active learning to
minimize the number of pairwise comparisons required. Long et al. [2010] developed an
active learning framework for ranking, but they produce the ranking by eliciting a score for
each item rather than pairwise comparisons.
6.2 Our Adaptive Method
We are interested in predicting the ranking of n competing alternatives, where the true
ranking is determined by hidden strength parameters si for each alternative. If si >s j,
alternative i is ranked higher than alternative j.P a r t i c i p a n t sh a v en o i s yi n f o r m a t i o no nt h e
strength parameters.
Our method presents simple pairwise comparison questions to participants and elicits
information only on the presented pair of alternatives. Based on the data collected, we esti-
mate the strength parameters of all the alternatives. As it is costly to poll the participants,
we adaptively choose (in each iteration) the next pair of alternatives that can provide the
largest expected (myopic) improvement to the current estimation.
Let M be a n ⇥ n nonnegative matrix used to record the pairwise comparison results.
Mi,j denotes the number of times alternative i has been ranked higher than alternative j.
Let Mi,i =0 ,8i.T h e n ,ah i g h - l e v e ls u m m a r yo fo u rm e t h o dw i t hT iterations is presented
in Algorithm 1 below.
In Section 6.2.1, we introduce the Thurstone-Mosteller model adopted for modeling the
noisiness of the participants’ information. We discuss the method for estimating the strength
126Algorithm 1 Adaptive Information Polling and Aggregation
1. Initialize M to a nonnegative, invertible matrix, with value 0 on the diago-
nal.
2. t =1 .
while t  T do
3. Estimate the strength parameters based on M. We use the Thurstone-
Mosteller model to capture the noisiness of participants’ information and obtain the
maximum likelihood estimates of the strength parameters. See Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2
for details.
4. Select a pair of alternatives that maximizes the expected information gain
of the parameter estimation. See Section 6.2.3 for details.
5. Obtain the answer to the pairwise comparison question from an partici-
pant and update the matrix M.
6. t = t +1 .
end while
parameters of alternatives in Section 6.2.2. Together, these two parts detail how step 3 of
Algorithm 1 is carried out. Finally, we explain step 4 of Algorithm 1 in Section 6.2.3.
6.2.1 Noisy Information Model
To model the noisiness of the participants’ information, we adopt the Thurstone-Mosteller
model or the Probit model with Gaussian noise. One may also adopt the Bradley-Terry
model, also called the Logit model, by setting P(ri >r j)t o 1
1+e
sj si,t h ec d fo ft h el o g i s t i c
distribution. The di↵erence between the two models is very slight, but the Gaussian distri-
bution of the Thurstone-Mosteller model is more tractable for the adaptive approach in our
algorithm.
Let s0 =( s0
1,s 0
2,...,s 0
n)r e p r e s e n tt h ea b s o l u t es t r e n g t ho ft h en alternatives. We model
ar a n d o mp a r t i c i p a n t ’ sp e r c e i v e da b s o l u t es t r e n g t ho fa l t e r n a t i v ei as a random variable:
r0
i = s0
i + ✏0
i, where the noise term is Gaussian, ✏0
i ⇠N(0, 2)w i t hu n k n o w n 2. Thus, the
probability for the participant to rank alternative i higher than alternative j is
P(r
0
i >r
0
j)=P ( ✏
0
j   ✏
0
i <s
0
i   s
0
j)= 
✓
s0
i   s0
j p
2 
◆
(6.1)
127where  (·)i st h ec u m u l a t i v ed i s t r i b u t i o nf u n c t i o n( c d f)o ft h es t a n d a r dG a u s s i a nd i s t r i b u t i o n
N(0,1).
We note that the  2 term only a↵ects scaling. Furthermore, with a ﬁxed number of
parameters n, only their di↵erences a↵ect the probabilities. Without loss of generality, let
si =
1
p
2 
(s
0
i   s
0
k), (6.2)
and
ri =
1
p
2 
(r
0
i   s
0
k), (6.3)
where k is an arbitrary reference alternative. We then have sk =0 ,a n dri = si + ✏i, where
✏i ⇠N(0,1/2). E↵ectively we only have n 1 unknown parameters. The probability that a
participant ranks alternative i higher than alternative j can be written as
P(ri >r j)=  ( si   sj). (6.4)
From now on, for simplicity, we will call s the strength parameters of the alternatives and r
the perceived strength of the alternatives.
6.2.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Given the pairwise comparison results M, we will obtain the maximum likelihood estimates
of the strength parameters for the Thurstone-Mosteller model introduced above.
The log likelihood given M is
L(s|M) =
X
i,j
Mi,j log( (si   sj)). (6.5)
The maximum likelihood estimators, ˆ s,a r et h es t r e n g t hp a r a m e t e r st h a tm a x i m i z et h el o g
likelihood, i.e. ˆ s 2 argmaxs L(s|M).
Let  (x) be the probability density function (pdf) of the standard Gaussian distribution:
 (x)= 1 p
2⇡e  x2
2 . Note that  (x)i sl o g - c o n c a v e ,t h a ti s ,l o g (x) is concave. According to
Bagnoli and Bergstrom [1989], the cdf of a log-concave and di↵erentiable pdf is also log-
128concave. This means that log (x)i sc o n c a v ei nx.T h u s ,t h el o gl i k e l i h o o df u n c t i o nL(s|M)
in (6.5) is a concave function of s and we only need to consider the ﬁrst order conditions to
solve the optimization problem.
The derivatives of L(s|M) are
@L(M|s)
@si
=
X
j
Mi,j
 (si   sj)
 (si   sj)
 
X
j
Mj,i
 (sj   si)
 (sj   si)
for all i. Hence, ˆ s is the solution to the equation system
@L(M|s)
@si =0 ,8i.T h i sd o e sn o th a v e
a closed-form solution, but can be solved using numerical methods.
The maximum likelihood estimators ˆ s asymptotically follow a multivariate Gaussian
distribution. The variance and covariance of ˆ s can be estimated using the Hessian matrix of
the log likelihood evaluated at ˆ s. The Hessian matrix has elements
@2L
@sj@si
=M i,j
 (si   sj)
 (si   sj)
✓
si   sj +
 (si   sj)
 (si   sj)
◆
+M j,i
 (sj   si)
 (sj   si)
✓
sj   si +
 (sj   si)
 (sj   si)
◆
for i 6= j,a n d
@2L
@s2
i
=  
X
j:j6=i
@2L
@sj@si
for all i. Let H(ˆ s) be the Hessian matrix at s = ˆ s.T h e n ,t h ee s t i m a t e dc o v a r i a n c em a t r i x
of ˆ s is the inverse of negative H(ˆ s), i.e.
ˆ ⌃=(  H(ˆ s))
 1.
Therefore, given M, our knowledge on s can be approximated by the multivariate Gaussian
distribution N(ˆ s, ˆ ⌃).
1296.2.3 Adaptive Approach
At each iteration, the most valuable poll to present to a participant is on a pair of alternatives
that can best improve our current knowledge of the strength parameters.
Let M
c be the matrix of observations, ˆ sc be the estimation of s,a n dˆ ⌃c be the estimated
covariance matrix of ˆ sc in the current round. Because ri = si + ✏i,w h e r e✏i ⇠N(0,1/2) is
independent Gaussian noise, the predicted perceived strength of alternatives by a random
participant follows a multivariate Gaussian distribution: ˆ rc ⇠N(ˆ sc, ˆ ⌃c+⌃✏), where ⌃✏ is the
covariance matrix of the ✏i and has value 1/2 on the diagonal and 0 everywhere else. Hence,
given a pair of alternatives i and j,t h ep r e d i c t e dp r o b a b i l i t yt h a tar a n d o mp a r t i c i p a n tw i l l
rank alternative i higher than alternative j is
ˆ p
c
i,j =P ( ˆ r
c
i > ˆ r
c
j)= 
 
ˆ sc
i   ˆ sc
j
1+ˆ ⌃c(i,i)+ˆ ⌃c(j,j)   2ˆ ⌃c(i,j)
!
where ˆ ⌃c(i,j)i st h ee l e m e n to fˆ ⌃c at row i and column j.T h i sm e a n st h a ta te a c hi t e r a t i o n ,
for each pair of alternatives i and j, we can predict how likely a random participant will
rank i higher than j and similarly will rank j higher than i.
Suppose we present the pair of alternatives i and j to a participant. If the participant
ranks i higher than j,o u rm a t r i xo fo b s e r v a t i o n sw i l lb e c o m eM
ij,w h i c hi si d e n t i c a lt o
M
c everywhere except M
ij(i,j)=M
c(i,j)+1 . W ed e n o t et h ea p p r o x i m a t ed i s t r i b u t i o n
obtained from the maximum likelihood estimation given M
ij as N(ˆ sij, ˆ ⌃ij). Intuitively, if
N(ˆ sij, ˆ ⌃ij)i sv e r yd i ↵ e r e n tf r o mo u rc u r r e n te s t i m a t i o nN(ˆ sc, ˆ ⌃c), the extra observation has
al a r g ei n f o r m a t i o nv a l u e .T h u s ,w eu s et h eK u l l b a c k - L e i b l e rd i v e r g e n c e ,a l s oc a l l e dr e l a t i v e
entropy, to measure the information value. The Kullback-Leibler divergence between the
two multivariate normal distributions is
DKL(N(ˆ s
ij, ˆ ⌃
ij)kN(ˆ s
c, ˆ ⌃
c)) =
1
2
⇥
tr
⇣
(ˆ ⌃
c)
 1 ˆ ⌃ij
⌘
(6.6)
+
 
ˆ s
c   ˆ s
ij >
(ˆ ⌃
c)
 1(ˆ s
c   ˆ s
ij)   log
 
|ˆ ⌃ij|
|ˆ ⌃c|
!
  n
⇤
,
130where n is the dimension of the random vectors, which equals the number of alternatives, and
|ˆ ⌃ij| is the determinant of ˆ ⌃ij.S i m i l a r l y ,i ft h ep a r t i c i p a n tr a n k sj higher than i,o u rm a t r i x
of observations will become M
ji,w h i c hi si d e n t i c a lt oM
c everywhere except M
ji(j,i)=
M
c(j,i)+1 . T h en e wa p p r o x i m a t ed i s t r i b u t i o nb e c o m e sN(ˆ sji, ˆ ⌃ji). The Kullback-Leibler
divergence DKL(N(ˆ sji, ˆ ⌃ji)kN(ˆ sc, ˆ ⌃c)) can be calculated analogously to (6.6).
Putting all pieces together, for each pair of alternatives i and j,w ec a nc a l c u l a t et h e
expected information gain of polling an participant on the pair as
g(i,j)=ˆ p
c
i,jDKL(N(ˆ s
ij, ˆ ⌃
ij)kN(ˆ s
c, ˆ ⌃
c)) (6.7)
+ˆ p
c
j,iDKL(N(ˆ s
ji, ˆ ⌃
ji)kN(ˆ s
c, ˆ ⌃
c)).
At each iteration, we pick the pair with the maximum expected information gain and present
it to another participant.
Figure 6.1: Two example pictures. The left picture has 342 dots, and the right one has 447
dots.
6.3 Experiment Design
We experimentally evaluate the e↵ectiveness of our method with participants recruited from
MTurk. In our experiment, each alternative was a picture containing a relatively large
131number of dots [Horton, 2010]. We generated 12 di↵erent pictures, each having 318, 335,
342, 344, 355, 381, 383, 399, 422, 447, 460, and 469 non-overlapping dots respectively. The
number of dots x in each picture was independently drawn according to a distribution such
that P(x) _ 1/x for x 2 [300,500].Figure 6.1 presents two example pictures used in the
experiment. The goal was to use our method to estimate the relative number of dots in
these 12 pictures in order to correctly rank the pictures in decreasing number of dots. We
chose pictures with dots as the alternatives for our experiment for several reasons:
1. We know the correct ranking and can more objectively evaluate the proposed method.
2. The number of dots in each picture is large enough that counting is not an option for
participants, introducing uncertainty.
3. The di↵erences in number of dots across pictures vary and some pairs are more di cult
to compare than others; for example, pictures in some adjacent pairs di↵er by only 2
dots, while those in some other adjacent pair are separated by 26 dots.
We ran our experiment on MTurk. For each HIT (Human Intelligence Task in MTurk’s
terminology), we presented a pair of pictures, randomly placing one on the left and the other
on the right, and asked a MTurk user (Turker) to choose the picture that contained more
dots. The base reward for completing a HIT was $0.05. If the Turker correctly selected the
picture with more dots, we provided another $0.05 as a bonus. Using our adaptive method,
we compute an estimate of the strength parameters which reﬂect the relative di↵erences
between the number of dots in the pictures, and decide which pair of pictures to present to
the next Turker.
The matrix M was initialized to have value 0 on the diagonal and 0.08 everywhere else.
This e↵ectively set our initial estimate of the strength parameters to be N(0,⌃0), where ⌃0
had value 1.64 on the diagonal and value 0.82 everywhere else. This can be interpreted as
our prior belief of the strength parameters without any information.
132We ran 6 trials of adaptive polling. For each trial, we recruited 100 participants assuming
that the budget is only enough for collecting 100 correct answers. To evaluate the advantage
of our adaptive approach, we ran another 6 trials (with 100 HITs in each trial) of the random
polling method, where the pair in each HIT was randomly selected. In our experiment, each
HIT was completed by a Turker with a unique ID. In other words, we interacted with each
participating Turker only once.
6.4 Results
The actual number of dots in each picture can be considered its absolute strength parameter
s0
i, the value of which we know as the experimenter. However, in order to evaluate our
method, we need to establish a “gold standard” for the strength parameters relative to the
strength sk =0o far e f e r e n c ea l t e r n a t i v ek, as deﬁned in equation (6.2). To transform
the absolute strength parameters into these “gold standard” strength parameters, we need
ag o o de s t i m a t eo f 1 p
2  according to equation (6.2), si = 1 p
2 (s0
i   s0
k). We run a Probit
regression [McCullagh and Nelder, 1989] on the 1200 pairwise comparison results collected
from all 12 trials. Speciﬁcally, let Y be 1 if the left picture is selected and 0 if the right
picture is selected. Let X be the number of dots in the left picture minus the number of
dots in the right picture. Then, P(Y =1 |X)=  ( X ), where   = 1 p
2 ,a n dw eh a v e1 2 0 0
observations for (X,Y). The Probit regression gives us an estimate ˆ   =0 .017. Multiplying
(s0
i  s0
k)b yˆ  ,w eo b t a i nt h e“ g o l ds t a n d a r d ”s t r e n g t hp a r a m e t e r s- 0 . 4 1 ,- 0 . 1 2 ,0 ,0 . 0 3 ,0 . 2 2 ,
0.66, 0.7, 0.97, 1.36, 1.79, 2.01, and 2.16 for the 12 pictures. The picture with 342 dots
(the third lowest) is used as the reference picture and hence has a strength parameter of 0.
Since we only perform a linear transformation, a picture with more dots has a larger “gold
standard” strength parameter.
Af a i rc o n c e r nw i t ho u rm o d e li sw h e t h e rt h eT h u r s t o n e - M o s t e l l e rm o d e la c c u r a t e l yc a p -
tures the participants’ information in our setting. To evaluate this assumption, we compare
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Figure 6.2: Frequency of the left picture being selected in the 1200 pairwise comparisons
of all 12 trials. The x-axis represents the di↵erence in number of dots between the left
and right pictures (left   right). The observations are grouped into 7 buckets according to
the di↵erence in dots. Each bar represents the empirical frequency for the corresponding
bucket.The curve is  (0.017x).
the empirical frequencies of the Turkers’ responses with those predicted by the Thurstone-
Mosteller model. By equation (6.1), the probability for a participant to select picture i in a
pairwise comparison between pictures i and j is  
⇣
s0
i s0
j p
2 
⌘
,a n dw ee s t i m a t e d 1 p
2  =0 .017
using all the collected data. Thus, the Thurstone-Mosteller model predicts that the empirical
frequencies of the Turkers’ responses should closely follow the distribution  (0.017(s0
i s0
j)).
Figure 6.2 plots the empirical frequency of the left picture being selected in our experiment
for seven brackets of di↵erences in dots between the left and right pictures. The empirical
frequency matches the cdf well, indicating that our setting does not signiﬁcantly deviate from
the Thurstone-Mosteller model. We notice that Turkers have a slight bias toward selecting
the picture on the right, because when the di↵erence in number of dots is around 0, the
frequency of the left picture being selected is about 40%, in contrast to the 50% predicted
by the model.
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Figure 6.3: The dynamics of the estimated strength parameters for an adaptive polling trial.
The x-axis is the number of iterations. The y-axis is the value of the estimated strength
parameters. The rightmost part of the ﬁgure labels the value of the “gold standard” strength
parameter for each picture.
Next, we look into whether our method e↵ectively incorporates information over time.
Figure 6.3 shows the dynamics of the estimated strength parameters for one of the adaptive
polling trials. The ﬁgures for all adaptive and random polling trials (Figures D.1 and D.2)
are presented in Appendix D.
Since the strength parameter for the picture with 342 dots is set to 0, the estimates
are for the other 11 pictures. The lines are colored in grayscale such that the lightest color
corresponds to the picture with the most dots and the darkest line corresponds to the picture
with fewest dots. We can see that all pictures start with an estimated strength parameter of
0. As more pairwise comparisons are polled, the estimated strength parameters diverge. The
overall trend is that the estimated strength parameters of pictures with more dots increase
and those of pictures with less dots decrease, showing that information is aggregated into
the estimates over time. The right side of Figure 6.3 labels the value of the “gold standard”
135strength parameter for each picture. At the end of 100 iterations, the estimated strength
parameters are close to the gold standard strength parameters. The produced ranking is
generally correct, except that two adjacent pairs are ﬂipped. A closer look reveals that these
two ﬂipped pairs have the smallest di↵erence in dots among all adjacent pairs of the 11
pictures, with 381 and 383 dots and 344 and 355 dots respectively.
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Figure 6.4: The entropy of the estimated
distribution N(ˆ s, ˆ ⌃)
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Figure 6.5: The log score — the loga-
rithm of the pdf of N(ˆ s, ˆ ⌃) evaluated at
the “gold standard” strength parameters
Finally, we compare the performance of adaptive polling with that of random polling. In
addition to our collected data, we also run 100 trials of simulation for each method using
the “gold standard” strength parameters to understand what we should expect to see if our
model perfectly captures the noisiness of the setting and we know the strength parameters.
Figures 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 present the results of the comparison of the performance of our
adaptive polling method versus the random polling method.
Intuitively, we expect the adaptive method to reduce the entropy of the estimated distri-
bution more quickly than the random method, since the adaptive method is optimized for
quickly reducing the uncertainty of the probabilistic estimates of the strength parameters.
In Figure 6.4, we show a plot of the entropy of the estimated distribution N(ˆ s, ˆ ⌃), which is
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Figure 6.6: The fraction of the pairwise comparison questions that are correctly answered
calculated as log
q
(2⇡e)n|ˆ ⌃| where |ˆ ⌃| is the determinant of ˆ ⌃. This ﬁgure conﬁrms that
the entropy of the estimated distribution indeed decreases faster for the adaptive polling
than for the random polling. The di↵erence in the entropy produced by the two methods is
statistically signiﬁcant by two-tailed t-test (p =0 .01).
Next, Figure 6.5 presents a comparison of the log score of the estimated distributions
for the two methods. The log score is often used to measure the accuracy of a probabilistic
prediction, so it is a good indicator for how well our method performs in estimating the
strength parameters. Having a high log score means that our method produces accurate
estimates of the strength parameters. Given an estimated distribution N(ˆ s, ˆ ⌃) and the
“gold standard” strength parameters s,t h el o gs c o r ei st h el o g a r i t h mo ft h ep d fo fN(ˆ s, ˆ ⌃)
evaluated at s. Figure 6.5 shows that the log scores for both adaptive and random polling
increase over time. The log scores for adaptive polling are higher but the variation is large.
The di↵erence in the log score produced by the two methods is statistically signiﬁcant by
two-tailed t-test (p =0 .016).
Interestingly, according to Figure 6.6, the fraction of pairwise comparison questions that
are answered correctly is lower for adaptive polling than for the random polling, and the dif-
137ference is statistically signiﬁcant by two-tailed t-test (p =0 .005). This observation suggests
that adaptive polling tends to ask relatively di cult comparison questions. The answers to
these questions are more valuable for improving the estimates of the strength parameters,
even though the participants are less likely to answer them correctly. Moreover, since we
pay Turkers a bonus only for correct answers, this implies that the cost of adaptive polling is
lower than that of random polling. For our experiment, an average of 10% in bonus payment
is saved per trial by using adaptive polling instead of the random method.
6.5 Conclusion and Future Directions
In conclusion, we demonstrate that eliciting and aggregating information about the ranking
of n competing alternatives can be e↵ectively achieved by adaptively polling participants
recruited from an online labor market on simple pairwise comparison questions and gradually
incorporating the collected information into an overall prediction. Our adaptive polling
method is robust against the unpredictable noise in the participants’ information and it is
e↵ective in eliciting and aggregating information while requiring only simple interactions
with the participants. With the same number of participants per trial, our adaptive polling
method derives estimates with higher accuracy while requiring 10% less payments compared
to the random polling method.
As discussed in section 6.1, there are several di↵erent strategies in active learning to
evaluate how each query a↵ects the informativeness of the expected data. In our algorithm,
we choose each query that would most change the current estimates, and we interpret a
signiﬁcant change to the current estimates as informational gain. However, the active learn-
ing literature suggests many other ways to choose the next query, i.e. choosing the next
query that would most reduce the uncertainty or the variance in our estimates. It would
be interesting to evaluate the e↵ects of adopting di↵erent active learning approaches on the
performance of our algorithm.
138The baseline method in our MTurk experiment chooses each pairwise comparison question
randomly among all possible such questions. This is the most naive way to choose the
questions. One can imagine choosing each question using some smarter method that is less
sophisticated than active learning. For example, we can choose the pairwise comparisons for
which we have least data or pairs of alternatives whose estimated strength parameters are
close. It would be interesting to see whether our adaptive algorithm could still outperform
these smarter baseline methods.
Although the Thurstone-Mosteller model suitably captures the noisiness of participants’
information in our experiments, it has some limitations. The model implicitly assumes that
participants are ex-ante equally informed and their mistakes are independent. These may
not hold in some settings where some participants are better informed than others and
mistakes of participants are correlated. In future work, we are interested in studying how
our approach performs in such settings and developing suitable methods for them.
Even though we only evaluated our method for a setting with a known underlying ranking
of the alternatives, our method can be easily adapted for settings when the underlying
ranking is unknown. In this case, it is crucial to decide on a suitable termination condition for
our algorithm. Since our model produces probabilistic estimates of the strength parameters,
we could, for instance, choose to stop the algorithm once a desired entropy of the estimated
distribution is reached. It is an interesting future direction to explore di↵erent termination
conditions for applying our algorithm to such settings.
139Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Directions
The goal of this dissertation is to tackle the following research question:
How to generate an accurate estimate or prediction of an event of interest by
eliciting dispersed information from multiple individuals and aggregating these
information together?
Is t u d yt h r e ei n f o r m a t i o ne l i c i t a t i o na n da g g r e g a t i o nm e t h o d s : p r e d i c t i o nm a r k e t s ,p e e r
prediction mechanisms, and adaptive polling, using both theoretical and applied approaches.
In Chapters 3 and 4, we theoretically characterize the equilibrium behavior of the par-
ticipants when trading in market scoring rule prediction markets. Myopic participants in a
prediction market are incentivized to truthfully reveal their private information. However, if
a non-myopic market participant receives multiple payo↵s from inside and/or outside of the
market, then the participant may want to withhold or misreport his information early on
in order to maximize his total payo↵. We show that non-myopic participants’ equilibrium
behavior critically depends on the information structure (i.e. how the participants’ private
information relates to the event of interest) and the payo↵ structure of the prediction market.
In Chapter 3, when the non-myopic participants have multiple opportunities to trade and
receive multiple payo↵s in the market, we prove that the information structure determines
whether the participants reveal information early or late in the market at an equilibrium.
In Chapter 4, the non-myopic participants receive payo↵s from both inside and outside of
140the market. In this case, our results indicate that the information and the payo↵ structures
together determine whether all private information gets fully revealed inside the market.
In Chapters 5, we experimentally study participants’ behavior towards the Jurca and
Faltings [2009] peer prediction mechanism, in order to understand whether the participants
will play one of the multiple equilibria characterized in theory. In theory, the Jurca and
Faltings [2009] mechanism not only supports the truthful equilibrium, it also induces unin-
formative equilibria where participants reveal no information to the mechanism. Moreover,
the mechanism has not been evaluated in practice and its theory provides little support
that the participants will be truthful in practice. We conduct a controlled online experi-
ment to evaluate the Jurca and Faltings [2009] mechanism through a multi-player, real-time
and repeated game. In our experimental setting, we observed that the participants are not
truthful and they successfully coordinated on the uninformative equilibria. In contrast, the
participants are generally truthful in the absence of economic incentives.
One unifying theme in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 is understanding how strategic participants
behave when interacting with the mechanisms. The participants are assumed to be rational
and self-interested economic agents who seek to maximize their rewards from the mechanism.
When assuming that the participants are strategic, our ultimate goal is to design mecha-
nisms such that the participants will always truthfully reveal their private information as
soon as the information is available. However, for both prediction markets and peer predic-
tion mechanisms, we demonstrate that the participants may not be truthful in theoretical
or experimental settings. In prediction markets, the strategic participants may withhold
their information or delay revealing their information. For peer prediction mechanisms, the
participants may coordinate on uninformative equilibria which reveal no information to the
mechanism.
These undesirable strategic behavior of the participants inspires an immediate future
direction: designing new and improved mechanisms to have stronger theoretical guarantees
for truthfulness. For instance, can we design prediction markets to have better truthful-
141ness properties for non-myopic participants while still maintaining incentive compatibility
for myopic participants? Can we design new peer prediction mechanism such that the un-
informative equilibria are eliminated or the truthful equilibrium can be shown to be focal
with strong theoretical and empirical evidence? Several recent work has already proposed
peer prediction mechanisms with better theoretical properties.
For prediction markets and peer prediction mechanisms, we assume that the pieces of
information that the participants may potentially obtain are known in advance. We also
assume that each participant knows the several pieces of information he may obtain, the par-
ticipant already possesses one such piece of information, and he decides whether to truthfully
reveal his information or not. This model has several assumptions that seem unreasonable
in practice. It may be unreasonable to believe that the potential pieces of information are
ﬁxed and known in advance. In practice, participants need to invest costly e↵ort to gather
useful information and to synthesize the information together. In the current model, a par-
ticipant may decide not report his information truthfully because making a di↵erent report
can improve his expected payo↵. However, when the participant needs to invest e↵ort to
gather information, he may be tempted to provide a report which requires as little e↵ort
as possible. This reason for misreporting may be more reasonable and is more likely to
occur in practice. Such arguments have inspired recent work to design and develop new peer
prediction mechanisms which incentivize the participants to invest in costly e↵ort to obtain
accurate information [Jens Witkowski, 2013, Dasgupta and Ghosh, 2013].
There are several future directions that aim to reconcile the gap between the theoretical
understanding and the practical evaluations of these mechanisms. For example, prediction
markets have been shown to produce remarkably accurate forecasts in practice. However, our
theoretical results show that the participants’ strategic behavior in the market may damage
the information aggregation process, which seemingly contradict the empirical observations.
Similarly, the literature on peer prediction mechanisms focuses only on designing these mech-
anisms to support the truthful equilibrium. However, our experimental results suggest that
142participants may coordinate on the uninformative equilibria and reveal no information to
the mechanism. To address this gap between theory and practice, one future direction is to
evaluate these mechanisms in experimental or practical settings in order to understand the
extent to which the participants’ behavior deviate from our theoretical models. Knowing
the deviation, we could either develop better theoretical models to capture the market par-
ticipants’ behavior in practice or seek novel practical methods to motivate the participants
to be truthful.
In Chapter 6, we design an adaptive polling method for estimating the outcome of an
event without observable ground truth, which is the same problem we study in Chapter 5. In
contrast to prediction markets and peer prediction mechanisms, we make very di↵erent as-
sumptions about the participants’ behavior. We assume that each participant, when queried,
will truthfully reveal to us one partial and noisy piece of information about the latent ground
truth. Using a theoretical model to capture the noise in the participants’ information, the
adaptive polling method estimates the latent ground truth by aggregating these partial and
noisy pieces of information together and determines the piece of information to query from
the next participant in order to maximize the information gain. We apply our method to
the problem of ranking n competing alternatives, each characterized by a hidden strength
parameter. The method queries each participant for the result of a particular pairwise com-
parison. Through a MTurk experiment, we show that the adaptive polling method can
e↵ectively aggregate information over time and outperforms a naive method, which chooses
ar a n d o mp a i r w i s ec o m p a r i s o nq u e s t i o na te a c hs t e p .
The model of participants’ behavior used in Chapter 6 is very di↵erent from the model
used in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. Both models are motivated by practical scenarios. However, each
model only captures a particular aspect of the participants’ behavior and the aspect captured
may be more or less prominent depending on the particular setting considered. The model of
strategic participants used in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 is widely used in theoretical analyses but
so far seems to have little supporting evidence in practice. For instance, prediction markets
143are successful empirically but there are many theoretical results on how the participants’
strategic behavior damage the information aggregation process. This contrast suggests that
the theoretical models of the market participants may not accurately capture the market
participants’ behavior in practice. For peer prediction mechanisms, we obtained evidence of
participants’ strategic behavior in our highly controlled experimental settings, but we have
yet to verify whether these strategic behavior will be observed in more realistic scenarios.
In contrast, our results in Chapter 6 provide positive support for the “noisy information”
model of the participants. In particular, we show that our theoretical model accurately
captures the noise in the participants’ information compared to the ground truth. These
positive evidence, however, may be a result of the speciﬁc setting that we chose to evaluate
the adaptive polling method. In summary, both models make simplifying assumptions about
the participants’ behavior. Each model is a reasonable approximation of the participants’
behavior only for certain situations. In fact, a better model of the participants should contain
both the strategic and the noisy information aspects of their behavior, thus encompassing
the two current models as special cases. The challenge then is to ﬁnd a suitable way to
combine the two models. For example, di↵erent aspects of the participants’ behavior may
be more prominent in di↵erent settings, so the combined model needs to be ﬂexible enough
to allow the weights of the two aspects be adjusted for di↵erent situations.
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152Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 3
A.1 Omitted Proofs
A.1.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. The technique used in this proof is analogous to that of Theorem 2 in Chen et al.
[2010b].
Let   be Alice’s ﬁrst-stage strategy at a PBE of the 3-stage I game. By Lemma 1,  
must satisfy the consistency condition. At any PBE of the 3-stage I game, for a ﬁxed prior
distribution and a ﬁxed initial market probability, the total of Alice’s ex-ante expected payo↵
and Bob’s ex-ante expected payo↵ in the game is a constant. Therefore, Alice seeks to choose
a ﬁrst-stage strategy in order to minimize Bob’s ex-ante expected payo↵. We will show that
  must dictate Alice to change the market probability to the prior probability regardless of
Alice’s realized signal.
We ﬁrst argue that   must be a deterministic strategy, i.e. there exists a unique r 2 [0,1]
such that  sA(r)=1f o ra n yr e a l i z e ds i g n a lsA for Alice. We prove this by contradiction.
Suppose that there exists a realized signal sA such that the support of strategy   for signal sA
has at least 2 points, r1, r2,a n dp e r h a p sas e to fo t h e rp o i n t sR.T h e nw ec o n s t r u c ta n o t h e r
strategy  0 for Alice and show that Bob’s expected payo↵ when Alice uses the strategy  0 is
153less than his expected payo↵ when Alice uses the strategy  ,a s s u m i n gt h a tB o bk n o w sa n d
conditions on Alice’s ﬁrst-stage strategy.
Let r3 =
r1+r2
2 be the midpoint of r1 and r2.L e tt h en e ws t r a t e g y 0 for Alice randomize
over r1, r3,a n dt h es a m es e to fr e m a i n i n gp o i n t sR. Under  0, the probability that Alice
receives signal sA and reports r1 is
P(r1) P(r2)
P(r1) P(sA,r 1), and the probability that Alice receives
signal sA and reports r3 is
P(r2)
P(r1)P(sA,r 1)+P(sA,r 2). Under strategy  0, Alice mixes between
reporting r1 and r3 with probability P(r1) P(r2)a n d2 P ( r2)r e s p e c t i v e l y .F o rt h i ss t r a t e g y
 0,w ec a nc o m p u t eP ( sA|r3)a sf o l l o w s .
P(sA|r3)=
P(sA,r 3)
P(r3)
=
P(r2)
P(r1)P(sA,r 1)+P ( sA,r 2)
2P(r2)
=
1
2
P(sA|r1)+
1
2
P(sA|r2)
Note that xsB(r3)h a st h ef o l l o w i n gr e l a t i o n s h i pw i t hxsB(r1)a n dxsB(r2)a ss h o w nb e l o w .
xsB(r3)=
X
sA
P(sA|r3)P(1|sA,s B)=
X
sA
✓
1
2
P(sA|r1)+
1
2
P(sA|r2)
◆
P(1|sA,s B)
=
xsB(r1)+xsB(r2)
2
(A.1)
Let ⇡B( ) denote Bob’s ex-ante expected payo↵ when Alice uses strategy   and Bob
knows and conditions on Alice using the strategy  .W e d e r i v e t h e e x p r e s s i o n f o r ⇡B( )
154below.
⇡B( )= P ( r1)
X
sB
P(sB|r1)
⇢
xsB(r1)log
xsB(r1)
r1
+( 1  xsB(r1))log
1   xsB(r1)
1   r1
 
+P ( r2)
X
sB
P(sB|r2)
⇢
xsB(r2)log
xsB(r2)
r2
+( 1  xsB(r2))log
1   xsB(r2)
1   r2
 
+ remaining proﬁt over R
=P(r1)
X
sB
P(sB)
(
xsB(r1)log
xsB(r1)
P
sB xsB(r1)
+( 1  xsB(r1))log
1   xsB(r1)
1  
P
sB xsB(r1)
)
+P ( r2)
X
sB
P(sB)
(
xsB(r2)log
xsB(r2)
P
sB xsB(r2)
+( 1  xsB(r2))log
1   xsB(r2)
1  
P
sB xsB(r2)
)
+ remaining proﬁt over R
=(P(r1)   P(r2))
X
sB
P(sB)
(
xsB(r1)log
xsB(r1)
P
sB xsB(r1)
+( 1  xsB(r1))log
1   xsB(r1)
1  
P
sB xsB(r1)
)
+P ( r2)
X
sB
P(sB)
(
xsB(r1)log
xsB(r1)
P
sB xsB(r1)
+( 1  xsB(r1))log
1   xsB(r1)
1  
P
sB xsB(r1)
)
+P ( r2)
X
sB
P(sB)
(
xsB(r2)log
xsB(r2)
P
sB xsB(r2)
+( 1  xsB(r2))log
1   xsB(r2)
1  
P
sB xsB(r2)
)
+ remaining proﬁt over R
When Alice uses strategy  0,B o b ’ se x - a n t ee x p e c t e dp a y o ↵⇡B( 0)i sl e s st h a nh i se x - a n t e
155expected payo↵ ⇡B( ), as shown below.
⇡B( 0)= ( P ( r1)   P(r2))
X
sB
P(sB)
(
xsB(r1)log
xsB(r1)
P
sB xsB(r1)
+( 1  xsB(r1))log
1   xsB(r1)
1  
P
sB xsB(r1)
)
+ 2P(r2)
X
sB
P(sB)
(
xsB(r3)log
xsB(r3)
P
sB xsB(r3)
+( 1  xsB(r3))log
1   xsB(r3)
1  
P
sB xsB(r3)
)
+ remaining proﬁt over R
=(P(r1)   P(r2))
X
sB
P(sB)
(
xsB(r1)log
xsB(r1)
P
sB xsB(r1)
+( 1  xsB(r1))log
1   xsB(r1)
1  
P
sB xsB(r1)
)
+ 2P(r2)
X
sB
P(sB)
8
<
:
xsB(r3)log
xsB(r1)+xsB(r2)
2
P
sB
xsB(r1)+xsB(r2)
2
+
✓
1  
xsB(r1)+xsB(r2)
2
◆
log
1  
xsB(r1)+xsB(r2)
2
1  
P
sB
xsB(r1)+xsB(r2)
2
9
=
;
+ remaining proﬁt over R (A.2)
<(P(r1)   P(r2))
X
sB
P(sB)
(
xsB(r1)log
xsB(r1)
P
sB xsB(r1)
+( 1  xsB(r1))log
1   xsB(r1)
1  
P
sB xsB(r1)
)
+P ( r2)
X
sB
P(sB)
(
xsB(r1)log
xsB(r1)
P
sB xsB(r1)
+( 1  xsB(r1))log
1   xsB(r1)
1  
P
sB xsB(r1)
)
+P ( r2)
X
sB
P(sB)
(
xsB(r2)log
xsB(r2)
P
sB xsB(r2)
+( 1  xsB(r2))log
1   xsB(r2)
1  
P
sB xsB(r2)
)
+ remaining proﬁt over R (A.3)
=⇡B( )
where equation (A.2) follows from equation (A.1), and the inequality (A.3) follows from the
strict convexity of relative entropy when the signals satisfy the informativeness condition.
Therefore, for any Alice’s strategy   where for at least one realized signal the support of
the strategy has two or more points in its support (i.e. deterministic), there always exists a
strategy  0 such that ⇡B( 0) <  B( ). This means that, at any PBE of this game, Alice’s
ﬁrst-stage strategy must have only one point in its support. Such a strategy for Alice does
not reveal any information to Bob. If Alice’s ﬁrst-stage strategy is deterministic, we must
have  sA(r)=1f o ra l lsA 2 SA and for some r 2 [0,1]. Then, by the consistency condition,
156the only point in the support of Alice’s strategy must be P(1), as shown below.
P(1|r, )=r
)
P
sA P(1|sA) sA(r)P(sA)
P
sA P(sA) sA(r)
= r
)
P
sA P(1|sA)P(sA)
P
sA P(sA)
= r
)r =
X
sA
P(1|sA)P(sA)=P ( 1 )
Therefore, at any PBE of the 3-stage I game, Alice’s strategy must be  sA(P(1)) =
1,8sA.
A.1.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. According to the theorem statement, Alice’s ﬁrst-stage strategy is
 sA(P(1)) = 1,8sA 2 SA
and Bob’s second-stage strategy is
xsB(rA)=
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
fsB(↵min
sB ),r A 2 [0,↵ min
sB )
fsB(rA),r A 2 [↵min
sB ,↵ max
sB ]
fsB(↵max
sB ),r A 2 (↵max
sB ,1]
,8sB 2 SB
where
fsB(rA)=
P(1|sB)P(0)rA
P(1)P(0|sB)+( P ( 1 |sB)   P(1))rA
 
min
sB =min
sA
P(1|sA,s B), 
max
sB =m a x
sA
P(1|sA,s B)
↵
min
sB =f
 1
sB ( 
min
sB ),↵
max
sB = f
 1
sB ( 
max
sB )
To prove that Alice’s and Bob’s strategies form a PBE of the 3-stage I game, we need to
157show 2 things:
1. Bob’s strategy is valid. That is, 8sB,8rA 2 [0,1], xsB(rA) 2 [ min
sB , max
sB ];
2. Alice’s expected payo↵ usA(rA)a f t e rr e c e i v i n ga n ys i g n a lsA is uniquely maximized by
reporting rA =P ( 1 )g i v e nB o b ’ ss t r a t e g y .
1. We ﬁrst show that Bob’s strategy is valid. First, fsB(rA)i sm o n o t o n i c a l l yi n c r e a s i n g
in rA 2 [0,1] since
df sB(rA)
drA
=
P(1)(1   P(1))P(1|sB)(1   P(1|sB))
{P(1)P(0|sB)+( P ( 1 |sB)   P(1))rA}
2 > 0
Second, the domain of xsB(rA)i sw e l l - d e ﬁ n e ds i n c e
 
min
sB < 
max
sB ) ↵
min
sB <↵
max
sB .
Finally, Bob’s strategy is valid since
 
min
sB = fsB(↵
min
sB )  xsB(rA)  fsB(↵
max
sB )= 
max
sB ,8rA 2 [0,1].
2. We now show that Alice’s expected payo↵ after receiving any signal sA is uniquely
maximized by reporting rA =P ( 1 ) .
We divide the range [0,1] of rA into 3 subsets and analyze the properties of usA(rA)o n
these subsets.
(a) rA 2 [maxsB{↵min
sB },minsB{↵max
sB }];
(b) rA 2 [0,minsB{↵min
sB }) [ (maxsB{↵max
sB },1];
(c) rA 2 [minsB{↵min
sB },maxsB{↵min
sB }) [ (minsB{↵max
sB },maxsB{↵max
sB }];
These subsets are well-deﬁned as long as maxsB{↵min
sB }minsB{↵max
sB },a sp r o v e n
158below.
P(1|sB)=
X
sA
P(1|sA,s B)P(sA|sB) 
X
sA
 
max
sB P(sA|sB)= 
max
sB ,8sB 2 SB
P(1|sB)=
X
sA
P(1|sA,s B)P(sA|sB)  
X
sA
 
min
sB P(sA|sB)= 
min
sB ,8sB 2 SB
)  
min
sB  P(1|sB)   
max
sB ,8sB 2 SB
) ↵
min
sB  P(1)  ↵
max
sB ,8sB 2 SB
) max
sB
{↵
min
sB }P(1)  min
sB
{↵
max
sB }
(a) For any rA 2 [maxsB{↵min
sB },minsB{↵max
sB }], we show that Alice’s expected payo↵
after receiving any signal sA is uniquely maximized at rA = P(1). Alice’s expected
payo↵ after receiving the sA signal, denoted by usA(rA), is
usA(rA)=
X
sB
⇢
P(1,s B|sA)
✓
log
rA
r0 +l o g
P(1|sA,s B)
xsB(rA)
◆
+P(0,s B|sA)
✓
log
1   rA
1   r0 +l o g
P(0|sA,s B)
1   xsB(rA)
◆ 
The ﬁrst derivative of usA(rA)e v a l u a t e da trA =P ( 1 )i sz e r o ,a ss h o w nb e l o w :
dusA(rA)
drA
=
P
sB xsB(rA)P(sB)   rA
rA(1   rA)
)
dusA(rA)
drA
|rA=P(1) = 0 (A.4)
The second derivative of usA(rA)i sn e g a t i v es i n c exsB(rA) 6= rA,8j by the distin-
guishability condition, as shown below.
d2usA(rA)
dr2
A
=  
P
sB(xsB(rA)   rA)2P(sB)
r2
A(1   rA)2 < 0 (A.5)
By equations (A.4) and (A.5), for all rA 2 [maxsB{↵min
sB },minsB{↵max
sB }], usA(rA)
is uniquely maximized at rA =P ( 1 ) .
The above argument applies for any rA 2 (0,1) as long as xsB(rA)=fsB(rA).
For the rest of the proof, we make use of the following inequality, derived using
159equation (A.4).
rA <
X
sB
P(sB)fsB(rA),8rA 2 (0,P(1)) (A.6)
(b) Next, we show that usA(rA) is monotonically increasing for all
rA 2 [0,minsB{↵min
sB }). We omit the symmetric argument showing that usA(rA)i s
monotonically decreasing for all rA 2 (maxsB{↵max
sB },1].
We deﬁne  min =m i n sA{P(1|sA)}. First, we note that  min 2 (0,P(1)) since
P(1) =
X
i
P(sA)P(1|sA) > min
sA
{P(1|sA)} =  
min
We ﬁrst prove that minsB{↵min
sB } min. For contradiction, assume ↵min
sB >
 min,8j and let  min =P ( 1 |at)f o rs o m eat.T h e nw eh a v e
↵
min
sB > 
min,8j )  
min
sB >f sB( 
min),8j
) 
min =P ( 1 |at)=
X
sB
P(sB)P(1|at,s B)  
X
sB
P(sB) 
min
sB >
X
sB
P(sB)fsB( 
min)
which contradicts inequality (A.6) for rA =  min.
For rA < minsB{↵min
sB }, xsB(rA)i sac o n s t a n tf o ra l lj.T h u s ,usA(rA)i sm o n o t o n -
ically increasing for rA 2 [0,minsB{↵min
sB }). since the ﬁrst derivative of usA(rA)
with respect to rA is positive, as shown below.
dusA(rA)
drA
=
P(1|sA)   rA
rA(1   rA)
 
 min   rA
rA(1   rA)
 
minsB{↵min
sB } rA
rA(1   rA)
> 0
(c) Finally, we show that usA(rA)i sm o n o t o n i c a l l yi n c r e a s i n gf o ra l l
rA 2 [minsB ↵min
sB ,maxsB ↵min
sB ). We omit the symmetric argument showing that
usA(rA)i sm o n o t o n i c a l l yd e c r e a s i n gf o ra l lrA 2 (minsB{↵max
sB },maxsB{↵max
sB }].
For the following argument, let sB,j be the j-th realized signal for Bob. Without
loss of generality, we assume that ↵min
sB,j follows the increasing order, i.e. ↵min
sB,1 
160...  ↵min
sB,nB.F o rk 2{ 0,...,n B   2},i frA 2 [↵min
sB,k,↵ min
sB,k+1), then we have
xsB,j(rA)= fsB,j(rA),8j =0 ,...,k
xsB,j(rA)= fsB,j(↵
min
sB,j)= 
min
sB,j,8j = k +1 ,...,n B   1
We show below that the ﬁrst derivative of usA(rA)i sp o s i t i v e .
dusA(rA)
drA
=
P(1|sA)   rA +
Pk
j=1 {P(sB)fsB(rA)   P(1,s B,j|sA)}
rA(1   rA)
=
Pn
j=k+1 P(1,s B,j|sA)+
Pk
j=1 P(sB,j)fsB,j(rA)   rA
rA(1   rA)
=
Pn
j=k+1
 
P(1,s B,j|sA)   P(sB,j)fsB,j(rA)
 
rA(1   rA)
(A.7)
+
Pk
j=1 P(sB,j)fsB,j(rA)   rA
rA(1   rA)
>
Pn
j=k+1
n
P(1,s B,j|sA)   P(sB,j) min
sB,j
o
rA(1   rA)
(A.8)
 
Pn
j=k+1 {P(1,s B,j|sA)   P(sB,j)P(1|sA,s B,j)}
rA(1   rA)
=0
where inequality (A.8) was derived by inequality (A.6). Hence, usA(rA)i sm o n o -
tonically increasing for all rA 2 [0,minsB,j{↵min
sB,j}).
In conclusion, Bob’s strategy is valid and Alice’s expected payo↵ usA(r)i su n i q u e l y
maximized at rA = P(1). Therefore, the speciﬁed strategies for Alice and Bob form a PBE
of the 3-stage I game.
A.1.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. At a PBE of the ﬁnite-stage I game, suppose that rk and  k are the report and
the strategy of the player in stage k,a n ds u p p o s et h a tf o rap a r t i c u l a rk,t h ec o n s i s t e n c y
161condition given in equation (A.9) below is violated.
P(1|r
1,...,r
k, 
1,..., 
k)=r
k (A.9)
Then we construct a perturbed strategy ˆ  k satisfying the consistency condition, and we
show that the player’s expected payo↵ by using the perturbed strategy ˆ  k is greater than
her expected payo↵ by using the original strategy  k.
To construct the perturbed strategy ˆ  k,w es t a r tb ys e t t i n gˆ  k =  k.L e t x 2 [0,1] be
ap o i n ti nt h es u p p o r to fs t r a t e g y k such that the consistency condition fails for x,i . e .
P(! =1 |r1,...,r k 1,x, 1,..., k) 6= x.L e t ˆ x =P ( ! =1 |r1,...,r k 1,x, 1,..., k). Then,
whenever the strategy  k dictates that the player change the market probability to x,l e t
the strategy ˆ  k dictate that the player change the market probability to ˆ x.W e r e p e a t
this perturbation for each x in the support of strategy  k such that x 6=ˆ x.B y u s i n g t h i s
perturbation, the strategy ˆ  k satisﬁes the consistency condition.
Next, we show that the player’s expected payo↵ by using the perturbed strategy ˆ  k
is greater than her expected payo↵ by using her original strategy  k.L e t xk and ˆ xk be
the random variables that correspond to the values that the player of stage k the market
probability to, and let x and ˆ x be their realizations. Note that any x has a corresponding
value of ˆ x,s ow em a yw r i t ee x p r e s s i o n sl i k e
P
x ˆ x in which ˆ x is implicitly indexed by x.
The di↵erence between the player’s expected payo↵ by using strategy ˆ  k and  k is
X
z,r1,...,rk 1,x
P(z,r
1,...,r
k 1,x)
 
logP(z|r
1,...,r
k 1, ˆ x)   logx
 
=
X
r1,...,rk 1,x
P(r
1,...,r
k 1,x)
X
z
P(z|r
1,...,r
k 1,x)(logˆ x   logx)
=
X
r1,...,rk 1,x
P(r
1,...,r
k 1,x)
X
z
ˆ x(log ˆ x   logx)
=
X
r1,...,rk 1,x
P(r
1,...,r
k 1,x)D(p(ˆ xk)||p(xk))
where p(ˆ xk) and p(xk) are the probability distributions of ˆ xk and xk respectively. D(p(ˆ xk)||p(xk))
162is relative entropy, which is nonnegative and strictly positive when the two distributions are
not the same. Since  k does not satisfy the consistency condition, there is at least one x
such that P(x) > 0a n dˆ x = x.T h u s w e h a v e D(p(ˆ xk)||p(xk)) > 0, and this contradicts
our assumption that  k is an PBE strategy for the player of stage k of the ﬁnite-stage I
game.
A.1.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Recall that m is the last player of the game, and tm is the last stage of the game.
Also, stage k is the second to last stage of participation for player m (k<t m). Consider the
part of the ﬁnite-stage I game starting from stage k to stage tm.T h e r em u s te x i s ta tl e a s to n e
player j<mwhose last stage of participation is between stage k and stage tm.W ec o m b i n e
the players participating after stage k and before stage tm as one composite player, and also
combine their signals to be one composite signal. Because all the signals are independent,
the signal of this composite player is also independent of the signal of player m.T h e r e f o r e ,
we can treat the part of the ﬁnite-stage I game from stage k to stage tm as a 3-stage I game
where player m is Alice and the composite player is Bob. By the distinguishability condition,
at every PBE, information is fully aggregated at the same of the ﬁnite-stage I game. Thus,
at any PBE of this 3-stage I game, the total expected payo↵ of players is constant given
the market estimate at the beginning of stage k and the prior distribution. Thus, player m
seeks to minimize the total expected payo↵ of the composite player. By Theorems 2 and 3,
there exists a PBE of this 3-stage I game. At any PBE of this game, in stage k,p l a y e rm
changes the market probabilities to the prior probability of the event at the beginning of
stage k.S i n c ep l a y e rm is a Bayesian agent, he can condition his belief of the probability of
the event on the strategies and the reports of all participants in the previous stages. Thus,
at the beginning of stage k,p l a y e rm believes the prior probabilities of the event to be
P(1|r
1,...,r
k 1, 
1,..., 
k 1).
163where r1,...,r k 1 and  1,..., k 1 are the reports and the strategies of the participants in
the ﬁrst k 1s t a g e s .B yL e m m a2 ,a ta n yP B E ,t h es t r a t e g i e sa n dr e p o r t so fa l lp a r t i c i p a n t s
must satisfy the consistency condition. Thus, we must have
P(1|r
1,...,r
k 1, 
1,..., 
k 1)=r
k 1.
Therefore, player m’s report rk 1 in stage k is equal to the market estimate immediately
before stage k.T h i sm e a n st h a tp l a y e rm does not change the market estimate in stage k of
the game at any PBE.
A.1.5 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. First, we exclude degenerate cases by assuming that, if a player participates in any
number of consecutive stages in this game, then these stages are combined into one stage
for the player. This does not a↵ect the players’ strategic behaviors in this game because the
player’s total payo↵ in these consecutive stages only depends on the market estimate at the
beginning of the ﬁrst stage in this sequence, the market estimate at the end of the last stage
in this sequence, and the realized outcome of the event.
By Lemma 2, at any PBE of this game, the strategy of each participant must satisfy the
consistency condition.
PBE Strategy of Player m
We ﬁrst consider player m,w h oi sa l s ot h el a s tp a r t i c i p a n to ft h eg a m e .S t a g etm must be
the last stage of the game. By properties of LMSR, player m truthfully reveals his realized
signal in stage tm.
Let t⇤ denote the second to last stage of participation for player m. Consider the game
starting from stage t⇤ to stage tm.B y L e m m a 3 , p l a y e r m does not change the market
probability in stage t⇤.L e tt⇤ denote the new second to last stage of participation for player
m.C o n s i d e rt h eg a m es t a r t i n gf r o ms t a g et⇤ to stage tm.P l a y e rm does not participate in
any stage in between stages t⇤ and tm.B yL e m m a3 ,p l a y e rm does not change the market
164estimate in stage t⇤.I n f e r r i n g r e c u r s i v e l y , w e c a n s h o w t h a t , i n a n y s t a g e f r o m s t a g e 1 t o
stage tm   1i nw h i c hp l a y e rm is scheduled to participate, player m does not change the
market estimate in any of these stages.
In summary, from stage 1 to stage tm  1, player m does not participate in the game. In
stage tm,p l a y e rm truthfully reveals his private signal.
PBE Strategy of Player i, 2  i  m   1
Consider player m   1. By properties of the LMSR, player m   1t r u t h f u l l yr e v e a l sh i s
signal in stage tm 1.
From stage tm 2 +1t otm 1   1, by previous argument, player m does not participate
in any of these stages. Also, by the way in which players are ordered, any player i where
i<m  1a l r e a d yﬁ n i s h e dt h e i rp a r t i c i p a t i o ni nt h eg a m eb yt h ee n do fs t a g etm 2.T h u s ,
player m 1i st h eo n l yp a r t i c i p a n tf r o ms t a g etm 2+1tostagetm 1 1i nt h i sg a m e .T h u s ,
for these stages, if player m 1i ss c h e d u l e dt op a r t i c i p a t e ,h em a yu s ea n ys t r a t e g ya sl o n g
as the strategy satisﬁes the consistency condition.
Next, consider stage 1 to stage tm 2.S i n c e p l a y e r m   1i st h eo n l yp a r t i c i p a n tf r o m
stage tm 2+1tostagetm 1 1, we can combine these stages as stage t⇤⇤ and call it the new
last stage of participation for player m   1. Let stage t⇤ be the new second to last stage of
participation for player m   1. Note that we must have k<t m 2.C o n s i d e rt h eg a m ef r o m
stage t⇤ to stage t⇤⇤.B y L e m m a 3 , p l a y e r m   1d o e sn o tc h a n g et h em a r k e te s t i m a t ei n
stage t⇤.I n f e r r i n gr e c u r s i v e l y ,w ec a ns h o wt h a t ,f o ra n ys t a g eb e f o r etm 2 in which player
m 1 is scheduled to participate, player m 1d o e sn o tp a r t i c i p a t ei na n ys t a g ei nt h eg a m e .
Using the same argument, we can summarize the strategy of player i,f o ra n y2 i 
m   1, as follows: From stage 1 to stage ti 1   1, player i does not participate in the game.
From stage ti 1+1toti 1, player i uses any strategy that satisﬁes the consistency condition.
In stage ti,p l a y e ri truthfully reveals his private information.
PBE Strategy of Player 1
165By properties of LMSR, player 1 truthfully reveals his signal in stage t1.B yo u ra r g u m e n t s
above, from stage 1 to the stage t1   1, none of the other players participates in any stage
of the game. Thus, player 1 is the only participant from stage 1 to stage t1   1a n dh em a y
use any strategy that satisﬁes the consistency condition.
A.1.6 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. This proof has 3 main steps.
1. First, we study the function uai(r) for Alice’s ex-interim expected payo↵ at any PBE
of the 3-stage market game.
uai(r)= P ( 1 |ai)log
r
P(1)
+P ( 0 |ai)log
1   r
1   P(1)
+
X
j
⇢
P(1,s B|ai)log
P(1|ai,s B)
xsB(r)
+P ( 0 ,s B|ai)log
P(0|ai,s B)
1   xsB(r)
 
We prove that uai(r)h a st h ef o l l o w i n gp r o pe r t y :F o ra n yr 2 [mini P(1|ai),maxi P(1|ai)],
u0
ai(r)
(P(1|ai) r) is independent of the value of ai.
2. Next, by using the above property of uai(r), we show that there does not exist a PBE
of the 3-stage D game where Alice’s strategy satisﬁes
9r1,r 2 2 [min
i
P(1|ai),max
i
P(1|ai)],r 1 6= r2 s.t.  ai(r1) > 0,  ai(r2) > 0,8i =0 ,1
Intuitively, this means that the support of Alice’s PBE strategy at the 3-stage D game
cannot overlap at 2 or more points.
3. Finally, we show that if there exists a PBE of the 3-stage D game, Alice must play one
of the three speciﬁed strategies described at the PBE.
Step 1: The ﬁrst derivative of uai(r)i s
u
0
ai(r)=
P(1|ai)   r
r(1   r)
 
X
j
⇢
(P(1,s B|ai)   P(sB|ai)xsB(r))x0
sB(r)
xsB(r)(1   xsB(r))
 
166We would like to compare the expression of u0
ai(r)f o ri =0a n di =1 .
First, we show the expressions of xsB(r), 1 xsB(r), x0
sB(r)a n dP ( 1 ,s B|ai) P(sB|ai)xsB(r)
as follows:
xsB(r)=
[P(1,a 0|sB)P(a1)   P(1,a 1|sB)P(a0)]r +[ P ( 1 ,a 1|sB)P(1,a 0)   P(1,a 0|sB)P(1,a 1)]
[P(a0|sB)P(a1)   P(a1|sB)P(a0)]r +[ P ( a1|sB)P(1,a 0)   P(a0|sB)P(1,a 1)]
1   xsB(r)=
[P(0,a 0|sB)P(a1)   P(0,a 1|sB)P(a0)]r +[ P ( 0 ,a 1|sB)P(1,a 0)   P(0,a 0|sB)P(1,a 1)]
[P(a0|sB)P(a1)   P(a1|sB)P(a0)]r +[ P ( a1|sB)P(1,a 0)   P(a0|sB)P(1,a 1)]
x0
sB(r)=
(P(1|a0,s B)   P(1|a1,s B))P(a0|sB)P(a1|sB)P(a0)P(a1)(P(1|a0)   P(1|a1))
[P(a0|sB)P(a1)   P(a1|sB)P(a0)]r +[ P ( a1|sB)P(1,a 0)   P(a0|sB)P(1,a 1)]2
P(1,s B|ai)   P(sB|ai)xsB(r)
=(P(1|ai)   r)
P(sB)P(a0|sB)P(a1|sB)(P(1|a0,s B)   P(1|a1,s B))
[P(a0|sB)P(a1)   P(a1|sB)P(a0)]r +[ P ( a1|sB)P(1,a 0)   P(a0|sB)P(1,a 1)]
Note that these expressions have common components in their denominators. To simplify
the expression of u0
ai(r), let nu(f(x)) and de(f(x)) denote the numerator and the denomina-
tor of the function f(x)w h e r ef(x)i sxsB(r), 1 xsB(r), x0
sB(r)o rP ( 1 ,s B|ai) P(sB|ai)xsB(r).
Notice that:
de(xsB(r)) = de(1   xsB(r)) = de(P(1,s B|ai)   P(sB|ai)xsB(r)),{de(xsB(r))}
2 = de(x
0
sB(r)).
Then the expression of u0
ai(r)c a nb er e - w r i t t e na s :
u0
ai(r)=( P ( 1 |ai)   r)
1
r(1   r)
 
X
j
8
> <
> :
(P(1,s B|ai)   P(sB|ai)xsB(r))
nu(x0
sB(r))
de(x0
sB(r))
nu(xsB(r))
de(xsB(r))
nu(1 xsB(r))
de(1 xsB(r))
9
> =
> ;
=( P ( 1 |ai)   r)
0
@ 1
r(1   r)
 
X
j
⇢
(P(1,s B|ai)   P(sB|ai)xsB(r))nu(x0
sB(r))
(P(1|ai)   r)nu(xsB(r))nu(1   xsB(r))
 
1
A
Note that the expressions of
(P(1,sB|ai) P(sB|ai)xsB(r))
(P(1|ai) r) , nu(x0
sB(r)), nu(xsB(r)), and nu(1  
xsB(r)) do not depend on the value of ai.S o
u0
ai(r)
(P(1|ai) r) is not a function of ai and only a
function of r.T h u s ,
u0
a0(r)
(P(1|a0) r) and
u0
a1(r)
(P(1|a1) r) are the same function, and this function is
independent of the value of ai,f o ra n yr 2 [P(1|a0),P(1|a1)].
167Step 2: Next, we prove the statement by contradiction. If Alice’s PBE strategy in the
3-stage D game satisﬁes the speciﬁed condition, then by deﬁnition of a mixed strategy PBE,
the following necessary condition must be satisﬁed:
uai(r1)=uai(r2),8i =0 ,1
In step 1, we showed that the expression of u0
ai(r)c a nb ew r i t t e na sf o l l o w s :
u
0
ai(r)=( P ( 1 |ai)   r)f(r),8i =0 ,1
)
Z r
 1
u
0
ai(r
0)dr
0 =P ( 1 |ai)
Z r
 1
f(r
0)dr
0  
Z r
 1
r
0f(r
0)dr
0,8i =0 ,1 (A.10)
For convenience, we deﬁne g(r)a n dh(r)b e l o w :
g(r)=
Z r
 1
f(r
0)dr
0,h (r)=
Z r
 1
rf(r
0)dr
0
From equation (A.10), we have
uai(r)=P ( 1 |ai)g(r)   h(r)+Ci,8i =0 ,1
where Ci for i =0 ,1i sac o n s t a n t .
By our assumption, we have
uai(r1)=uai(r2),8i =0 ,1
)P(1|ai)g(r1)   h(r1)+Ci =P ( 1 |ai)g(r2)   h(r2)+Ci,8i =0 ,1
)P(1|ai)=
h(r2)   h(r1)
g(r2)   g(r1)
,8i =0 ,1
)P(1|a0)=P ( 1 |a1)
The above equation P(1|a0)=P ( 1 |a1) contradicts with the distinguishability condition.
Therefore, the speciﬁed mixed strategy for Alice cannot be part of a PBE of the 3-stage D
game.
168Step 3: By the results of step 1 and 2, there are four types of strategies that can possibly
be PBE strategies for Alice in the 3-stage D game. We discuss these four types of strategies
separately:
1. The truthful strategy is a possible PBE strategy for Alice in the 3-stage D game, as
stated in the theorem.
2. The delaying strategy is a possible PBE strategy for Alice in the 3-stage D game, as
stated in the theorem.
3. The third type of strategy is the mixed strategy given by the equation below where
r 6=P ( 1 ) .
 ai(P(1|ai)) = 1   p, ai(r)=p, a1 i(r)=1
where p =
P(a1 i)(r P(1|a1 i))
P(ai)(P(1|ai) r) and uai(P(1|ai)) = uai(r)i ss a t i s ﬁ e df o rs o m e
r 2 (mini P(1|ai),P(1)) [ (P(1),maxi P(1|ai)), 8i =0 ,1.
For the above strategy to be a PBE strategy, the following necessary condition must
be satisﬁed.
uai(P(1|ai)) = uai(r
⇤),
where um(r) denotes Alice’s ex-ante expected payo↵ by using this mixed strategy
in the ﬁrst stage of a PBE of the 3-stage D game and r⇤ =a r g m a x r um(r),r 2
(mini P(1|ai),P(1)) [ (P(1),maxi P(1|ai)).
We will show that
u
0
m(r
⇤)=0) uai(P(1|ai)) = uai(r
⇤)
169The expression of um(r)a n di t sﬁ r s td e r i v a t i v ea r ea sf o l l o w s :
um(r)=P ( ai)
✓
1  
P(a1 i)(r   P(1|a1 i))
P(ai)(P(1|ai)   r)
◆
uai(P(1|ai))
+P ( ai)
P(a1 i)(r   P(1|a1 i))
P(ai)(P(1|ai)   r)
uai(r)+P ( a1 i)ua1 i(r)
) u
0
m(r)=P ( a1 i)(P(1|ai)   P(1|a1 i))
uai(r)   uai(P(1|ai))
(P(1|ai)   r)2
By the distinguishability condition, we know that P(1|ai)   P(1|a1 i) 6=0 .T h e r e f o r e ,
we have
u
0
m(r)=0) uai(r)   uai(P(1|ai)) = 0
4. The ﬁnal type of strategy is the mixed strategy deﬁned below:
9!r 2 (P(1|a0),P(1|a1)),p2 (0,1),q2 (0,1),
s.t.  a0(P(1|a0)) = 1   p, a0(r)=p, a1(r)=q, a1(P(1|a1)) = 1   q (A.11)
For this mixed strategy, we observe that, if Alice uses this strategy in a PBE of the
3-stage D game, then there must also exist a PBE of where Alice uses the truthful
strategy in the ﬁrst stage. So we include this mixed strategy as a special case when
the truthful PBE exists for this game.
A.1.7 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. To show that Alice’s strategy and Bob’s strategy form a PBE of the 3-stage D game,
we need to prove 3 things below.
1. First, we show that Bob’s belief on the equilibrium path is derived from Alice’s strategy
using Bayes’ rule.
If Alice reports P(1|ai)i nt h eﬁ r s ts t a g e ,t h e nB o b ’ sb e l i e fs h o u l da s s i g np r o b a b i l i t y
1701 to Alice’s signal ai.T h u s ,B o b s t r a t e g y m u s t b e t o c h a n g e t h e m a r k e t p r o b a b i l i t y
to P(1|ai,s B)i nt h es e c o n ds t a g ei fh er e c e i v e ssB signal. By deﬁnition of xsB(r)i n
equation (3.14), we can easily check that
xsB(P(1|ai)) = P(1|ai,s B)
This means that Bob’s belief satisﬁes this requirement.
2. Next, we show that Bob’s belief is valid,
i.e. xsB(r) 2 [minai P(1|ai,s B),maxai P(1|ai,s B)],8sB.
First notice that xsB(r)i sm o n o t o n i ci nr since the sign of xsB(r)d o e sn o td e p e n do n
the value of r.
x
0
sB(r)=
(P(1|a0,s B)   P(1|a1,s B))P(a0|sB)P(a1|sB)P(a0)P(a1)(P(1|a0)   P(1|a1))
[P(a0|sB)P(a1)   P(a1|sB)P(a0)]r +[ P ( a1|sB)P(1,a 0)   P(a0|sB)P(1,a 1)]2
Thus, xsB(r)a c h i e v e si t sm a x i m u ma n dm i n i m u ma tr =P ( 1 |ai). So we just need to
check the value of xsB(P(1|ai)) 2 [minai P(1|ai,s B),maxai P(1|ai,s B)],8i =0 ,1. From
the argument above, we have xsB(P(1|ai)) = P(1|ai,s B)a n di t ’ sw i t h i nt h es p e c i ﬁ e d
range. Thus, Bob’s belief is valid.
3. Finally, we prove that given Bob’s strategy in the second stage, Alice maximizes her
total expected payo↵ by reporting P(1|ai)w h e ns h er e c e i v e st h eai signal. When Alice
receives the signal ai and reports r,h e rt o t a le x p e c t e dp a y o ↵i sg i v e nb yuai(r). By our
assumption, uai(r)i sm o n o t o n i c a l l yd e c r e a s i n ga sr changes from P(1|ai)t oP ( 1 |a1 i).
Thus, when Alice receives the ai signal, her total expected payo↵ is uniquely maximized
by reporting P(1|ai).
171A.2 Omitted Derivations
A.2.1 Derivation for the expression of uai(r)
Let   be Alice’s ﬁrst-stage strategy in any PBE of the 3-stage D game and let r be any
report in the support of  .S i n c e  and r satisfy the consistency condition, we must have
P(1|r, )=r
)
P(1|a0) a0(r)P(a0)+P ( 1 |a1) a1(r)P(a1)
P(a0) a0(r)+P ( a1) a1(r)
= r
) a0(r)P(a0)(P(1|a0)   r)= a1(r)P(a1)(r   P(1|a1)) (A.12)
By the consistency condition, it’s easy to see that r 2 [minai{P(1|ai)},maxai{P(1|ai)}].
By equation (A.12), we have
 a0(r)P(a0)(P(1|a0)   r)+ a0(r)P(a1)(r   P(1|a1))
=  a0(r)P(a1)(r   P(1|a1)) +  a1(r)P(a1)(r   P(1|a1))
) a0(r)(P(a0)(P(1|a0)   r)+P ( a1)(r   P(1|a1)))
=(  a0(r)+ a1(r))P(a1)(r   P(1|a1))
)
 a0(r)
 a0(r)+ a1(r)
=
P(a1)(r   P(1|a1))
P(a0)(P(1|a0)   r)+P ( a1)(r   P(1|a1))
(A.13)
At any PBE, Bob’s belief on the equilibrium path is derived from Alice’s strategy by
using the Bayes’ rule. Since Alice only has 2 realized signals, it su ces to specify µr,sB(a0)
since µr,sB(a1)=1  µr,sB(a0). Bob’s belief can be derived as follows:
µr,sB(a0)=
P(a0,r|sB)
P(r|sB)
=
P(a0|sB) a0(r)
P(a0|sB) a0(r)+P ( a1|sB) a1(r)
(A.14)
Taking equation (A.13) and plugging into equation (A.14), we have
µr,sB(a0)=
P(a0|sB)P(a1)(r   P(1|a1))
(P(a0|sB)P(a1)   P(a1|sB)P(a0))r +( P ( a1|sB)P(1,a 0)   P(a0|sB)P(1,a 1))
(A.15)
172At any PBE, Bob’s strategy xsB(r) is fully determined given Bob’s belief, Bob’s signal,
and Alice’s report, as follows:
xsB(r)=P ( 1 |r,sB)=µr,sB(a0)P(1|a0,s B)+( 1  µr,sB(a0))P(1|a1,s B) (A.16)
Plugging the expression of Bob’s belief (A.15) into the deﬁnition of Bob’s strategy (A.16),
we have
xsB(r)=
P(1,s B|a0)(P(1|a1)   r)+P ( 1 ,s B|a1)(r   P(1|a0))
P(sB|a0)(P(1|a1)   r)+P ( sB|a1)(r   P(1|a0))
Finally, we can write down the expression of uai(r)a sf o l l o w s .
uai(r)= P ( 1 |ai)log
r
P(1)
+P ( 0 |ai)log
1   r
1   P(1)
+
X
sB
⇢
P(1,s B|ai)log
P(1|ai,s B)
xsB(r)
+P ( 0 ,s B|ai)log
P(0|ai,s B)
1   xsB(r)
 
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Appendix to Chapter 4
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The partial derivative of the loss function with respect to rA is
@
@rA
L(fai,;,r A)=
rA   fai,;
rA(1   rA)
. (B.1)
It is negative for rA <f ai,;,z e r of o rrA = fai,; and positive for rA >f ai,;.T h u s , t h e l o s s
function is strictly increasing for rA 2 [fai,;,1) and strictly decreasing for rA 2 (0,f ai,;]. In
addition, note that L(fai,;,r A) !1as rA ! 0o rrA ! 1f o ra n yﬁ x e dfai,;. Hence, the loss
function has the range [0,1)f o rb o t hrA 2 [fai,;,1) and rA 2 (0,f ai,;].
The partial derivative of the loss function with respect to fai,; is
@
@fai,;
L(fai,;,r A) = log
✓
fai,;
1   fai,;
1   rA
rA
◆
. (B.2)
It equals zero when fai,; = rA, negative when fai,; <r A and positive when fai,; >r A.
Therefore, for a ﬁxed rA 2 [0,1], L(fai,;,r A)i ss t r i c t l yd e c r e a s i n gf o rfai,; 2 [0,r A]a n d
strictly increasing for fai,; 2 [rA,1].
174B.2 Example 2
Example 2. Suppose the outside payo↵ function is Q(rB)=rB, and the prior distribution
is given by Table B.1.
⌦=1 ⌦=0
SA = H SA = T SA = H SA = T
SB = H 0.54 0.054 SB = H 0 0.006
SB = T 0.036 0 SB = T 0.324 0.04
Table B.1: An example prior distribution. Each cell gives the value of P(⌦,S A,S B)f o rt h e
corresponding realizations of ⌦, SA,a n dSB.
It is easy to compute fH,; =0 .64, fT,; =0 .54, fH,H =1 , fH,T =0 .1, fT,H =0 .9, and
fT,T =0 .
Alice’s expected loss in market scoring rule payo↵ when receiving the T signal but changing
the market probability to fH,; is
L(fT,;,f H,;)=fT,; log
fT,;
fH,;
+(1 fT,;)log
1   fT,;
1   fH,;
=
✓
0.54log
0.54
0.64
+0 .46log
0.46
0.36
◆
⇡ 0.021.
(B.3)
Alice’s expected gain in outside payo↵ when receiving the T signal but convincing Bob that
she has the H signal is
ESB[Q(fH,SB)   Q(fT,SB) | SA = T]
=P(SB = H|SA = T)(fH,H   fT,H)+P(SB = T|SA = T)(fH,T   fT,T)
=0.6(1   0.9) + 0.4(0.1   0) (B.4)
=0.1. (B.5)
It is clear that L(fT,;,f H,;) <E SB[Q(fH,SB)   Q(fT,SB) | SA = T]. Thus, inequality (4.4) is
satisﬁed and a truthful PBE does not exist.
In addition to the above derivation, we note that even though a truthful PBE does not
exist for this example, a separating PBE does exist. The intuition behind this can be shown
175by calculating and comparing the quantities YH, YT, and fH,;, as illustrated below. We solve
for YT by solving the following equation:
L(fT,;,Y T)=ESB[Q(fH,SB)   Q(fT,SB) | SA = T]( B . 6 )
)0.54log
0.54
YT
+0 .46log
0.46
1   YT
=0 .1( B . 7 )
)YT ⇡ 0.747 (B.8)
Similarly, we solve for YH below:
L(fH,;,Y H)=ESB[Q(fH,SB)   Q(fT,SB) | SA = H]( B . 9 )
)0.64log
0.64
YH
+0 .36log
0.36
1   YH
=0 .1( B . 1 0 )
)YH ⇡ 0.827 (B.11)
The above calculations show that we have fH,; <Y T <Y H. Thus, a truthful PBE does not
exist because if Alice reports fH,; in the ﬁrst stage, then Bob will believe that there is positive
probability that Alice actually received a T signal but is trying to pretend that she received a
H signal, since fH,; <Y T. However, since YH >Y T, a separating equilibrium exists because
Alice can establish credibility with Bob by reporting any value in [YT,Y H] in the ﬁrst stage.
Lastly, note that this example illustrates a prior distribution for which the signals of
Alice and Bob are independent. In Proposition 4, we will prove that when Alice and Bob
have independent signals, YH >Y T must be satisﬁed.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. If fH,;   YT   fT,;   Y T,t h e ni ti se a s yt os e et h a tL(fH,;,Y T)  L(fH,;,Y  T)a n d
the equality holds only when YT = fT,; = Y T. The remainder of the proof focuses on the
case when fH,; <Y T.
176By deﬁnitions of YT and Y T,w eh a v e
L(fT,;,Y T)=L(fT,;,Y  T). (B.12)
By Proposition 1 and Y T  fT,; <f H,;,w eh a v e
L(fT,;,Y  T) <L (fH,;,Y  T). (B.13)
By Proposition 1 and fT,; <f H,;  YT,w eh a v e
L(fH,;,Y T) <L (fT,;,Y T). (B.14)
Hence, we must have L(fH,;,Y T) <L (fH,;,Y  T)d u et oe q u a t i o n( B . 1 2 )a n di n e q u a l i -
ties (B.13) and (B.14), as
L(fH,;,Y T) <L (fT,;,Y T)=L(fT,;,Y  T) <L (fH,;,Y  T). (B.15)
B.4 Example 3
Example 3. Consider the outside payo↵ function and the prior distribution in Table B.2.
We show below that there exists su ciently small ✏ such that YH <Y T.
⌦=1 ⌦=0
SA = H SA = T SA = H SA = T
SB = H ✏ ✏ SB = H 0 0.5   2✏
SB = T ✏ 0 SB = T 0.5   2✏ ✏
Table B.2: An example prior distribution with ✏ 2 (0,0.25). Each cell gives the value of
P(⌦,S A,S B)f o rt h ec o r r e s p o n d i n gr e a l i z a t i o n so f⌦ ,SA,a n dSB.
It is easy to compute fH,; =4 ✏, fT,; =2 ✏, fH,H =1 , fH,T = ✏
0.5 ✏, fT,H = ✏
0.5 ✏, and
177fT,T =0 . With this, we can calculate
L(fH,;,Y H)= ESB[Q(fH,SB)   Q(fT,SB) | SA = H]
=P(SB = H|SA = H)(fH,H   fT,H)+P(SB = T|SA = H)(fH,T   fT,T)
=(2✏)
✓
1  
✏
0.5   ✏
◆
+( 1  2✏)
✓
✏
0.5   ✏
  0
◆
.
As ✏ approaches 0, we have
lim
✏!0L(fH,;,Y H)=0 . (B.16)
Because lim✏!0 fH,; =l i m ✏!0 4✏ =0 , by deﬁnition of L(fH,;,Y H), (B.16) implies that
lim
✏!0YH =0 . (B.17)
Similarly, we have
L(fT,;,Y T)= ESB[Q(fH,SB)   Q(fT,SB) | SA = T]
=P(SB = H|SA = T)(fH,H   fT,H)+P(SB = T|SA = T)(fH,T   fT,T)
=(1   2✏)
✓
1  
✏
0.5   ✏
◆
+2 ✏
✓
✏
0.5   ✏
  0
◆
.
As ✏ approaches 0, we have
lim
✏!0L(fT,;,Y T)=1 . (B.18)
Because lim✏!0 fT,; =l i m ✏!0 2✏ =0 , by deﬁnition of L(fT,;,Y T),
lim
✏!0L(fT,;,Y T)= log(1   lim
✏!0YT).
Given (B.18), we have
lim
✏!0YT =1  1/e. (B.19)
Combining (B.17) and (B.19), we know that when ✏ is su ciently small, YH <Y T.
In addition to the above derivation, we describe some qualitative properties of the given
prior distribution, which may be helpful in highlighting the intuitions behind the YH <Y T
condition. For this prior distribution, Alice is willing to report a higher value after receiving
178the T signal due to the combined e↵ect of two factors. First, note that when Alice has the T
signal, Bob is far more likely to have the H signal than the T signal for su ciently small ✏.
This is shown by
lim
✏!0P(SB = H|SA = T)=l i m
✏!0(1   2✏)=1 , (B.20)
lim
✏!0P(SB = T|SA = T)=l i m
✏!02✏ =0 . (B.21)
Second, Alice’s maximum gain in outside payo↵ when she has the T signal but manages to
convince Bob that she has the H signal is much higher when Bob has the H signal than when
he has the T signal for su ciently small ✏. When Bob has the H signal, the maximum gain
for Alice is
lim
✏!0
(fHH   fTH)=l i m
✏!0
(1  
✏
0.5   ✏
)=1 , (B.22)
which is greater than the maximum gain for Alice when Bob has the T signal,
lim
✏!0(fHT   fTT)=l i m
✏!0(
✏
0.5   ✏
  0) = 0. (B.23)
Thus, when Alice has the T signal, Bob is more likely to have the H signal, resulting in a
higher expected gain in outside payo↵ for Alice by convincing Bob that she has the H signal.
This intuitively explains why YT is high.
In Example 2, we describe a prior distribution and outside function and show that a
truthful PBE does not exist when fH,; <Y T  YH. Note that guaranteeing fH,; <Y T  YH
is not the only way for a truthful PBE to fail to exist. For instance, this example shows that,
when fH,;  YH <Y T, a truthful PBE also fails to exist.
B.5 Proof of Theorem 9
Proof. If YT   fH,;,t h ei n t e r v a l[ m a x ( Y H,Y T),Y H]c a nb ew r i t t e na s[ m a x ( fH,;,Y T),Y H]
because Y H  fH,;.I fYT <f H,;,t h ei n t e r v a l[ m a x ( Y H,Y T),Y H]c a nb es p l i ti n t ot w oi n t e r -
179vals [max(Y H,Y T),f H,;)a n d[ m a x ( fH,;,Y T),Y H]. In the following, we ﬁrst consider the case
rA 2 [max(fH,;,Y T),Y H]; then, for YT <f H,;,w ec o n s i d e rt h ec a s erA 2 [max(Y H,Y T),f H,;).
First, suppose that Alice reports rA 2 [max(fH,;,Y T),Y H]a f t e rr e c e i v i n gt h eH signal.
Fix a particular k 2 [max(fH,;,Y T),Y H]. We prove that the following pair of Alice’s strategy
and Bob’s belief forms a separating PBE of our game:
SE2(k):
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
 S
H(k)=1 , S
T(fT,;)=1
µS
sB,rA(H)=
8
> > <
> > :
1, if rA 2 [k,1]
0, if rA 2 [0,k)
.
(B.24)
We’ll show that Alice’s strategy is optimal given Bob’s belief. If Alice receives the T
signal, she does not report any rA >Y T by deﬁnition of YT.S h em a yb ei n d i ↵ e r e n tb e t w e e n
reporting YT and fT,;.F o ra n yrA <Y T,w eh a v erA <kand Bob’s belief sets µS
sB,rA(H)=0
for any rA <k .S of o rrA <Y T,r e p o r t i n grA = fT,; dominates reporting any other value.
Thus, it is optimal for Alice to report fT,; when having the T signal.
If Alice receives the H signal, according to the deﬁnitions of Y H and YH,s h ew o u l do n l y
report values in [Y H,Y H]. Given Bob’s belief, Alice would only report some rA 2 [k,YH].
Because fH,;  k, Alice maximizes her expected market scoring rule payo↵ by reporting
rA = k for any rA 2 [k,YH]. Therefore, it is optimal for Alice to report rA = k after
receiving the H signal.
We can show that Bob’s belief is consistent with Alice’s strategy by mechanically apply-
ing Bayes’ rule (argument omitted). Hence, for each k 2 [max(YT,f H,;),Y H], SE2(k)i sa
separating PBE of our game.
Next, we assume YT <f H,; and consider that Alice reports rA 2 [max(Y H,Y T),f H,;)
after receiving the H signal. For every k 2 [max(Y H,Y T),f H,;), we prove that the following
180pair of Alice’s strategy and Bob’s belief forms a separating PBE of our game:
SE3(k):
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
 S
H(k)=1 , S
T(fT,;)=1
µS
sB,rA(H)=
8
> > <
> > :
1, if rA = k
0, if rA 2 [0,k) [ (k,1]
. (B.25)
We’ll show that Alice’s strategy is optimal given Bob’s belief. If Alice receives the T
signal, she does not report any rA >Y T by deﬁnition of YT and is at best indi↵erent between
reporting YT and reporting fT,;.F o ra n yrA 2 [0,Y T), Bob’s belief sets µS
sB,rA(H)=0s i n c e
k   YT.F o ra n yrA 2 [0,Y T), Alice maximizes her expected market scoring rule payo↵ by
reporting rA = fT,;. Thus, it is optimal for Alice to report fT,; when having the T signal.
If Alice receives the H signal, for any rA 2 [0,1]\{k}, Alice maximizes her expected
market scoring rule payo↵ by reporting fH,;. By deﬁnition, we know that Y H  k<f H,;.
Given Bob’s belief
L(fH,;,k)  L(fH,;,Y  H)=ESB[Q(fH,SB)   Q(fT,SB) | ai]( B . 2 6 )
By switching from reporting fH,; to reporting k, Alice’s expected gain in outside payo↵ is
greater than or equal to her loss in her expected market scoring rule payo↵. So she weakly
prefers reporting k to reporting fH,;. By enforcing the consistency with Bob’s belief, Alice’s
strategy must be to report k after receiving the H signal.
We can show that Bob’s belief is consistent with Alice’s strategy by mechanically applying
Bayes’ rule (argument omitted). Hence, if YT <f H,;,f o re a c hk 2 [max(Y H,Y T),f H,;),
SE3(k)i sas e p a r a t i n gP B Eo ft h i sg a m e .
181B.6 Proof of Theorem 10
Proof. If Y H  Y T,f o re v e r yk 2 [Y H,Y  T], we prove the following pair of Alice’s strategy
and Bob’s belief forms a separating PBE of our game:
SE4(k):
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
 S
H(k)=1 , S
T(fT,;)=1
µS
sB,rA(H)=
8
> > <
> > :
0, if rA 2 (k,1]
1, if rA 2 [0,k]
.
(B.27)
We’ll show that Alice’s strategy is optimal given Bob’s belief. If Alice receives the T
signal, she does not report any rA <Y  T by deﬁnition of YT and is at best indi↵erent
between reporting Y T and fT,;.F o ra n yrA >Y  T, because Bob’s belief sets µS
sB,rA(H)=0 ,
reporting fT,; dominates reporting any other value in this range. Thus, it is optimal for
Alice to report fT,; when having the T signal.
If Alice receives the H signal, for any rA 2 (k,1], Alice maximizes her expected market
scoring rule payo↵ by reporting rA = fH,;.F o r a n y rA 2 [Y H,k], Alice maximizes her
expected market scoring rule payo↵ by reporting rA = k.B y d e ﬁ n i t i o n o f Y H, Alice is
better o↵ reporting k than reporting fH,; since
L(fH,;,k)  L(fH,;,Y  H)=ESB[Q(fH,SB)   Q(fT,SB) | ai]( B . 2 8 )
Therefore, it is optimal for Alice to report k after receiving the H signal.
We can show that Bob’s belief is consistent with Alice’s strategy by mechanically applying
Bayes’ rule (argument omitted). Hence, if Y H  Y T,f o re v e r yk 2 [Y H,Y  T], SE4(k)i s
as e p a r a t i n gP B E .
B.7 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. The existence of a separating PBE requires YH   YT by Theorem 8. By Lemma 5,
we have  T(fT,;)=1a ta n ys e p a r a t i n gP B E .
182By Theorem 9, for every rA 2 [max(Y H,Y T),Y H], there exists a pure strategy separating
PBE in which Alice reports rA with probability 1 after receiving the H signal. Now suppose
that Bob’s belief satisﬁes the domination-based reﬁnement. Consider 2 cases.
(1) Assume that fH,; >Y T. Then we must have fH,; 2 [max(Y H,Y T),Y H]. By Lemma 8,
Bob’s belief must set µsB,fH,;(T)=0 .T h u s ,r e p o r t i n gfH,; is strictly optimal for Alice since
reporting fH,; strictly maximizes Alice’s expected market scoring rule payo↵ and weakly
maximizes Alice’s expected outside payo↵. Therefore, there are no longer pure strategy
separating PBE in which Alice reports rA 2 [max(Y H,Y T),Y H]\{fH,;} after receiving the
H signal.
(2) Assume that fH,;  YT.T h e nw em u s th a v eY H <Y T,a n dt h ei n t e r v a l
[max(Y H,Y T),Y H]c a nb er e d u c e dt o[ YT,Y H]. By Lemma 8, Bob’s belief must set
µsB,rA(T)=0f o ra n yrA 2 (YT,Y H]. If Alice receives the H signal, given Bob’s belief, Alice
would not report any rA 2 (YT,Y H]b e c a u s et h e r ea l w a y se x i s t sar0
A 2 (YT,r A)s u c ht h a t
reporting r0
A is strictly better than reporting rA for Alice. Therefore, there no longer exist
pure strategy separating PBE in which Alice reports rA 2 [max(Y H,Y T),Y H]\{YT} after
receiving the H signal.
Hence, Alice would not report rA 2 [max(Y H,Y T),Y H]\max(fH,;,Y T) after receiving the
H signal at any separating PBE satisfying the domination-based belief reﬁnement.
By Theorem 10, if YH   YT and Y H  Y T,f o re v e r yrA 2 [Y H,Y  T], there exists a
pure strategy separating PBE in which Alice reports rA with probability 1 after receiving the
H signal. By Lemma 8, Bob’s belief must set µsB,rA(T)=0f o ra n yrA 2 [Y H,Y  T). Then,
if Alice receives the H signal, given Bob’s belief, Alice would not report any rA 2 [Y H,Y  T)
because there always exists a r0
A 2 (rA,Y  T)s u c ht h a tr e p o r t i n gr0
A is strictly better than
reporting rA for Alice.
Also, Alice would not report Y T after receiving the H signal for the following reasons.
We consider 2 cases. If fH,;   YT, then Alice’s market scoring rule payo↵ is strictly better
by reporting fH,; than reporting Y T.O t h e r w i s e , i f fH,; <Y T,w ek n o wt h a tY T <Y T
183and hence, by Proposition 3, L(fH,;,Y  T) <L (fH,;,Y T). Consider rA = YT + ✏ for a
small ✏>0s u c ht h a tL(fH,;,Y  T) >L (fH,;,r A). Such an ✏ must exist because as ✏ ! 0,
L(fH,;,r A) ! L(fH,;,Y T). Alice’s market scoring rule payo↵ is strictly better by reporting
rA than reporting Y T.G i v e nB o b ’ sb e l i e f ,w ek n o wt h a tµsB,rA(T)=0a n dµsB,Y T(T)   0.
So Alice’s outside payo↵ is weakly better when reporting rA than reporting Y T.T h e r e f o r e ,
reporting rA = YT + ✏ strictly dominates reporting Y T.
Hence, there are no longer pure strategy separating PBE in which Alice reports rA 2
[Y H,Y  T]a f t e rr e c e i v i n gt h eH signal.
It remains to show that there exists a belief for Bob satisfying the reﬁnement so that
Alice’s strategy  H(max(fH,;,Y T)) = 1,  T(fT,;)=1a n dB o b ’ sb e l i e ff o r maP B E .I ti s
straightforward to verify that Bob’s belief in the PBE SE1 described in (4.11) is such a
belief.
B.8 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Let r be the unique value in [0,f H,;]s a t i s f y i n gL(fH,;,r)=L(fH,;,Y T). Consider a
PBE satisfying the domination-based reﬁnement. We will show that there exists an ✏>0
such that if Alice receives the H signal, then reporting any rA  r is strictly worse than
reporting YT + ✏.
By deﬁnition of r,w eh a v et h a tL(fH,;,r A)   L(fH,;,r)=L(fH,;,Y T),8rA  r.W e
consider 2 cases.
(1) rA <r :C h o o s ea n y0<✏<r  rA,t h e nw em u s th a v eL(fH,;,r A) >L (fH,;,r 
✏)=L(fH,;,Y T + ✏). Since the PBE satisﬁes the domination-based reﬁnement, then Bob’s
belief must set µsB,rA(T)=0 ,8rA 2 (YT,Y H]. Alice’s expected outside payo↵ by reporting
YT +✏ is weakly better than her expected outside payo↵ by reporting rA.T h e r e f o r e ,f o ra n y
✏ 2 (0,r  rA), Alice is strictly worse o↵ reporting any rA <rthan reporting YT + ✏.
(2) rA = r:F o ra n ys m a l l✏>0, we have that L(fH,;,r) <L (fH,;,Y T + ✏). However as
184✏ ! 0, L(fH,;,Y T +✏) L(fH,;,r) ! 0. Since r<f H,; <Y T, if Alice reports r after receiving
H signal at any PBE, then Bob’s belief must set µsB,r(T) > 0. Since the PBE satisﬁes the
domination-based reﬁnement, then Bob’s belief must set µsB,YT+✏(T)=0 ,forany0 <✏
YH YT.R e g a r d l e s so f✏, Alice’s expected outside payo↵ by reporting YT +✏ is strictly better
than her expected outside payo↵ by reporting r. However, as ✏ approaches 0, the di↵erence
between Alice’s expected market scoring rule payo↵ for these two reports goes to 0. Hence,
there must exist ✏>0 such that Alice’s total expected payo↵ by reporting r is strictly less
than her total expected payo↵ by reporting YT + ✏.
B.9 Proof of Theorem 16
Proof. We will show that among all pure strategy separating PBE of our game, Bob’s ex-
pected payo↵ is maximized in SE2(YH), deﬁned in equation (B.24).
In all separating PBE, the sum of Alice and Bob’s expected payo↵s inside the market
is the same. Thus, the separating PBE that maximizes Bob’s payo↵ is also the separating
PBE that minimizes Alice’s payo↵.
By Lemma 5, in any separating PBE, Alice must report fT,; after receiving the T signal.
Therefore, Alice’s expected payo↵ after receiving the T signal is the same at any separating
PBE.
For any separating PBE, Alice may report r 2 [Y H,Y H]a f t e rr e c e i v i n gt h eH signal.
In [Y H,Y H], reporting YH or Y H maximizes Alice’s loss in her market scoring rule payo↵
and thus minimizes Alice’s expected payo↵ after receiving the H signal. Reporting YH
corresponds to the separating PBE SE2(YH)a n dr e po r t i n gY H corresponds to the separating
PBE SE4(Y H).
If Y H  Y T,t h es e p a r a t i n gP B ESE4(Y H)e x i s t s ,b yt h ep r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 0i n
Appendix B.6. We know that Y H  Y T implies YH   YT by the proof of Theorem 8.
Thus, when the separating PBE SE4(Y H)e x i s t s ,t h es e p a r a t i n gP B ESE2(YH)a l s oe x i s t s
185and Alice’s total expected payo↵ at these two separating PBE are the same.
If Y H >Y  T,t h es e p a r a t i n gP B ESE4(Y H) does not exist. However, if any separating
PBE exists, then we must have YH   YT,a n dt h es e p a r a t i n gP B ESE2(YH)m u s te x i s t .
Hence, the separating PBE SE2(YH) maximizes Bob’s expected payo↵ among all sepa-
rating PBE of our game.
B.10 Proof of Theorem 17
Proof. Su cient condition
First, we show that satisfying at least one of the two pairs of inequalities is a su cient
condition for a separating PBE to exist for our game.
If inequalities (4.29) and (4.30) are satisﬁed, we can show that SE5 is a separating PBE
of our game.
SE5 :
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
 S
H(max(YT,f H,;)) = 1, S
T(fT,;)=1
µS
sB,rA(H)=
8
> > <
> > :
1, if rA 2 [YT,1]
0, if rA 2 [0,Y T)
.
(B.29)
First, we show that Alice’s strategy is optimal given Bob’s belief. Since inequality (4.29)
is satisﬁed, YT is a well deﬁned value in [fT,;,1]. If fH,; <Y T, then it is optimal for Alice
to report YT after receiving the H signal because her gain in outside payo↵ is greater than
her loss in the market scoring rule payo↵ by inequality (4.30). Otherwise, if fH,;   YT,t h e n
it’s optimal for Alice to report fH,; after receiving the H signal. Therefore, Alice’s optimal
strategy after receiving the H signal is to report max(fH,;,Y T). When Alice receives the T
signal, Alice would not report any rA   YT by deﬁnition of YT. Any other report rA 2 [0,Y T)
is dominated by a report of fT,; given Bob’s belief. Therefore, it is optimal for Alice to report
fT,; after receiving the T signal. Moreover, we can show that Bob’s belief is consistent with
Alice’s strategy by mechanically applying Bayes’ rule (argument omitted). Given the above
arguments, SE5 is a separating PBE of this game.
186Similarly, if inequalities (4.31) and (4.32) are satisﬁed, then we can show that SE6 is a
separating PBE of our game.
SE6 :
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
 S
H(Y T)=1 , S
T(fT,;)=1
µS
sB,rA(H)=
8
> > <
> > :
0, if rA 2 (Y T,1]
1, if rA 2 [0,Y  T]
.
(B.30)
First, we show that Alice’s strategy is optimal given Bob’s belief. Since inequality (4.31)
is satisﬁed, Y T is well deﬁned. If Alice receives the H signal, reporting any rA 2 [0,Y  T]
gives her higher outside payo↵ than reporting any rA 2 (Y T,1]. For any rA 2 [0,Y  T], her
outside payo↵ is ﬁxed and reporting rA = Y T maximizes her market scoring rule payo↵.
Therefore, it is optimal for Alice to report rA = Y T after receiving the H signal. If Alice
receives the T signal, she does not report any rA <Y  T by deﬁnition of Y T.G i v e nB o b ’ s
belief, she is indi↵erent between reporting Y T and fT,;.F o ra n yrA >Y  T,B o b ’ sb e l i e fs e t s
µS
sB,rA(H) = 0, so it is optimal for Alice to report fT,; to maximize her market scoring rule
payo↵. We can show that Bob’s belief is consistent with Alice’s strategy by mechanically
applying Bayes’ rule (argument omitted). Hence, SE6 is a separating PBE of our game.
Necessary condition
Second, we show that, if there exists a separating PBE of our game, then at least one
of the two pairs of inequalities must be satisﬁed. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose
that there exists a separating PBE of our game but at least one of the two inequalities in
each of the two pairs of inequalities is violated.
Suppose that at least one of the inequalities (4.29) and (4.30) is violated. Then, we can
show that Alice does not report any value rA 2 [fT,;,1] after receiving the H signal at any
separating PBE. We divide the argument for this into 2 cases.
(1) If inequality (4.29) is violated, we know that YT is not well deﬁned. We show by
contradiction that Alice does not report any value in [fT,;,1] after receiving the H signal.
187Suppose that at a separating PBE, Alice reports rA 2 [fT,;,1] with positive probability after
receiving the H signal. Since this PBE is separating, Bob’s belief must be that µsB,rA(H)=1
to be consistent with Alice’s strategy. By Lemma 5, in any separating PBE, Bob’s belief
must be µsB,fT,;(H) = 0 and Alice must report fT,; after receiving the T signal. Since
inequality (4.29) is violated, then we have that
Ls(fT,;,r A)  Ls(fT,;,1) <E SB[Q(fH,SB)   Q(fT,SB) | SA = T], (B.31)
so Alice would strictly prefer to report rA rather than fT,; after receiving the T signal, which
is a contradiction.
(2) Otherwise, if inequality (4.29) is satisﬁed but inequality (4.30) is violated, then we
know that YT is well deﬁned. If fH,;   YT, then inequality (4.30) is automatically satisﬁed,
so we must have that fH,; <Y T and Ls(fH,;,Y T) >E SB[Q(fH,SB)   Q(fT,SB) | SA = H].
Then Alice does not report any rA 2 [YT,1] after receiving the H signal because doing so is
dominated by reporting fH,;. Next, we can show by contradiction that Alice does not report
any rA 2 [fT,;,Y T)a f t e rr e c e i v i n gt h eH signal at any separating PBE. Suppose that at any
separating PBE, Alice reports rA 2 [fT,;,Y T)w i t hp o s i t i v ep r o b a b i l i t ya f t e rr e c e i v i n gt h eH
signal. Since this PBE is separating, Bob’s belief must be that µsB,rA(H)=1t ob ec o n s i s t e n t
with Alice’s strategy. By Lemma 5, in any separating PBE, Alice must report fT,; after
receiving the T signal and Bob’s belief must be µsB,fT,;(H)=0 .T h u s ,f o rrA 2 (Y T,Y T),
by deﬁnitions of YT and Y T, Alice would strictly prefer to report rA rather than fT,; after
receiving the T signal, which is a contradiction.
Hence, if at least one of the inequalities (4.29) and (4.30) is violated, then at any sepa-
rating PBE, Alice does not report any rA 2 [fT,;,1] after receiving the H signal.
Similarly, we can show that, if at least one of the inequalities (4.31) and (4.32) is violated,
Alice does not report any value rA 2 [0,f T,;]a f t e rr e c e i v i n gt h eH signal at any separating
PBE. We again consider 2 cases:
(1) If inequality (4.31) is violated, we know that Y T is not well deﬁned. Then we can
188show that Alice does not report any value in [0,f T,;]a f t e rr e c e i v i n gt h eH signal. We prove
by contradiction. Suppose that at a separating PBE, Alice reports rA 2 [0,f T,;]w i t hp o s i t i v e
probability after receiving the H signal. Since this PBE is separating, Bob’s belief must be
that µsB,rA(H) = 1 to be consistent with Alice’s strategy. By Lemma 5, in any separating
PBE, Bob’s belief must be µsB,fT,;(H) = 0 and Alice must report fT,; after receiving the T
signal. Since inequality (4.31) is violated, we have that
Ls(fT,;,r A)  Ls(fT,;,;) <E SB[Q(fH,SB)   Q(fT,SB) | SA = T], (B.32)
so Alice would strictly prefer to report rA rather than fT,; after receiving the T signal, which
is a contradiction.
(2) Otherwise, if inequality (4.31) is satisﬁed but inequality (4.32) is violated, then we
know that Y T is well deﬁned. Also, we must have that Ls(fH,;,Y  T) >E SB[Q(fH,SB)  
Q(fT,SB) | SA = H]. Then Alice does not report any rA 2 [0,Y  T]a f t e rr e c e i v i n gt h eH
signal because doing so is dominated by reporting fH,;. Next, We can show by contradiction
that at any separating PBE, Alice does not report any rA 2 (Y T,f T,;]a f t e rr e c e i v i n g
the H signal. Suppose that at any separating PBE, Alice reports rA 2 (Y T,f T,;]w i t h
positive probability after receiving the H signal. Since this PBE is separating, Bob’s belief
must be that µsB,rA(H) = 1 to be consistent with Alice’s strategy. By Lemma 5, in any
separating PBE, Alice must report fT,; after receiving the T signal and Bob’s belief must be
µsB,fT,;(H)=0 .T h u s ,f o rrA 2 (Y T,Y T), by deﬁnitions of YT and Y T, Alice would strictly
prefer to report rA rather than fT,; after receiving the T signal, which is a contradiction.
Hence, if at least one of the inequalities (4.31) and (4.32) is violated, in any separating
PBE, Alice does not report any rA 2 [0,f T,;]a f t e rr e c e i v i n gt h eH signal.
Therefore, if at least one of the two inequalities in the two pairs of inequalities is violated,
then at any separating PBE, Alice does not report any rA 2 [0,1] after receiving the H signal.
This contradicts our assumption that a separating PBE exists for our game.
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Appendix to Chapter 5
C.1 Estimated HMMs
i P(MM | MM) P(MM | GB) Pi
0 0.82 0.45 0.50
1 1.00 0.99 0.27
2 0.99 0.04 0.17
3 0.13 0.09 0.05
(a) States and initial probabilities.
j =0 j =1 j =2 j =3
i =0 0.89 0.08 0.02 0.01
i =1 0.01 0.99 0.00 0.00
i =2 0.01 0.02 0.96 0.01
i =3 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.97
(b) Transition probabilities.
Table C.1: Treatment 1 Estimated HMM (K =4 ) . P ( MM | MM)i st h ep r o b a b i l i t yo f
reporting MM given a MM signal. P(MM | GB) is the probability of reporting MM given a
GB signal. Pi is the initial probability of state i. The cell at row i and column j gives the
transition probability from state i to state j.
i P(MM | MM) P(MM | GB) Pi
0 0.96 0.01 0.33
1 0.99 0.99 0.04
2 0.01 0.00 0.14
3 0.61 0.31 0.49
(a) States and initial probabilities.
j =0 j =1 j =2 j =3
i =0 0.95 0.00 0.03 0.02
i =1 0.01 0.99 0.00 0.00
i =2 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
i =3 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.91
(b) Transition probabilities.
Table C.2: Treatment 2 Estimated HMM (K =4 ) . P ( MM | MM)i st h ep r o b a b i l i t yo f
reporting MM given a MM signal. P(MM | GB) is the probability of reporting MM given a
GB signal. Pi is the initial probability of state i. The cell at row i and column j gives the
transition probability from state i to state j.
190i P(MM | MM) P(MM | GB) Pi
0 0.97 0.06 0.23
1 0.87 0.97 0.07
2 0.02 0.03 0.06
3 0.54 0.42 0.64
(a) States and initial probabilities.
j =0 j =1 j =2 j =3
i =0 0.98 0.00 0.01 0.01
i =1 0.00 0.97 0.01 0.02
i =2 0.01 0.01 0.99 0.00
i =3 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.97
(b) Transition probabilities.
Table C.3: Treatment 3 Estimated HMM (K =4 ) . P ( MM | MM)i st h ep r o b a b i l i t yo f
reporting MM given a MM signal. P(MM | GB) is the probability of reporting MM given a
GB signal. Pi is the initial probability of state i. The cell at row i and column j gives the
transition probability from state i to state j.
i P(MM | MM) P(MM | GB) Pi
0 0.96 0.06 0.22
1 0.73 0.61 0.48
2 0.96 0.97 0.06
3 0.34 0.37 0.25
(a) States and initial probabilities.
j =0 j =1 j =2 j =3
i =0 0.97 0.02 0.00 0.01
i =1 0.01 0.97 0.03 0.00
i =2 0.00 0.01 0.98 0.00
i =3 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.97
(b) Transition probabilities.
Table C.4: Treatment 4 Estimated HMM (K =4 ) . P ( MM | MM)i st h ep r o b a b i l i t yo f
reporting MM given a MM signal. P(MM | GB) is the probability of reporting MM given a
GB signal. Pi is the initial probability of state i. The cell at row i and column j gives the
transition probability from state i to state j.
i P(MM | MM) P(MM | GB) Pi
0 0.98 0.02 0.65
1 0.02 0.00 0.02
2 0.16 0.96 0.01
3 0.68 0.34 0.33
(a) States and initial probabilities.
j =0 j =1 j =2 j =3
i =0 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
i =1 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.00
i =2 0.02 0.00 0.92 0.06
i =3 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.98
(b) Transition probabilities.
Table C.5: Non-Peer Prediction Treatment Estimated HMM (K =4 ) .P ( MM | MM)i st h e
probability of reporting MM given a MM signal. P(MM | GB)i st h ep r o b a b i l i t yo fr e p o r t i n g
MM given a GB signal. Pi is the initial probability of state i.T h ec e l la tr o wi and column
j gives the transition probability from state i to state j.
191Appendix D
Appendix to Chapter 6
0 20 40 60 80 100
−
0
.
5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
1
.
5
2
.
0
Iteration
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
S
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
"
G
o
l
d
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
"
 
s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
(a) Adaptive polling trial 1
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(b) Adaptive polling trial 2
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(c) Adaptive polling trial 3
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(d) Adaptive polling trial 4
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(e) Adaptive polling trial 5
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(f) Adaptive polling trial 6
Figure D.1: The dynamics of the estimated strength parameters for adaptive polling trials
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(a) Random polling trial 1
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(b) Random polling trial 2
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(c) Random polling trial 3
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(d) Random polling trial 4
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(e) Random polling trial 5
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(f) Random polling trial 6
Figure D.2: The dynamics of the estimated strength parameters for random polling trials
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